Opinion
Civil Action 22 - 569
09-12-2022
JOSHUA WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, PENNSYLVANIA, and DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, Respondents.
William S. Stickman, District Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Lisa Pupo Lenihan, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 3) be dismissed as untimely and that a certificate of appealability be denied.
II. REPORT
Currently pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) filed by Petitioner Joshua Williams (“Petitioner”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 3.) The Petition challenges Petitioner's judgments of sentences at five different criminal cases out of Allegheny County: (1) CP-02-CR-0006775-2009,(2) CP-02-CR-0011756-2009,(3) CP-02 CR-0013294-2009,(4) CP-02-CR-0013882-2009, and (5) CP-02-CR-0017835-2009.For the following reasons, it is recommended that the Court dismiss the Petition as untimely and deny a certificate of appealability.
At CP-02-CR-0006775-2009, Petitioner was charged with one count each of Possession of Controlled Substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32). (Resp't Exhs. 1&2, ECF No. 9-1, pp.1-18.)
At CP-02-CR0011756-2009, Petitioner was charged with one count each of Robbery-Serious Bodily Injury, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i), Aggravated Assault, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4), Terroristic Threats, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1), Unlawful Restraint, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2902(a)(1), Theft by Unlawful Taking, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3921(a), Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2705, and Simple Assault, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2701(a)(3). (Resp't Exhs. 3&4, ECF No. 9-1, pp.19-39.)
At CP-02-CR-0013294-2009, Petitioner was charged with two counts each of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and Possession of a Controlled Substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). (Resp't Exhs. 5&6, ECF No. 9-2, pp.1-18.)
At CP-02-CR-0013882-2009, Petitioner was charged with one count each of Tampering with Public Records or Information, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4911(a)(1), and Theft by Unlawful Taking, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3921(a). (Resp't Exh. 7&8, ECF No. 9-2, pp.19-37.)
At CP-02-CR-0017835-2009, Petitioner was charged with two counts of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). (Resp't Exh. 9&10, ECF No. 9-3, pp.1-18.)
A. Procedural Background
On October 21, 2010, Petitioner completed a Guilty Plea Explanation of Defendant's Rights form and entered into a negotiated plea of guilty. (Resp't Exh. 11, ECF No. 9-3, pp.1928.) At CP-02-CR-0011756-2009, the Commonwealth withdrew Counts 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7, and it agreed to a sentence of five to ten years of imprisonment at Count 1 and no further penalty at Count 4. (GP4.) At CP-02-CR-0013294-2009, the Commonwealth made no amendments to the information, but it agreed to a consecutive period of probation. (GP 3.) At CP-02-CR-0006775-2009, the Commonwealth made no amendments to the information, but it agreed to a concurrent period of probation. (GP 2.) At CP-02-CR-0013882, the Commonwealth withdrew Count 1, and it agreed to a concurrent period of probation at Count 2. (GP 5.) At CP-02-CR-0017835-2009, the Commonwealth withdrew Counts 2 and 3, and it agreed to a concurrent period of probation at Count 1. (GP 6.)
“GP” refers to pages of the Guilty Plea transcript dated October 21, 2010.
Following the guilty plea colloquy, the trial judge accepted the negotiated plea of guilty. Petitioner was sentenced as follows: (1) CP-02-CR-0011756-2009, at Count 1, Robbery, to a term of five to ten years of incarceration, and at Count 4, Unlawful Restraint, Petitioner received no further penalty (Res't Exh. 12, ECF No. 9-3, pp.29-30); (2) CP-02-CR-0013294-2009, at Count 2, Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance, to five years of probation, which was to run consecutive to CP-02-CR-0011756-2009, and at Count 1, Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance, and Counts 3 and 4, Possession of a Controlled Substance, no further penalty (Resp't Exh. 13, ECF No. 9-3, p.31); (3) CP-02-CR-0006775-2009, at Count 1, Possession of Controlled Substance, to a one year period of probation, which was to run concurrent to the probation imposed at CP-02-CR-0013294-2009, and at Count 2, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Petitioner received no further penalty (Resp't Exh. 14, ECF No. 9-3, p.32); (4) CP-02-CR-0013882-2009, at Count 2, Theft by Unlawful Taking, Petitioner was sentenced to a two year period of probation, which was to run concurrent to the probation imposed at CP-02-CR-0013294-2009 (Resp't Exh. 15, ECF No. 9-3, p.33); and (5) CP-02-CR-0017835-2009, at Count 1, Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance, Petitioner was sentenced to a two year period of probation, which was to run concurrent to the probation imposed at CP-02-CR-0013294-2009 (Resp't Exh. 16, ECF No. 9-3, p.34). Thus, in total, Petitioner received an aggregate sentence of not less than five years nor more than ten years of incarceration and a consecutive period of five years of probation. Petitioner did not file a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Motion to Modify Sentence or a Notice of Appeal.
