Opinion
570842/05.
Decided March 24, 2006.
Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court, Bronx County (Raul Cruz, J.), entered February 23, 2004, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and from an order (same court and Judge), entered August 3, 2004, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, upon reargument, adhered to the prior decision.
Order (Raul Cruz, J.), entered August 3, 2004, reversed, without costs, and defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. Appeal from order (Raul Cruz, J.), entered February 23, 2004, dismissed, without costs, as superseded by the appeal from the order of August 3, 2004.
PRESENT: McCOOE, J.P., DAVIS, GANGEL-JACOB, JJ.
Defendant met his burden of presenting objective medical evidence that the injured plaintiff had not suffered a serious injury as defined in Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Newton v. Drayton, 305 AD2d 303; McNair v. Ofori, 198 AD2d 47).
Plaintiff failed to come forward with objective, probative evidence to raise an issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury in the 2000 motor vehicle accident. The record demonstrates that plaintiff, at most, suffered minor injuries, missed one week of work and, after a short course of physical therapy, complained of only intermittent pain and sought no further treatment until the underlying summary judgment motion was filed in 2003. Although plaintiff was examined shortly after the accident and found to have limitations, her treating doctor failed to quantify any such limitations ( see Toulson v. Pae, 13 AD3d 317). The first quantification of restriction by plaintiff's doctor took place at an examination three years after the accident. Given the absence of admissible, contemporaneous evidence of serious injury, plaintiff's proffered conclusions are insufficient ( see Petinrin v. Levering, 17 AD3d 173).
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.