Opinion
Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-CT-333
07-27-2022
WILLIAM F. BRAUN MILK HAULING, INC., and Joseph Daugherty, Appellants, v. Peggy MALANOSKI, Appellee.
Attorneys for Appellants: Christopher R. Whitten, Matthew K. Phillips, Witten Law Office, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney for Appellee: Scott A. Faultless, Craig Kelley & Faultless, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellants: Christopher R. Whitten, Matthew K. Phillips, Witten Law Office, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee: Scott A. Faultless, Craig Kelley & Faultless, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana
Brown, Judge.
[1] In this interlocutory appeal, William F. Braun Milk Hauling, Inc., ("Braun") and Joseph Daugherty appeal the trial court's order denying their motion to dismiss. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On August 19, 2019, Peggy Malanoski was driving a vehicle and was in a collision with a semi-tractor and trailer operated by Daugherty. On September 24, 2021, Malanoski filed a complaint against Daugherty and Braun. Malanoski alleged that Daugherty was an employee of Braun and working within the scope of his employment and his negligent conduct was a responsible cause of the collision and her harm.
The complaint also alleged: "At all times relevant herein, the orders issued by the Indiana Supreme Court tolling statutes of limitation due to the public health emergency related to COVID-19 apply to this case." Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 10.
[3] On November 1, 2021, Braun and Daugherty filed a motion to dismiss. They argued the complaint alleged the accident occurred on August 19, 2019, and Malanoski failed to timely commence her lawsuit prior to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations under Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. They also argued "[t]he Indiana Supreme Court granted two Petitions for Emergency Relief for the courts of Marion County, on March 13, 2020, and March 23, 2020, in response to Covid-19" and "[n]either order extended the statute of limitations applicable to this lawsuit." Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 13.
[4] Malanoski filed an objection to Braun and Daugherty's motion to dismiss. She argued "all statutes of limitation were tolled from March 16, 2020, through August 14, 2020, for a total of 151 days." Id. at 20. In support of her argument, Malanoski cited several attached documents and orders. She cited a Petition for Relief under Indiana Administrative Rule 17 filed by the Courts of Marion County on March 13, 2020, requesting the Indiana Supreme Court to declare an emergency existed and to make appropriate emergency orders "directing and allowing the courts and clerk of Marion County to alter, modify, and suspend necessary procedures as provided in the emergency plan submitted herewith, so as to appropriately address this emergency for the period of Monday, March 16 through Friday, April 3, 2020, including a toll on the timeframes set forth in Ind. Crim. R. 4." Id. at 25. She cited to an order by the Indiana Supreme Court on March 13, 2020, providing:
It appears from the petition that compliance with appropriate public-health practices will inhibit litigants’ and courts’ ability to comply with statutory deadlines and rules of procedure....
* * * * *
The Court authorizes the tolling, beginning March 16, 2020 and until April 6, 2020, of all laws, rules, and procedures setting time limits for speedy trials in criminal and juvenile proceedings, public health, and mental health matters; all judgments, support, and other orders; and in all other civil and criminal matters before the courts of Marion County.
Id. at 52-53. She cited a petition for additional relief filed by the Courts of Marion County on March 17, 2020.
[5] Malanoski further cited two orders by the Indiana Supreme Court issued on March 23, 2020. The first order provided in part:
The file-stamp on this order indicates it was filed at 2:12 p.m. on March 23, 2020.
[T]he Court on its own motion DECLARES that an emergency exists in the Indiana Supreme Court and Clerk of Courts and ORDERS as follows to ensure the orderly and fair administration of justice during this emergency, effective immediately and through April 6, 2020 or further order of the Court:
1. The Court hereby tolls all laws, rules, and procedures setting time limits for appellate filings through April 6, 2020 , ....
2. The Court suspends Appellate Rule 23(A)(1), regarding filing by personal delivery to the Clerk or the "rotunda filing drop box." E-filing remains available pursuant to Appellate Rule 68 ; and documents exempted from e-filing shall be filed by United States Mail or third-party commercial carrier pursuant to Appellate Rules 23(A)(2)-(3) unless otherwise ordered by the Court....
3. To the extent not already provided by an order granting emergency relief under Administrative Rule 17 to a particular court, the Court hereby tolls all laws, rules, and procedures setting time limits for speedy trials in criminal and juvenile proceedings, public health, mental health, and appellate matters ; all judgments, support, and other orders; statutes of limitations; and in all other civil and criminal matters before the Indiana Tax Court and all circuit, superior, and city/town courts ("trial courts") of the State of Indiana. Further, no interest shall be due or charged during this tolled period. Nothing in this paragraph, however, prohibits any trial court from proceeding with any matter it deems in its discretion to be essential or urgent.
Id. at 90-91. The second order issued on March 23, 2020 stated: "The provisions of this Court's March 13, 2020 order, including but not limited to tolling of time limits and authority to continue jury trials, are extended through May 1, 2020." Id. at 93. Malanoski cited an order by the Indiana Supreme Court on April 3, 2020, which stated "[t]he effective date of all orders granting emergency relief to trial courts under Administrative Rule 17, including but not limited to tolling of time limits and authority to continue jury trials (if such authority was previously granted), is extended through May 4, 2020 ." Id. at 95. An order by the Court on April 24, 2020, stated the effective date of all orders granting emergency relief "is extended through May 17, 2020 , including but not limited to: ... tolling of time limits...." Id. at 101. An order by the Court on May 13, 2020, stated the effective date of all orders granting emergency relief "is extended through May 30, 2020 , including but not limited to: ... tolling of time limits...." Id. at 106. She cited a petition for additional relief filed by the Courts of Marion County on May 22, 2020. (109) Finally, Malanoski cited an order by the Indiana Supreme Court on May 29, 2020, which stated: "The Court authorizes the tolling, through August 14, 2020 , of all laws, rules, and procedures setting time limits for speedy trials in criminal and juvenile proceedings; public health and mental health matters; all judgments, support, and other orders; and in all other civil and criminal matters before Indiana trial courts." Id. at 123.
