William Wicke Co. v. Kaldenberg Mfg. Co.

3 Citing cases

  1. Snowber v. Loeb

    76 Misc. 556 (N.Y. App. Term 1912)

    As we have seen there existed a valid and binding written agreement between the parties under which the defendant could take possession. Therein the case differs from that of Wicke Co. v. Kaldenberg Mfg. Co., 21 Misc. 79, in which an oral agreement only had been made and a lease was to be prepared. The defendant entered into possession, not dissenting from the terms and conditions of the lease, Mr. Kaldenberg stating that it was hardly worth while to sign a lease for so short a period.

  2. Franke v. Hewitt

    56 App. Div. 497 (N.Y. App. Div. 1900)   Cited 10 times

    ( Wilbur v. Collin, 4 App. Div. 418.) If all the conditions of the letting are definitely agreed upon, the failure to execute a written lease, though one had been contemplated by the parties, would not prevent the consummation of the contract, particularly where the tenant had been admitted to possession. ( William Wicke Co. v. Kaldenberg Mfg. Co., 21 Misc. Rep. 79.) The rule is the same where the negotiations are in writing and a formal written contract is stipulated for into which their agreement is to be reduced; if the minds of the parties meet upon all the essentials, the agreement is complete though the contemplated written contract was never made. Should either party attempt to assert any material condition not agreed to, the other would have the right to fall back upon the original agreement. ( Sanders v. Pottlitzer B.F. Co., 144 N.Y. 209.) A contract to make a written contract, the terms of which are mutually understood and agreed upon, is as valid and obligatory as the written contract would be if executed; but this only applies where the terms are in all respects definitely understood and agreed upon, and a part of the mutual understanding is that a written contract embodying those terms should be drawn. ( Pratt v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 21 N.Y. 308.)

  3. Hellman v. Hellman

    19 Misc. 3d 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)   Cited 5 times

    Contrary to Glenn Hellman's argument, a five-year lease of the kind at issue here is not an extraordinary or unusual contract for a business of this type, given the deposition and affidavit testimony that Bruce Hellman executed leases of this kind in connection with day-to-day business at Maynards' various places of operation, particularly when Maynards acquired a struggling concern in Jamestown, Olean and Hornell. ( Sign Up USA, Inc. v JCF Assoc. LLC, 33 AD3d 905, 906-907 [2d Dept 2006] ["plaintiff made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that Slone was an officer of Robson, and was the only individual who managed the day-to-day affairs of the corporation" and that "(t)herefore, he was authorized to enter into the lease in question on behalf of the corporation"]; William Wicke Co. v Kaldenberg Mfg. Co., 21 Misc 79 [App Term 1897]; 2 White, New York Business Entities ΒΆ B715.07 [2] at 7-177-7-178 [14th ed] [placing "(1)easing premises for corporation use" as in the class of "ordinary contracts," not extraordinary contracts requiring express board approval].) Accordingly, Glenn Hellman failed prima facie on his motion to establish that the president lacked the implied authority to execute the lease ( cf. Polish-American Media, Inc. v Jozwiak, 29 AD3d 663, 664 [2d Dept 2006]), and on Bruce Hellman's motion Glenn fails to raise an issue of fact on the issue of the presumptive power ( cf. Mumford v Hawkins, 5 Denio 355, 359 [Sup Ct, NY County 1848] [evidence "left no ground on which the jury could lawfully find that the proceeding in chancery was not authorized by the bank"]).