Opinion
HHDCV175046342S
06-12-2018
Yvette WILLIAMS v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
CESAR A. NOBLE, J.
Before the court is the motion to dismiss of the administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act (administrator) in this statutory appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249 by the plaintiff, Yvette Williams, from a decision of the Employment Security Board of Review (board). Section 31-249 provides that an appeal may be had from the decision of the board before it becomes final with the caveat that any finding of the board shall be subject only to correction to the extent provided by section 22-9 of the Practice Book. Section 22-9, in turn, provides that the "court does not retry the facts or hear evidence, it considers no evidence other than that certified to it by the board, and then for the limited purpose of determining whether the finding should be corrected, or whether there was any evidence to support in law the conclusions reached. It cannot review the conclusions of the board when those depend upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses."
The present appeal is from the board’s decision holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to unemployment compensation for the period from January 1, 2017 through March 4, 2017. The board agreed with the referees’ finding that the plaintiff had not met her burden of proving that she made reasonable efforts to obtain work during this period as required by General Statutes § 31-235(a)(2) because she devoted herself to starting her own business. The board rejected as unpersuasive the plaintiff’s contention that she was initially unaware of the eligibility requirements because the Labor Department delayed in providing clarification as to the meaning of the term "seeking employment." The rejection was based on the fact that she had access to Unemployment Insurance: A Guide to Collecting Benefits in the State of Connecticut and could have presented herself to any unemployment office to request answers to any questions she might have had.
The board found that the plaintiff was entitled to unemployment compensation effective March 5, 2017 through April 1, 2017. That finding is not at issue in this appeal.
The decision of the board was mailed to the plaintiff on June 8, 2017. Thereafter the plaintiff filed a timely motion to reopen the board’s decision pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249a(b) and Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-237g-50 which permit the board to reopen, vacate, set aside or modify a decision for good cause shown "on grounds of new evidence or the ends of justice so require." On July 27, 2017 the board denied the motion to reopen on the grounds the plaintiff had not presented new evidence and that the plaintiff was simply attempting to reargue her case. The plaintiff filed this appeal with the clarification that the basis for the motion to reopen was not the presentation of new evidence but on what this court construes as the "ends of justice" basis. The court therefore considers the plaintiff’s appeal as one from the board’s initial decision affirming the referee’s findings and holdings.
The administrator’s motion to dismiss asserts that because the plaintiff did not file a motion to correct pursuant to Practice Book § 22-4 this court is bound by the board’s factual findings. Shah v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 114 Conn.App. 170, 176, 968 A.2d 971 (2009). This court’s review is thus limited to a determination of whether the board’s conclusions of law based upon the findings of facts were unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal. Lantieri v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 136 Conn.App. 174, 183, 43 A.3d 815, 820 (2012).
Mindful of these principles the court does not find that the board acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. The board found that there was nothing which hindered the plaintiff’s access to information regarding what was necessary for her to do in order to engage in reasonable efforts to obtain work and that her undertaking of the start of her own business did not qualify as such an effort. The motion for judgment is granted and the appeal dismissed.