Opinion
C. A. 6:22-cv-00370-MGL-KFM
05-19-2022
Wendell Wilkins, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Warden Lana Hollis, Captain Parker, Sergeant Bostick, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated in North Carolina, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on February 7, 2022 (doc. 1). On March 8, 2022, the undersigned issued an order informing the plaintiff that his complaint was subject to dismissal as drafted and providing him with time to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies noted in the order (doc. 12). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his claims be dismissed (id. at 7-8). The plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided; accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the instant matter be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a state prisoner in the custody in North Carolina, brings this action regarding alleged constitutional violations that occurred while he was temporarily in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and located at Kirkland Correctional Institution (“Kirkland”) (doc. 1). The plaintiff alleges that when he was transferred to SCDC for court on May 17, 2021, he was assigned substantial security risk (“SSR”) custody level (id. at 4-5, 6, 7). The plaintiff contends that SSR custody is considered supermax, and the plaintiff should not have been classified as a supermax prisoner (id. at 7). The plaintiff further contends that upon arriving at Kirkland he was told that he would have to cut off his dreadlocks per SCDC policy, even though he was not subject to SCDC grooming policy because he was only temporarily transferred to SCDC for court in South Carolina and the jail in North Carolina allows inmates to grow out their hair (id. at 5, 7-8). The plaintiff contends that the defendants “used mace” and strapped him in a restraint chair so that his hair could be cut (id. at 5, 8-9). The plaintiff also contends that he requested not to be maced and complied with the defendants so that he would not be maced (id. at 9). The plaintiff's hair was cut with scissors, even though that is against SCDC policy (id. at 5, 9). After his hair was cut with scissors, the defendants used clippers to finish cutting the plaintiff's hair (id. at 9). The plaintiff was then returned to his cell, which was dry and did not have any of his personal belongings (id. at 7, 9).
For injuries, the plaintiff alleges mental anguish and pain and suffering (id. at 10). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages and for Deputy Warden Hollis to be terminated (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c)), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Custody Level Claim
First, to the extent the plaintiff seeks damages based upon his custody classification, asserting that he should not have been held in “supermax” “SSR” custody, his claim is subject to dismissal because prisoners generally do not have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in a particular security classification or prison placement. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (finding no constitutional right under the due process clause to a particular security classification or prison placement), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Indeed, as noted by the Supreme Court, a change in a prisoner's conditions of confinement only gives rise to a federally-protected liberty interest if it “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483, 485 (finding no liberty interest when inmate placed in segregated confinement). Here, the plaintiff's complaint does not allege an atypical or significant hardship, as outlined below with respect to his conditions of confinement claim. Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to allege a constitutionally cognizable injury with respect to his custody level (or with respect to any claim) because there is no constitutional right to be free from emotional distress or mental anguish. See Williams v. Pruitt, C/A No. 8:13-cv-01812-JMC, 2013 WL 4500436, at *2 n.2 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2013) (finding that there is no federal constitutional right to be free from emotional distress, mental anguish, or psychological stress) (citing Grandstaff v. City of Borger, Tex., 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987); Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899, 903 (1st Cir. 1989)). As such, the plaintiff's claim regarding his custody level is subject to summary dismissal.
Excessive Force Claim
It appears that the plaintiff alleges excessive force by the defendants when his hair was cut against his will (see doc. 1). The Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In order to state a plausible Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff must allege that the “prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component) and [that] the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious (objective component).” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). Thus, courts must analyze both subjective and objective components. “[T]he ‘core judicial inquiry' regarding the subjective component of an excessive force claim is ‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.'” Parkerv. Stevenson, 625 F. App'x. 196, 198 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 238, 239). The Fourth Circuit has identified the following four factors to consider when determining whether a prison official's actions were carried out “maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm:
(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of any reasonably perceived threat that the application of force was intended to quell; and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.Id. (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 239); see also Whitley Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986). To establish the objective component, a plaintiff must allege “the alleged wrongdoing is objectively ‘harmful enough' to establish a constitutional violation” in the context of “‘contemporary standards of decency.'” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991)). When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, there always exists a constitutional violation regardless of how significant a plaintiff's injury may be. Id. at 9; see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). Here, even liberally construed, the plaintiff's excessive force claim fails to state a claim for relief. The plaintiff alleges that he was threatened with being maced if he failed to submit to a haircut (see doc. 1 at 5, 8-9). However, it is not clear from the complaint whether the plaintiff was in fact maced. Moreover, it is unclear which defendants were involved in the alleged excessive force incident and the plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege malicious or sadistic acts by the involved parties to satisfy the subjective component of an excessive force claim especially in light of the conflicting factual allegations. In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff's excessive force claim is subject to summary dismissal.
Conditions of Confinement Claims
As noted above, the Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment regarding the conditions of his confinement, a prisoner must prove that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. See Stricklerv. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298).
Here, the plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations that he was placed in a dry cell without his personal items do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir.1994) (noting that the Constitution “creates no entitlement to grievance procedures” or any other procedures voluntarily established by a state); see also Thompson v. Brown, C/A No. 3:11-cv-318-TMC-JRM, 2011 WL 6012592, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2011) (rejecting conditions of confinement claim where the plaintiff claimed “his mattress and blanket were confiscated for six days, he was not allowed to have any toilet tissue for six days, his clothes were taken away from him for six days, his cell was cold, he had no running water in his cell, and he was forced to sleep on a steel cot for six days”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 6012550 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2011). The plaintiff also seeks relief this court cannot grant - requesting that Dep. Warden Hollis be terminated. See Maxton v. Johnson, 488 F.Supp. 1030, 1032 n.2 (D.S.C. 1980) (recognizing that “[f]ederal courts lack the authority to remove or reassign state employees” (internal citations omitted)).
Additionally, to the extent the plaintiff seeks relief because he was required to get a haircut and because his hair was cut with scissors, his claim also fails. First, his allegation that having his hair cut with scissors was a violation of SCDC policy, absent more, does not constitute a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992); Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., C/A No. 3:06-cv-02062-CMC-JRM, 2007 WL 904826, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007) (The plaintiff's allegation that defendants did not “follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation.”). Moreover, the plaintiff has not alleged a constitutionally protected interest in having long hair, or, as noted above, a constitutionally cognizable injury. As such, in light of the foregoing, the plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims are subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued March 8, 2022, the undersigned provided the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to timely file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment (doc. 12). The plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided. Accordingly, in addition to the reasons discussed herein, this action should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 Fed.Appx. 280, 281 (4th Cir. 2018) (in a case where the district court had already afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, directing the district court on remand to “in its discretion, either afford [the plaintiff] another opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order”) (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)); see also Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2020). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).