Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp.

6 Citing cases

  1. Hartford Acc. Indem. Co. v. Mitchell Buick

    479 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Miss. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    The doctrine which grew out of suits involving automobile collisions, denies recovery against the manufacturers of the vehicle, when the alleged defect did not contribute to or cause the initial accident. In Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corporation, 376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss. 1974), this court discussed the Mississippi precedents and held that this court must adhere to that doctrine. This action involves similar circumstances and similar allegations, and the court must apply Mississippi law once more. "Sitting as a Mississippi trial forum, our task . . . is not to criticize or ignore precedent, but to follow it where the facts warrant."

  2. Pattillo v. Cessna Aircraft Corp.

    379 So. 2d 1225 (Miss. 1980)   Cited 3 times

    Further argument is made that most of the decisions relied upon by this Court when we rejected the so-called doctrine or theory have now been repealed or overruled. As recently as 1974 our line of cases was adhered to in Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D.Miss. 1974). There the facts were almost identical to the facts now before us and the Court on the strength of Walton v. Chrysler, supra, and Ford v. Simpson, supra, held:

  3. Knippen v. Ford Motor Co.

    546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976)   Cited 42 times
    In Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 178 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 236-37, 546 F.2d 993, 1002-03 (1976) we said that gross negligence will not support punitive damages, since "[t]he most extreme negligence lacks the essential element of conscious indifference to consequences."

    1971); Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233 So.2d 797, 798-99 (Miss. 1970). But see Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F.Supp. 603, 605-07 (N.D.Miss. 1974); Maraist Barksdale, Mississippi Products Liability — A Critical Analysis, 43 Miss.L.J. 139, 180 n. 200 (1972). The modern trend of the case law and increasingly the weight of authority favors Larsen's extended scope of liability.

  4. Neel v. Fannie Mae

    CIVIL NO. 1:12cv311-HSO-RHW (S.D. Miss. Mar. 17, 2014)   Cited 1 times
    Granting the defendant's request for summary judgment on the basis that HAMP does not provide for a private action

    Saxon challenges the manner in which Plaintiffs have pleaded their fraud claim and asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for fraud. Saxon's challenge to Plaintiffs' fraud claim thus will be measured by the standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Shorty v. Liddell, No. 4:07-cv-207-M-A, 2008 WL 5111003, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 2, 2008), aff'd, 356 F. App'x 769 (5th Cir. 2009) (treating motion for summary judgment as a motion for judgment on the pleadings given the motion's brevity); Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F. Supp. 603, 605 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (treating motion for summary judgment as a motion for judgment on the pleadings where motion was not based on evidentiary matters outside the pleadings and the motion was not filed at a time that would cause a delay of the trial). "The standard for deciding a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss."

  5. Neel v. Fannie Mae

    CIVIL NO. 1:12cv311-HSO-RHW (S.D. Miss. Mar. 12, 2014)   Cited 6 times
    Finding that "simply having insurance on the [p]roperty [at issue], notwithstanding . . . that the insurance did not comply with the specific terms of the Deed of Trust"—namely because it failed to "name any additional loss payees"—could not sustain the plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract as against a motion for summary judgment

    Having considered RCS' argument with respect to the fraud claim, the Court finds that this argument should be treated as one seeking judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Shorty v. Liddell, No. 4:07-cv-207-M-A, 2008 WL 5111003, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 2, 2008), aff'd, 356 F. App'x 769 (5th Cir. 2009) (treating motion for summary judgment as a motion for judgment on the pleadings given the motion's brevity); Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F. Supp. 603, 605 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (treating motion for summary judgment as a motion for judgment on the pleadings where motion was not based on evidentiary matters outside the pleadings and the motion was not filed at a time that would cause a delay of the trial). "The standard for deciding a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss."

  6. Estate of Portnoy v. Cessna Aircraft Co.

    603 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Miss. 1985)   Cited 4 times

    F.L. Crane Co. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 73 F.R.D. 384 (N.D.Miss. 1976); Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corporation, 376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D.Miss. 1974). See also Pattillo v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 379 So.2d 1225 (Miss.