The text in bold appears in the emergency orders.
The file-stamp on this order indicates it was filed at 3:02 p.m. on March 23, 2020.
[6] Braun and Daugherty filed a brief in response to Malanoski's objection. They argued that one of the Indiana Supreme Court's March 23, 2020 orders tolled the statutes of limitations "from March 23, 2020 to April 6, 2020 – a period of 15 days." Id. at 129. They argued this order was "the only Order which prescribes any changes to the existing law concerning the statute of limitations period in which a plaintiff may file a personal injury action, and it expired on April 6, 2020 – over four months before [Malanoski's] limitations period expired and nearly five and one-half months before [Malanoski] filed her Complaint." Id. at 130. They argued that, even if the order gave Malanoski an additional fifteen days to file a complaint, her complaint was still untimely. They maintained that the March 23, 2020 order "provided a roughly two-week window for plaintiffs whose limitations periods were going to expire between March 23, 2020 and April 6, 2020," additional time to file their complaints. Id.
[7] On December 15, 2021, the court held a hearing. An entry in the chronological case summary on that date states: "Court having read the briefs of the parties and having heard oral argument as to the statute of limitations and potential tolling of that statute by Indiana Supreme Court orders having to do with COVID, and being duly advised, hereby DENIES [Braun and Daugherty's] Motion to Dismiss." Id. at 7. At Braun and Daugherty's request, the trial court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and this Court accepted jurisdiction.
Discussion
[8] A motion to dismiss under Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Price v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. , 80 N.E.3d 170, 173 (Ind. 2017). We accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint. Id. We review a trial court's grant or denial of a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion de novo. Thornton v. State , 43 N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 2015). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted is an appropriate means of raising the statute of limitations. Brown v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't , 85 N.E.3d 866, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
[9] Braun and Daugherty maintain Malanoski's complaint was untimely. They argue the only order "which arguably extended or tolled a statute of limitations period" was the Indiana Supreme Court's first order on March 23, 2020, "which according to its most liberal reading, extended Malanoski's limitations period 15 days." Appellants’ Brief at 9. Malanoski argues that, through its emergency orders, the Indiana Supreme Court "tolled all statutes of limitation from March 16, 2020, through August 14, 2020, for a total of 151 days" and that the statute of limitations for her case "was tolled (stopped running) for 151 days." Appellee's Brief at 13. She argues the order which specifically mentioned statutes of limitations was extended by the subsequent orders. [10] Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 provides that an action for injury to person or personal property must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. Statutes of limitations are favored because they afford security against stale claims and promote the peace and welfare of society. Runkle v. Runkle , 916 N.E.2d 184, 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. They are enacted upon the presumption that one having a well-founded claim will not delay in enforcing it. Id. A cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when a claimant knows or in exercise of ordinary diligence should have known of the injury. Id. The claimant bears the burden of bringing suit against the proper party within the statute of limitations. Id. at 192.
[11] We note that the Indiana Supreme Court's order issued at 2:12 p.m. on March 23, 2020, unambiguously "tolls all ... statutes of limitations" in all civil matters before Indiana's trial courts. Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 91. Typically, when a statute of limitations is "tolled," the "limitations period is suspended (stops running) ..., then starts running again when the tolling period ends, picking up where it left off." See Artis v. Dist. of Columbia , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 594, 601, 199 L.Ed.2d 473 (2018) (referring to tolling provision of federal Supplemental Jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) ); see also Jordan v. Deery , 609 N.E.2d 1104, 1107-1108 (Ind. 1993) (describing effect of medical malpractice tolling statute); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1716 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "toll" as "to stop the running of; to abate < toll the limitations period>"). The Court's next three emergency orders (dated April 3, April 24, and May 13, 2020) specifically state that they are extending "[t]he effective date of all orders granting emergency relief to trial courts under Administrative Rule 17, ... including but not limited to " tolling of time limits. Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 95, 101, 106 (emphasis added). To the extent that the tolling of statutes of limitations could be construed as something different from the tolling of time limits, the all-encompassing italicized phrase clearly extends the tolling of statutes of limitations through at least May 30, 2020. Accordingly, the limitations period for Malanoski's personal injury claim was tolled for over two months, and her complaint was timely filed.
[12] This interpretation of the emergency orders is consistent with the plain language of the orders and also with the important policy considerations behind them. The national, state, and local executive-branch emergency orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic severely restricted travel and in-person interactions, both of which are critical to the functioning of the judicial system in general and the attorney-client relationship in particular. Those restrictions undoubtedly had an adverse impact on the ability of clients, especially those of modest financial and technological means, to seek and consult with counsel, as well as on the ability of attorneys to investigate claims and draft appropriate pre-litigation correspondence and good-faith pleadings on behalf of their clients. The Indiana Supreme Court recognized as much in its first March 23, 2020 emergency order, see id. at 90 (observing orders declaring a public health emergency in Indiana and implementing statewide restrictions on travel and business operations and stating "[t]his emergency will impede litigants’ and courts’ ability to comply with statutory deadlines and rules of procedure"), and the Court took the corrective steps necessary to ensure that the wheels of justice would not run roughshod over the rights of injured Hoosiers. Malanoski filed her complaint before the expiration of the applicable limitations period as tolled by the Indiana Supreme Court's emergency orders, and her complaint was timely.
[13] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.
[14] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Crone, J., concur.