The doctrine which grew out of suits involving automobile collisions, denies recovery against the manufacturers of the vehicle, when the alleged defect did not contribute to or cause the initial accident. In Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corporation, 376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss. 1974), this court discussed the Mississippi precedents and held that this court must adhere to that doctrine. This action involves similar circumstances and similar allegations, and the court must apply Mississippi law once more. "Sitting as a Mississippi trial forum, our task . . . is not to criticize or ignore precedent, but to follow it where the facts warrant."
Further argument is made that most of the decisions relied upon by this Court when we rejected the so-called doctrine or theory have now been repealed or overruled. As recently as 1974 our line of cases was adhered to in Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D.Miss. 1974). There the facts were almost identical to the facts now before us and the Court on the strength of Walton v. Chrysler, supra, and Ford v. Simpson, supra, held:
1971); Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233 So.2d 797, 798-99 (Miss. 1970). But see Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F.Supp. 603, 605-07 (N.D.Miss. 1974); Maraist Barksdale, Mississippi Products Liability — A Critical Analysis, 43 Miss.L.J. 139, 180 n. 200 (1972). The modern trend of the case law and increasingly the weight of authority favors Larsen's extended scope of liability.
Saxon challenges the manner in which Plaintiffs have pleaded their fraud claim and asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for fraud. Saxon's challenge to Plaintiffs' fraud claim thus will be measured by the standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Shorty v. Liddell, No. 4:07-cv-207-M-A, 2008 WL 5111003, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 2, 2008), aff'd, 356 F. App'x 769 (5th Cir. 2009) (treating motion for summary judgment as a motion for judgment on the pleadings given the motion's brevity); Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F. Supp. 603, 605 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (treating motion for summary judgment as a motion for judgment on the pleadings where motion was not based on evidentiary matters outside the pleadings and the motion was not filed at a time that would cause a delay of the trial). "The standard for deciding a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss."
Having considered RCS' argument with respect to the fraud claim, the Court finds that this argument should be treated as one seeking judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Shorty v. Liddell, No. 4:07-cv-207-M-A, 2008 WL 5111003, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 2, 2008), aff'd, 356 F. App'x 769 (5th Cir. 2009) (treating motion for summary judgment as a motion for judgment on the pleadings given the motion's brevity); Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F. Supp. 603, 605 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (treating motion for summary judgment as a motion for judgment on the pleadings where motion was not based on evidentiary matters outside the pleadings and the motion was not filed at a time that would cause a delay of the trial). "The standard for deciding a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss."
F.L. Crane Co. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 73 F.R.D. 384 (N.D.Miss. 1976); Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corporation, 376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D.Miss. 1974). See also Pattillo v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 379 So.2d 1225 (Miss.