Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Ct. No. BC372286. Edward A. Ferns, Judge. Affirmed.
Phill J. Williams, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
McCurdy & Fuller, Kevin G. McCurdy and Rosemary J. Springer for Defendants and Respondents Church’s Chicken and Employers Insurance of Wausau.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Pro se plaintiff Phill Williams claims that he sustained injuries more than eight years ago after sitting in a defective booth at a Church’s Chicken (Church’s) restaurant in Louisiana. In three separate and successive actions, he sued Church’s and multiple insurance companies (collectively “Defendants”) in Louisiana state court, federal district court in Louisiana, and federal district court in California. All three courts entered judgment in favor of Defendants and the Louisiana Court of Appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgments respectively. Most recently, Williams sued Defendants in Los Angeles Superior Court. Pursuant to the Vexatious Litigants statute (Code of Civil Proc., § 391 et seq.), the trial court required Williams to furnish security in the amount of $20,000 to proceed with his action. Williams failed to post the bond and the trial court accordingly dismissed his complaint with prejudice. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In January 2000, Williams filed a “petition for damages” in Louisiana state court after he allegedly sustained injuries from sitting in a “defective” booth at a Church’s restaurant in New Iberia, Louisiana. He named Church’s and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company as defendants. Williams later amended his petition several times to add other defendants including Employers Insurance of Wausau and AFC Enterprises, Inc., the owner of the restaurant. In his amended petitions, Williams alleged that the two insurance companies conspired in bad faith to deny his third-party claim for damages.
Because Williams continued to sue the same entities in several other courts, we will refer to all the sued entities as Defendants for brevity.
In April 2002, the Sixteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Iberia granted a directed verdict for Defendants and entered judgment in their favor. The trial court concluded there was no evidence the booth was defective, and even assuming it was defective, there was no evidence that the restaurant had actual or constructive knowledge of the defective condition. “After hearing and reviewing all evidence in [the] matter,” the trial court concluded “that the law and the evidence [were] in favor of the defendants and against plaintiff.” Williams appealed the judgment to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in Defendants’ favor, holding “that the plaintiff’s proof fell woefully below his burden” and that “plaintiff did not establish the essential elements of his cause of action.” The Court of Appeal further characterized Williams’ allegations of conspiracy as mere “innuendos” unsupported by the record. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied Williams’ petition for review. Williams then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court rejected his petition as procedurally deficient.
In February 2004, Williams sued Defendants in the United States District Court in the Western District of Louisiana. Although this federal complaint included the same allegations made in the state complaint with additional allegations of conspiracy, federal constitutional violations, and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. § 1961), the gravamen of the complaint stemmed from the original incident at Church’s. Williams sought over $100 million in damages. The district court dismissed Williams’ complaint on the ground that he was essentially seeking review of a final state court judgment, and accordingly, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Williams’ complaint.
“[U]nder what has come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” (Lance v. Dennis (2006) 546 U.S. 459, 463.)
In July 2005, Williams sued Defendants in the United States District Court in the Central District of California. This second federal complaint included virtually the same allegations made in the previous state and federal complaints. The district court concluded that Williams’ claims were “clearly frivolous” and that his successive complaints in state and federal court were “improper” and amounted to “harassment.” The district court deemed Williams a “vexatious litigant” and issued an order prohibiting Williams from “fil[ing] any further actions relating to the allegations in his Complaint without first obtaining leave of court.” The district court dismissed Williams’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and the trial courts’ issuance of sanctions and vexatious litigant order.
In June 2007, without first obtaining leave of court, Williams sued Defendants in Los Angeles Superior Court. Again, this complaint mirrored the same allegations made in the previous Louisiana state complaint and the two federal complaints. This time, Williams sought over $60 million in damages. Defendants moved for a dismissal and contempt order based on Williams’ failure to obtain court leave before filing the present action. In the alternative, Defendants requested that the superior court stay the action until Williams furnished security in the amount of $20,000, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.1.
Section 391.1 provides: “In any litigation pending in any court of this state, at any time until final judgment is entered, a defendant may move the court, upon notice and hearing, for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish security. The motion must be based upon the ground, and supported by a showing, that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that there is not a reasonable probability that he will prevail in the litigation against the moving defendant.” (All subsequent section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.)
On August 1, 2007, the superior court granted Defendants’ motion in the alternative and issued an order “staying [the] action until plaintiff Phill Williams furnishes security in the amount of $20,000.” The superior court gave Williams 30 days to post the security. After Williams failed to post the required security, the superior court dismissed his complaint with prejudice pursuant to section 391.4. Williams timely appealed from the superior court’s dismissal order.
Section 391.4 provides: “When security that has been ordered furnished is not furnished as ordered, the litigation shall be dismissed as to the defendant for whose benefit it was ordered furnished.”