On November 28, 2018, Petitioner filed a pro se petition pursuant to Pennsylvania's PostConviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541-46 arguing, inter alia, that his plea was constitutionally invalid because both his defense attorney and the assistant district attorneys involved caused him to believe that his plea agreement consolidated his five cases and as a result he received a single “consolidated” conviction by pleading guilty. (Resp't Exh. 17, ECF No. 9 3, pp.35-38.) He maintained that this became an issue when he pleaded guilty to federal offenses in 2018, and he discovered that not only was he mistaken as to the number of convictions he possessed, but that the number of convictions he possessed subjected him to a significantly increased sentence.The PCRA court appointed counsel who then filed an amended PCRA petition on Petitioner's behalf arguing that Petitioner's plea was constitutionally invalid and unlawfully induced, his defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective and that Petitioner's due process rights were violated. (Resp't Exh. 18, ECF No. 9-4, pp.1-45.) He further argued that Petitioner's claim satisfied the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA's time bar. Id., p.7 (citing 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)). After the Commonwealth filed its answer (Resp't Exh. 19, ECF No. 9-5, pp.1-23), the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the amended petition without a hearing (Resp't Exh. 20, ECF No. 9-5, p.24). The PCRA court ultimately dismissed the amended petition on March 27, 2019, finding that it was untimely and that no exception to the PCRA's time bar had been established. (Resp't Exh. 22, ECF No. 9-6, p.20.) Petitioner appealed (Resp't Exh. 23, ECF No. 9-6, pp.21-31), and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the dismissal of the PCRA petition as untimely on August 21, 2020 (Resp't Exh. 33, ECF No. 10-2, pp.9-18). Specifically, they found that Petitioner could not avail himself of the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA time bar because his convictions at each of his five docket numbers “are and have always been part of the public record . . . .” Id., p.17 (citing Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 955 (Pa. 2018) (“[T]o qualify as a new fact, the information may not be part of the public records.”) The Superior Court denied Petitioner's application for reargument on October 27, 2020. (Resp't Exh. 35, ECF No. 10-3, pp.27-28.)
Petitioner served a portion of his sentence at issue in this case and was paroled. He was later charged with three federal offenses in the Western District of Pennsylvania at 2:17-cr-195. On May 30, 2017, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole issued a detainer against Petitioner for initiating violation of parole proceedings. Petitioner pled guilty to the federal offenses on April 18, 2018, and he is currently awaiting sentencing for those offenses. On August 10, 2018, a federal probation officer filed a Presentence Investigation Report, in which he noted that: (1) Petitioner's guilty plea to the state offenses at issue in this case did not result in a single, “consolidated” conviction; and (2) Petitioner's multiple convictions for the state offenses subject him to a significantly increased sentence.
On December 16, 2020, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition to Enforce Plea Agreement/Petition to Correct the Record. (Resp't Exh. 36, ECF No. 10-4, pp.1-13.) It was construed as another PCRA petition and the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss it on January 11, 2021. (Resp't Exh. 38, ECF No. 10-4, p.29.) On March 12, 2021, the PCRA court found that the petition was not in fact within the purview of the PCRA, but nevertheless determined that the record did not support Petitioner's claim that he was promised that his pleas would be consolidated such that his cases would consist of a single conviction of “first strike” as they relate to any future recidivism-based sentencing, and it therefore denied the petition. (Resp't Exh. 40, ECF No. 10-4, p.39.) Petitioner appealed (Resp't Exh. 41, ECF No. 10-5, pp.17), and the Superior Court affirmed the denial of the petition on January 28, 2022 (Resp't Exh. 53, ECF No. 10-9, pp.22-31). Petitioner's application for reconsideration (Resp't Exh. 54, ECF No. 10-9, pp.32-48) was denied by the Superior Court on April 7, 2022 (Resp't Exh. 55, ECF No. 10-9, pp.49-50).
