Opinion
98 Civ. 7988 (RPP)
May 11, 2000
OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Gail Hinds submitted a bill of costs on April 7, 2000 in connection with the judgment in her favor in this case. The bill of costs totaled $4,388.38: $2546.50 for "[f]ees of the court reporter for all or any part of the transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case"; $20 for "[d]ocket fees under 28 U.S.C. 1923"; $1466.30 for the deposition of plaintiff Jomo Williams; and $355.58 for the deposition of non-party witness/co-defendant Mike Boyland ("Boyland").
Plaintiff filed an objection to the proposed bill of costs on April 13, 2000. On April 17, 2000, the Judgment Clerk taxed costs in the amount of $4,388.38. By order of the Court, defendant filed a declaration on May 9, 2000 in response to plaintiff's objection.
Plaintiffs application of April 13, 2000 will be viewed as a motion to review the taxation of costs determined by the Clerk of the Court pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Discussion
In his application of April 13, 2000, plaintiff raises objections to the cost of the trial transcript and to the costs of plaintiff's and Boyland's depositions.
I. Trial Transcript
In objection to the cost of the trial transcript, plaintiff states, "[t]he trial transcript was not necessarily obtained for use at trial. The transcript was not needed at trial. Defendant ordered the transcript as a convenience." (Objection to Proposed Bill of Costs, ¶ 2.) Defendant responds that the daily transcripts were used in connection with defendant's motion pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that defense counsel needed to use the transcripts "to respond to the Court's queries on several occasions, and used the transcripts to prepare for summation." (Declaration of Brett H. Klein, May 9, 2000, ¶ 9.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2), the Clerk of the Court may tax as costs "[f]ees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case." See also Local Civil Rule 54.1(c)(1) (stating that "[t]he cost of any part of the original trial transcript that was necessarily obtained for use in this court or on appeal is taxable"). To determine if it was appropriate to tax the trial transcript as a cost in this case, the Court must determine "whether the transcripts of plaintiff's trial testimony were necessary for defendant's use in the case." Cohen v. Stephen Wise Free Synagogue, 1999 WL 672303, 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1999) (citing Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 999 (2d Cir. 1973)).
Defendant cites Cohen v. Stephen Wise Free Synagogue for the proposition that the costs of the trial transcript should be taxed because defense counsel used the transcript to prepare summation. (Klein Decl. ¶ 9; 1999 WL 672903.) the court in Cohen held that the cost of the transcript of plaintiff's testimony should be taxed because "[t]he trial went on for nearly three weeks, and plaintiff's three days of testimony was critical to his case. Defendant needed the transcripts to cross-examine him, particularly with respect to plaintiff's description of his employment relationship with defendant. Defendant also relied on the transcript in summations." 1999 WL 672903 at 2. In contrast, the entire trial in this matter lasted only three days, and defense counsel did not use the trial transcript in summation.
In deciding whether trial transcripts should be taxed as costs, courts in this district have observed that "[d]aily transcripts of trial testimony are not customary." John G. v. Board of Ed. of Mt. Vernon Public Schools, 891 F. Supp. 122, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting Zapata Gulf Marine Co. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 133 F.R.D. 481, 484 (E.D.La. 1990)). Several courts in this district have denied costs for trial transcripts where, as in this case, the trial was short. See Walther v. Maricopa Int'l Investment Corp., 1999 WL 816176 (S.D.N Y Oct. 13, 1999) (trial lasted three days); Dehoust v. Baxter Healthcare Corporation, 1999 WL 280423, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1999) (trial lasted "less than two weeks"); Morales v. Smith, 1998 WL 352595, at 2 (S.D.N Y June 26, 1998) ("trial was not particularly long or complex"). Courts have also observed that use of the trial transcripts in summation is not a sufficient reason for taxing the costs of the transcripts. See Walther v. Maricopa Int'l Investment Corp., 1999 WL 816176, 1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999) (holding that "being able to quote verbatim pertinent trial testimony — while convenient — cannot be characterized as `necessary' within the meaning of Local Rule 54.1(c)(1)"); John G. v. Board of Ed. of Mt. Vernon Public Schools, 891 F. Supp. 122, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that "there was no need to refer to the precise language of the witnesses" in summation). Because defendant has not offered a convincing explanation as to why the trial transcript was "necessary," defendant's request to include the cost of the trial transcript in its bill of costs is denied.
II. Deposition Costs
Plaintiff objects to the cost of the depositions "because the depositions were not introduced into evidence at trial." (Objection to Proposed Bill of Costs, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff asserts that plaintiff's deposition was taken for purposes of discovery, that it was not introduced into evidence at trial, and that it "was hardly used for impeachment." (Objection to Proposed Bill of Costs, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff argues that Boyland's deposition "was never used by the defendant Hinds for any reason whatsoever," and that its only use at trial was by plaintiff for impeachment purposes. (Objection to Proposed Bill of Costs, ¶ 5.)
Defendant contends that the costs of the depositions of plaintiff and Boyland were properly taxed because the transcripts of both of those depositions were attached as exhibits to defendant's motion for summary judgment and the Court referred to the depositions in ruling on that motion. (Klein Decl. 11-12.) In support of this argument, defendant cites Local Civil Rule 54.1(c)(2), which states that "[c]osts for depositions are . . . taxable if they were used by the court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive substantive motion." Loc. Civ. R. 54.1(c)(2).
The Court had to use the depositions of plaintiff and Boyland in deciding defendant's motion for summary judgment. (See Opinion and Order, February 24, 2000, at 10-11.) Therefore, the costs for those depositions were appropriately included in the bill of costs. However, Local Civil Rule 54.1(c)(2) limits recovery for the costs of depositions to "the original transcript of the deposition, plus one copy." Loc. Civ. R. 54.1(c)(2) See Walther v. Maricopa Int'l Investment Corp., 1999 WL 816176, 2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999). Courts have construed this limitation to exclude from taxable costs reporter's fees and delivery charges associated with deposition transcripts. See Sim v. New York Mailers' Union Number 6, 1999 WL 674447, 2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1999). Defendant's costs for the depositions of plaintiff and Boyland will be reduced accordingly.
Conclusion
Defendant's bill of costs is reduced by the following amounts: 1) $2546.50, the entire cost of the trial transcript; 2) $89.50 for reporter's fees and delivery charges for plaintiff's deposition; and 3) $25.18 for reporter's fees and delivery charges for Boyland's deposition. With these reductions, the total amount of costs to be taxed is $1727.20.
IT IS SO ORDERED.