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review.
“A court exercises its discretion in determining whether a person is a vexatious litigant. [Citation.] We uphold the court’s ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] On appeal, we presume the order declaring a litigant vexatious is correct and imply findings necessary to support the judgment. [Citation.]” (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 219.) Similarly, a court’s decision that a vexatious litigant does not have a reasonable probability of success is based on an evaluative judgment in which the court is permitted to weigh evidence. (Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 785-786 (Moran).) If there is any substantial evidence to support a trial court’s conclusion that a vexatious litigant has no reasonable probability of prevailing in the action, it will be upheld. (See Moran, supra, at pp. 784-786.)
II. Statutory Framework.
Code of Civil Procedure section 391 provides multiple definitions of a “vexatious litigant.” As relevant to this appeal, subdivision (a)(4) defines a “vexatious litigant” as anyone who “[h]as previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by any state or federal court of record in any action or proceeding based upon the same or substantially similar facts, transaction, or occurrence.” If a court determines that a plaintiff is a “vexatious litigant and that there is no reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the moving defendant, the court shall order the plaintiff to furnish, for the benefit of the moving defendant, security in such amount and within such time as the court shall fix.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 391.3.) “When security that has been ordered furnished is not furnished as ordered, the litigation shall be dismissed as to the defendant for whose benefit it was ordered furnished.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 391.4.)
The Legislature enacted these statutes “to curb misuse of the court system by those acting in propria persona who repeatedly re-litigate the same issues. Their abuse of the system not only wastes court time and resources but also prejudices other parties waiting their turn before the courts. [Citations.]” (In re Bittaker (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1008; First Western Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 860, 867-868 [“the vexatious litigant statutes were enacted to require a person found a vexatious litigant to put up security for the reasonable expenses of a defendant who becomes the target of one of these obsessive and persistent litigants whose conduct can cause serious financial results to the unfortunate object of his attack. The purpose of the statutory scheme is to deal with the problem created by the persistent and obsessive litigant who has constantly pending a number of groundless actions, often against the judges and other court officers who decide or were concerned in the decision of previous actions adversely to him”].)
III. The trial court properly required Williams to post security for continued litigation, and properly dismissed his complaint when he failed to do so.
Section 391.1 provides: “In any litigation pending in any court of this state, at any time until final judgment is entered, a defendant may move the court, upon notice and hearing, for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish security. The motion must be based upon the ground, and supported by a showing, that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that there is not a reasonable probability that he will prevail in the litigation against the moving defendant.” Although Williams raises numerous issues on appeal, our inquiry concerns only two questions: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by declaring Williams a vexatious litigant? (2) Was there substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Williams had no reasonable probability of prevailing in the litigation against Defendants?
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declaring Williams a vexatious litigant. Williams was undoubtedly a vexatious litigant under the plain language of section 391, subdivision (a)(4), which defines a “vexatious litigant” as anyone who “[h]as previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by any state or federal court of record in any action or proceeding based upon the same or substantially similar facts, transaction, or occurrence.” Here, the district court in California expressly declared Williams to be a “vexatious litigant” after finding that Williams’ claims were “clearly frivolous” and that his successive complaints in state and federal court were “improper” and amounted to “harassment.” The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
We further conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Williams had no reasonable probability of prevailing on his action. In support of its dismissal motion, Defendants submitted copies of all the previous court orders and decisions concluding Williams’ claims were meritless, including the order by the Louisiana state court entering judgment in favor of Defendants and the decision by the Louisiana Court of Appeal affirming the lower court’s order.
“Under the full faith and credit clause, full res judicata effect attaches to a sister state judgment when the party sought to be bound by the judgment participated in the litigation and had a full opportunity to contest the sister state court’s jurisdiction. (Tyus v. Tyus (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 789, 792 (Tyus); Beard v. Beard (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 579, 581, “it is settled that a valid judgment of a sister state which has become final must be accorded full faith and credit by every other court within the United States”].) “This means that the sister state judgment bars re-litigation in California of any issue which was, or could have been litigated in the sister state action.” (Tyus, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 792; Butcher v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1451 [the “clear purpose of the full faith and credit clause [is] to establish throughout the federal system the salutary principle of the common law that a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as in that where the judgment was rendered, so that a cause of action merged in a judgment in one state is likewise merged in every other”].) Moreover, “sister state judgments are entitled to full faith and credit even as to matters of law or fact erroneously decided.” (Ibid.)
Here, the complaint Williams filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court (the “California complaint”) mirrored the complaint he originally filed in the Louisiana state court (the “Louisiana complaint”). In relevant part, his Louisiana complaint alleged:
“On January 6, 2000 the Plaintiff was a customer in the defendant’s store #519 located at the corner of St. Peter and Hopkins Street in New Iberia, Louisiana.