Petitioner filed his Petition in this case on April 11, 2022.Petitioner raises the following two claims in his Petition: (1) Due process violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), and others, and (2) Common law breach of contract according to Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987), as interpreted by Kernan v. Cuero, 138 S.Ct. 4 (2017), and others. (ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their Answer to the Petition on May 24, 2022. (ECF Nos. 8-10.) Petitioner's Reply brief was filed on June 16, 2022. (ECF No. 14.)
Under the mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner's filing is deemed filed at the time he or she hands it over to prison officials to the court or puts it in the prison mailbox. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). Although the Petition was not received by the Clerk of Court until April 18, 2022, the Petition was signed and dated April 11, 2022. As there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court will assume that Petitioner delivered his Petition for mailing on the date he signed it, April 11, 2022. See West v. Lockett, 2009 WL 1270225, at *4 n.2 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2009) (“Absent proof of the exact date of delivering the habeas petition to the prison authorities, the court will presume the date whereon [the petitioner] signed his habeas petition is the date he gave the prison authorities his habeas petition for mailing.”) (citing cases). Thus, for statute of limitations purposes, the Court should consider the Petition filed as of April 11, 2022.
B. Statute of Limitations
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a one-year limitations period for state prisoners seeking federal habeas review. It is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and it provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of -
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this section.28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
C. Discussion
The statute of limitations set out in § 2244(d)(1) must be applied on a claim-by-claim basis. Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2004), cert denied, 543 U.S. 1067 (2005). In analyzing whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus has been timely filed under the one-year limitations period, a federal court must undertake a three-part inquiry. First, the court must determine the “trigger date” for the one-year limitations period pursuant to section 2244(d)(1). Second, the court must determine whether any “properly filed” applications for post-conviction or collateral relief were pending during the limitations period that would toll the statute pursuant to section 2244(d)(2). Third, the court must determine whether any of the other exceptions or equitable tolling should be applied on the facts presented.
First, the “trigger date” for Petitioner's claims is the date on which his judgment of sentence became final. In this case, Petitioner's judgment of sentence became final on November 22, 2010, when the time expired for him to file a notice of appeal. See Pa. R.A.P. 903(a); see also Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that a judgment becomes “final” at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review). Thus, the first day of Petitioner's one-year statute of limitations period was November 23, 2010, and absent any tolling for “properly filed” applications for post-conviction relief under section 2244(d)(2), Petitioner had one year from that date to file a timely federal habeas petition challenging his judgment of sentence. Here, however, Petitioner did not file any applications for post-conviction relief until November 28, 2018, after his AEDPA one-year statute of limitations period had already expired. Therefore, section 2244(d)(2) does not apply and the Petition in this case was untimely filed on April 11, 2022.
The thirtieth day fell on a Saturday, therefore, the last day on which Petitioner could have filed a timely notice of appeal was the following Monday, November 22, 2010. See 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1908 (governing computation of time).
Having failed to meet AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations, the Petition can only be saved by the application of equitable tolling or the Supreme Court's recognized fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (statute of limitations may be equitably tolled with showing of diligence and extraordinary circumstances); see also McQuggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013) (equitable exception to statute of limitations for actual innocence). Petitioner has not argued, much less demonstrated, the applicability of equitable tolling or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. Instead, he argues for the utilization of an alternative trigger date for his two claims. Specifically, he argues that his Petition was timely filed under section 2244(d)(1)(D) because it was filed within one year of when the facts supporting his claims were discovered. He claims that the factual predicate for his claims was not discovered until he reviewed his federal Presentence Investigation Report on or about August 10, 2018. Even assuming, without deciding, that Petitioner's AEDPA statute of limitations started on August 10, 2018, Petitioner was required to file his federal habeas petition within one year thereof and he did not do so. While section 2244(d)(2) provides for statutory tolling during the pendency of a petitioner's “properly filed” state post-conviction proceedings, and while Petitioner did file a PCRA petition on November 28, 2018, the PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely and the Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of the PCRA petition on that basis on August 21, 2020. An untimely post-conviction petition is not considered “properly filed” and does not entitle a petitioner to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter' for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 11 (2000) (noting that time limits on petitions are “condition[s] to filing,” such that an untimely petition would not be deemed “properly filed.”); Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 16566 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that untimely PCRA petition was not “properly filed” for purposes of AEDPA and therefore does not toll the federal limitations period even where the petitioner sought to pursue his PCRA petition under a statutory exception to the PCRA's time bar). As such, Petitioner's PCRA proceedings did not toll any portion of the AEDPA one-year limitations period.His Petition was therefore untimely filed in this case and no basis for equitable tolling has been demonstrated. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 416 (stating that a prisoner can avoid the “predicament” of “trying in good faith to exhaust state remedies . . . only to find out at the end that [the state post-conviction petition] was never ‘properly filed'” by “filing a ‘protective' petition in federal court and asking the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted) (citation omitted); Darden v. Sobina, 477 Fed.Appx. 912, 918 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that equitable tolling did not apply notwithstanding petitioner's argument regarding the “procedural conundrum” he faced due to the need to exhaust state law remedies before filing in federal court).
