Will of Nassano

3 Citing cases

  1. Matter of Estate of Stanton

    472 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1991)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that revocatory acts on a photocopy of the original will did not comport with statutory requirements

    In this case, the physical act of destruction ("crumpl[ing]") was not made of the original will, but rather of a copy of the will. While the destruction of an executed, duplicate will may operate to revoke the original will, see Will of Nassano, 199 N.J. Super. 414, 489 A.2d 1189 (1985); In re Estate of Minsky, 46 Ill. App.3d 394, 4 Ill. Dec. 884, 360 N.E.2d 1317 (1977); but see Matter of Succession of Talbot, 516 So.2d 431 (La.Ct.App. 1987), the destruction of an unexecuted or conformed copy is ineffectual as an act of revocation regardless of the testator's intent. See In re D'Agostino's Will, 9 N.J. Super. 230, 75 A.2d 913 (1950); In re Wehr's Will, 247 Wis. 98, 18 N.W.2d 709 (1945); see generally 95 C.J.S. Wills ยง 281.

  2. Gushwa v. Hunt

    142 N.M. 575 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 1 times

    See, e.g., In re Estate of Tong, 619 P.2d 91, 92 (Colo.Ct.App. 1980) (cancelling executed carbon copy of will sufficient to revoke original will); In re Holmberg's Estate, 400 111. 366, 81 N.E.2d 188, 191 (1948) (writing `Void" on executed carbon copy sufficient to revoke original will); In re Will of Nassano, 199 N.J.Super. 414, 489 A.2d 1189, 1191 (Ct.App.Div. 1985) (writing "null and void" on executed duplicate copy sufficient to revoke original will). We observe, however, that duplicate originals and executed carbon copies are not the same as photocopies.

  3. In re Estate of Dickson

    590 So. 2d 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 7 times

    As shown by the majority opinion, they objectively invoke the provisions of section 732.506, Florida Statutes (1989). See also Starnes v. Andre, 243 Ark. 712, 421 S.W.2d 616 (1967); In re Davies' Estate, 5 Ill. App.3d 15, 282 N.E.2d 528 (1972); In re Will of Nassano, 199 N.J. Super. 414, 489 A.2d 1189 (1985). In my view, it is also clear that the testator's subjective intent was, as he unequivocally said, to "declare this will null and void," and therefore that the legal consequence of that act is, as the statute says, to revoke the will.