“While a customer he made use of a booth, which is provided for the customers of the defendant.
“While making use of the booth seat[,] the seat gave way causing the plaintiff to fall and receive serious injuries.
“The defendant’s seat gave way because it was not in good working order and not secured properly.
“ . . .
“Plaintiff also contends that Employers Insurance of Wausau defraud [sic], and conspired with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, AFC Enterprises Inc., Law Offices Campbell, McCranie, Sistruck, Anzelmo, and Hardy, Church’s Fried Chicken and its 4 employees [sic].”
In relevant part, Williams’ California complaint alleged:
“On Jan 6th, 2000 the plaintiff was a customer in the defendant’s store #519 locate [sic] at the corner of St. Peter and Hopkins Street in New Iberia, Louisiana.
“While as a customer he made use of a booth, which is provided for the customers of the defendant.
“While making use of the booth-seat[,] the seat gave way, collapsing upon the plaintiff causing him to fall out of the booth-seat unto the floor and receive serious injuries.
“The defendant’s seat gave way because it was not in good working order and not properly secured.
“. . .
“The defendant, Employers Insurance of Wausau, A Mutual Company has failed to perform its obligation to its insured Church’s Chicken and the third party claimant from Jan 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 & April 2007.”
Although Williams included additional causes of actions in his California claim (e.g., breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and invasion of privacy), both complaints essentially alleged that Williams sustained injuries as a result of sitting in a defective booth at Church’s, and that various insurance companies wrongfully conspired to deny Williams’ third party claim. “After hearing and reviewing all evidence in [the] matter,” the Louisiana state trial court determined that Williams’ case was meritless and entered judgment in favor of Defendants and against Williams. The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed this judgment and the Louisiana Supreme Court declined to review Williams’ case. In short, Williams had full opportunity to litigate his case in Louisiana. As a “sister state judgment,” the final judgment against Williams rendered in Louisiana had “full res judicata effect” in the Los Angeles Superior Court under the full faith and credit clause. (Tyus, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at 792.) Thus, there was no reasonable probability that Williams would prevail in the underlying action.
IV. Motions for sanctions and pre-filing order by Defendants.
Defendants urge us to impose monetary sanctions on Williams on the ground that “[t]his appeal . . . is the epitome of a frivolous and harassing misuse of the legal process.” According to a declaration submitted by defense counsel, Rosemary Springer, Defendants have incurred over $8,000 in the present appeal.
This Court’s power to impose sanctions must be used “sparingly to deter only the most egregious conduct.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 651.) “Thus, an appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive -- to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment -- or when it indisputably has no merit -- when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit.” (Id. at p. 650.) While Williams’ current appeal comes close to meeting this standard, we conclude that Williams’ conduct is not “most egregious” and thus, sanctions are not warranted at this time.
Defendants also urge us to issue a pre-filing order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7, which provides in relevant part:
“[T]he court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party, enter a prefiling order which prohibits a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state in propria persona without first obtaining leave of the presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed. Disobedience of the order by a vexatious litigant may be punished as a contempt of court.”
Section 391.7 authorizes both trial and appellate courts to issue pre-filing orders. (Andrisani v. Hoodack (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 279, 281 [“appellate court is authorized to determine that a prefiling order should be issued” pursuant to Vexatious Litigant statute].) Williams’ successive complaints over the last eight years have utilized a considerable amount of judicial and litigant resources, to the detriment of those involved and those who utilize our judicial system. (Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1, 17 [“Other appellate parties, many of whom wait years for a resolution of bona fide disputes, are prejudiced by the useless diversion of this court’s attention. [Citation.] In the same vein, the appellate system and the taxpayers of this state are damaged by what amounts to a waste of this court’s time and resources”].) For these reasons, we prohibit Williams from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state in propria persona without first obtaining leave of the presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed.
The clerk of this court is directed to provide a copy of this opinion to the Judicial Council. (§ 391.7, subd. (e).) Copies shall also be provided to the presiding judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court.
V. Motions filed by Williams.
Williams filed two motions to augment the record with documents apparently filed in the superior court but not included in the Clerk’s Transcript on appeal. We grant both motions.
Although we grant the motions to augment, we note that none of the documents Williams submitted have any bearing on the issues presented in this appeal.
Williams has filed the following additional motions: (1) a motion for sanctions against Defendants based on their purportedly “deceptive practices,” (2) a motion to compel Defendants to produce a copy of the secondary liability insurance policy issued by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, (3) a motion to strike the respondents’ brief because Defendants purportedly filed it late, and (4) a motion “for the superior court judge to show cause” as to why he did not enter a default judgment for Williams. We deny each motion because it is either wholly without merit or improperly before us.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their ordinary costs on appeal.
We concur: MALLANO, P. J. ROTHSCHILD, J.