We believe this rule is controlling in Tennessee. In Williams v. Buntin, 4 Tenn. App. 340 (1927), the court was faced with a situation where a widow of means, Rachel Craighead, a resident of Nashville, had agreed to will a store owned by her on the public square in Nashville to a young lady, Ida Williams, who, though not related, was previously taken into her home by Mrs. Craighead and resided with her until the age of 21. The conditions of the agreement were that Mrs. Williams, then a non-resident, would return to Nashville, live with Mrs. Craighead for a period of years and take care of her. Mrs. Williams did this. However, in 1922, two years before her death and when in failing health, Mrs. Craighead sold the store to a third party for $25,000.00. After the death of Mrs. Craighead, Mrs. Williams sued her estate.

Blair v. Snodgrass, 33 Tenn. 1, 26; Huffine v. McCampbell, supra, 149 Tenn. at page 76, 257 S.W. 80. Nor is it "essential that the party charged should have subscribed each paper forming a link in the chain of evidence." Williams v. Buntin, 4 Tenn. App. 340, 355, being a case in which certiorari was denied by this Court. In 85 A.L.R., page 1193 numerous cases are cited in support of the statement of the annotator as to facts said to be quite similar to the situation here on the point under discussion that: "It has been held that a signed paper and an unsigned paper to which it refers may constitute a sufficient memorandum, although the unsigned paper has not been delivered, or has not yet been prepared at the time when the paper which refers to it is signed."

Id. at 228. Under the Statute of Frauds, which does not require a single document, id. at 226 (citing Williams v. Buntin, 4 Tenn.App. 340, 347 (1927)), the essential terms of the foreclosure sale can be found within the collective writings and electronic records.

The form of the instrument is perfectly immaterial, as the statute of frauds merely requires that the contract, ‘or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing.’ But the written evidence of the contract must be reasonably certain in itself, as to the estate intended to be sold, and the terms of sale, as parol evidence to supply a writing defective in this respect is inadmissible.”); Williams v. Buntin, 4 Tenn.App. 340, 347 (1927) (“[T]he memorandum or note required ... may be in two or more papers.... [I]t is not required that each paper of itself be sufficient in content to satisfy the statute.”). Of course, even if one or more memoranda are produced sufficiently describing the terms of a parol agreement, the Statute of Frauds also requires that one of the writings be signed by the party to be charged or by some other person authorized to act on that party's behalf.

But see Harris v. Morgan, 157 Tenn. 140, 7 S.W.2d 53 (rule not to be enforced where there is room to doubt). See, also, Huffine v. McCampbell, 149 Tenn. 47, 257 S.W. 80; Williams v. Buntin, 4 Tenn. App. 340. "The contract, memorandum, or note thereof may be made out from the correspondence between the owner and his agent, where the letters refer to and connect with each other, and taken as a whole, show clearly a sufficient description of the land, and the fact and terms of the sale authorized by the principal and effected by the agent.

Id. at 881; Brandel v. Moore Mortgage Inv. Co., 774 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1989). Also see, Williams v. Buntin, 4 Tenn. App. 340, 1927 WL 2073, at *6 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1927). Their connection will be implied where the writings "relate to the same parties, subject-matter and transaction."

This rule follows from two related rules: (1) it is not necessary that the contract be contained in a single document, Blair v. Snodgrass, 33 Tenn. 1 (1853); and (2) it is not essential that the party to be charged should have signed each paper forming a link in the chain of evidence, Williams v. Buntin, 4 Tenn. App. 340 (1927). But the chain must be established within the documents themselves without resort to parol evidence.

McAdoo v. Dickson, 23 Tenn. App. 74, 126 S.W.2d 393, 402 (1938). In fact, an oral contract to devise lands is within the Statute of Frauds and unenforceable. Goodloe v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S.W. 767 (1905); Williams v. Buntin, 4 Tenn. App. 340 (1927); Quirk v. Bank of Commerce Trust Co., 244 F. 682 (6th Cir. 1917). There are two essential elements to a gift: donative intent and delivery.

It is not necessary that the party to be charged sign each paper writing forming a part of the agreement where the writings on their face relate to one another. Yates v. Skaggs, 187 Tenn. 149, 213 S.W.2d 41 (1948); Williams v. Buntin, 4 Tenn. App. 340 (1927). Having determined that the documents in evidence satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds, we will now consider the agreement between the parties.

"The two instruments can be connected without violation of the statute of frauds because they bear date on the same day, relate to the same transaction, are proved by D. Snodgrass to have been executed for the same purpose * * *." p. 7 The later and much cited case of Williams v. Buntin, 4 Tenn. App. 340 (1927) upheld a contract to devise based upon multiple instruments and said: "`It has been held that if all the writings adduced to estabish the contract, when viewed together in the light of the conditions and circumstances of the parties at the time they were written show unmistakably that they relate to the same matter and constitute the several parts of one connected transaction, so that there can be no other reasonable conclusion, from the evidence thus afforded, than that they were written with reference to those concurrent or preceding, there is such a reference of one to the other as satisfies the rule, although there is no reference in express terms; and parol evidence is admissible to show the circumstances under which the transaction occurred, and to connect the several papers constituting the contract between the parties. Strouse v. Elting, 110 Ala. 132, 20 So. 123.