An appeal from a judgment awarding a temporary injunction does not have the effect of suspending the judgment unless ordered by the trial court. Rule 385(d), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Oak Downs v. Watkins, 85 S.W.2d 1100 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1935, no writ); Owens v. Coker, 368 S.W.2d 959 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1963, no writ); Ralph Williams Gulfgate Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. State, 449 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston 1st, no writ). Since the trial court may within its discretion refuse to allow supersedeas, and no rule or statute allows supersedeas as a matter of right in appeal from a temporary injunction, the appellate court may not by mandamus require the trial judge to permit supersedeas. Ralph Williams Gulfgate Chrysler Plymouth v. State, Supra, 449 S.W.2d 139, 140.
On the other hand, this court does not have the power to issue a writ of injunction merely to preserve the status quo pending appeal. Becker v. Becker, 639 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ); Ralph Williams Gulfgate Chrysler P., Inc. v. State, 449 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, no writ). Nor does this court have the power to grant a temporary injunction to prevent damage to an appellant.
See also TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. sec. 22.221(a) (Vernon Pamph. 1987). On the other hand, this court does not have the power to issue a writ of injunction merely to preserve the status quo pending appeal. Becker v. Becker, 639 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ); Ralph Williams Gulfgate Chrysler P., Inc. v. State, 449 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, no writ). Nor does this court have the power to grant a temporary injunction to prevent damage to an appellant. Pace v. McEwen, 604 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1980, no writ). The power to grant a temporary writ of injunction to prevent damages which would otherwise flow to a litigant who has an appeal pending rests exclusively with the district judge.
Pendleton Green Associates v. Anchor Savings Bank, 520 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1975, no writ). On the other hand, this court does not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction merely for the purpose of preserving the status quo or to prevent loss or damage to one of the parties during the appeal. Ralph Williams Gulfgate Chrysler Plymouth Inc. v. State, 449 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, no writ); Pace v. McEwen, 604 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1980, no writ). In the instant case the relators contend that if respondent is allowed to build elaborate improvements on the land pending the appeal, he will have "staked his claim" to that portion of the tract with the highest ground, best view, and greatest overall aesthetic appeal and that the essential characteristics of the land, as it existed when the Commissioners made their appraisal and report, will be "radically and indelibly altered".
We also hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants supersedeas. Rule 385(d), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Wesware, Inc. v. Blackwell, 486 S.W.2d 599, Tex.Civ.App. Austin, decided October 25, 1972; Ralph Williams Gulfgate Chrysler — Plymouth, Inc. v. State, 449 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969, no writ hist.). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering its order against appellants and as modified above, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.