In his Reply brief, Petitioner takes issue with the way Respondents have interpreted his claim. He states that his claim is not that he did not realize that he pled guilty to multiple charges at multiple criminal informations, but that his cases were actually consolidated and that he reasonably believed that he would receive a single, consolidated conviction as a result of pleading guilty. He claims that he did not learn that the Commonwealth “breached” his reasonable understanding of the plea agreement until August 10, 2018, and therefore, he claims that is the date his statute of limitations should start. However, the statute of limitations starts running from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence,” § 2244(d)(1)(D) (emphasis added), not the date on which the factual predicate actually was discovered. Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 2004). For the same reasons noted by the state courts in addressing the timeliness of Petitioner's PCRA petition, notably that Petitioner's convictions are and have always been a part of the public record, the undersigned finds that the factual predicate for his claims could have been discovered on the date his judgments of sentence were entered.
Moreover, even utilizing August 10, 2018 as the trigger date, there was no effect of Petitioner's Petition to Enforce Plea Agreement/Petition to Correct the Record on Petitioner's AEDPA one-year statute of limitations because it was filed on December 16, 2020, after the time period for filing a timely federal habeas petition would have expired.
The undersigned notes that even if the Petition was not time barred then it would be subject to dismissal for substantially the same reasons set forth by the Respondents in their Answer. Furthermore, even if Petitioner could demonstrate entitlement to habeas relief, that is that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the relief he is specifically seeking would not be available to him. Petitioner asks that the Court vacate his judgments of sentence and “hold” that he has “one prior consolidated conviction/sentence for Federal sentencing purposes, or hold the Career Offender [statute] is inapplicable.” (ECF No. 3, p.15.) However, the “only function” of the writ of habeas corpus “is to inquire into the legality of the detention of one in custody.” Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 421 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring). The writ of habeas corpus's “singular focus on the legality of detention not only constrains the scope of a habeas court's review, but also the nature of relief that a habeas court may provide.” Kamara v. Attorney General of U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 215 FN11 (3d Cir. 2005). Federal courts are to dispose of habeas corpus matters “as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. “The typical relief granted in federal habeas corpus is a conditional order of release unless the State elects to retry the successful habeas petitioner.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403 (1993). If Petitioner were successful in this action, which, again, the undersigned re-emphasizes that his Petition is untimely, then the appropriate remedy would not be for this Court to order an alteration in Petitioner's sentence to reflect what he thought he received as a result of pleading guilty pursuant to the plea agreement, i.e., a single conviction, or for this Court to “hold” that the Career Offender statute is inapplicable to him for purposes of the sentence he faces in his federal criminal case. Rather, the appropriate remedy would be “to provide the State with an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation found by the court[,]” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987); for example, a writ conditioned upon the Commonwealth offering Petitioner the opportunity to enter a constitutionally valid guilty plea to the same plea agreement or go to trial. See e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 174 (2012); Velazquez v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, 937 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 2019); Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger, 453 F.3d 362, 368 (6th Cir. 2006).
D. Certificate of Appealability
A court should issue a certificate of appealability where a petitioner makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Petitioner has not made the requisite showing in this case. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability should be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 3) be dismissed as untimely and that a certificate of appealability be denied.
In accordance with the Federal Magistrate Judge's Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Any party opposing such objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.