Opinion
No. COA11–1543.
2012-07-3
Sandra B. WILKINS, Plaintiff, v. Brian Andrew FARAH, M.D., and Guilford Psychiatric Associates, P.A ., Defendants.
Jerry R. Everhardt, for the plaintiff. Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Carrie E. Meigs, and Young Moore and Henderson, P.A., by Robert M. Clay, for the defendants.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 14 September 2009 by Judge Edgar Gregory in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 April 2012. Jerry R. Everhardt, for the plaintiff. Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Carrie E. Meigs, and Young Moore and Henderson, P.A., by Robert M. Clay, for the defendants.
THIGPEN, Judge.
Sandra B. Wilkins (“Plaintiff”) appeals from an order granting partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim to Brian Farah and Guilford Psychiatric Associates, P.A., (“Defendants”) on the basis of collateral estoppel. Because the issue of whether the drug Adderall was the cause of Plaintiff's loss of employment was actually litigated and determined in a previous lawsuit, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies, and we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
This case is back before this Court after being dismissed as interlocutory. For a summary of the facts preceding dismissal, reference is made to this Court's prior opinion. Wilkins v. Farah, No. COA10–28, 2010 N.C.App. LEXIS 2315, 2010 WL 5135553 (filed 7 December 2010) (unpublished).
Following this Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's appeal as interlocutory, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all remaining claims on 26 September 2011 and subsequently filed a notice of appeal. Plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of all the remaining claims had the effect of making the 14 September 2009 order granting partial summary judgment to Defendants a final judgment. See Combs & Associates, Inc. v. Kennedy, 147 N.C.App. 362, 367, 555 S.E.2d 634, 638 (2001) (holding that “[o]rdinarily, an appeal from an order granting summary judgment to fewer than all of a plaintiff's claim is premature and subject to dismissal”; however, the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of the claim which survived summary judgment “has the effect of making the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment a final order”) (citations omitted).
The trial court's 14 September 2009 order granted partial summary judgment to Defendants “as to the plaintiff's claims for damages arising from the termination of her employment as a result of the alleged negligent conduct of Brian Andrew Farah, M.D., in treating Plaintiff's ADHD with the medication Adderall” on the basis of the doctrine of issue preclusion.
II. Summary Judgment
Plaintiff's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on her claim for damages arising out of her termination of employment on the basis of collateral estoppel. We disagree.
“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (quotation and quotation marks omitted). “The showing required for summary judgment may be accomplished by proving “an essential element of the opposing party's claim does not exist, cannot be proven at trial, or would be barred by an affirmative defense, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of her claim.” Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 83, 530 S.E.2d 829, 835 (2000) (citations omitted). “When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge must view the presented evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Jones, 362 N.C. at 573, 669 S.E.2d at 576 (quotation omitted).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also referred to as “issue preclusion,”
precludes relitigation of a fact, question or right in issue when there has been a final judgment or decree, necessarily determining the fact, question or right in issue, rendered by a court of record and of competent jurisdiction, and there is a later suit involving an issue as to the identical fact, question or right theretofore determined, and involving identical parties or parties in privity with a party or parties to the prior suit.
State v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620, 622, 528 S.E.2d 17, 20 (2000) (quotation and quotation marks omitted); see also City of Asheville v. State, 192 N.C.App. 1, 17, 665 S.E.2d 103, 117 (2008) (stating that “where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered”) (emphasis omitted), disc. review denied,––– N.C. ––––, 672 S.E.2d 685 (2009). “When a fact has been ... decided in a court of record, neither of the parties shall be allowed to call it in question, and have it tried over again at any time thereafter, so long as the judgment or decree stands unreversed.” Summers, 351 N.C. at 623, 528 S.E.2d at 20. (quotation omitted).
In determining whether collateral estoppel is applicable to specific issues, the following four requirements must be met for an identity of issues:
(1) the issues must be the same as those involved in the prior action, (2) the issues must have been raised and actually litigated in the prior action, (3) the issues must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action, and (4) the determination of the issues in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.
Id. at 623, 528 S.E.2d at 20 (citation omitted). “An issue is ‘actually litigated,’ for purposes of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise submitted for determination and is in fact determined.” City of Asheville, 192 N.C.App. at 17, 665 S.E.2d at 117 (citation omitted). “A very close examination of matters actually litigated must be made in order to determine if the underlying issues are in fact identical.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff contends collateral estoppel does not apply because the issues raised in the instant case are not the same as those actually litigated and determined in a prior action. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that in the prior action, Wilkins v.. Guilford Cty., 158 N.C.App. 661, 582 S.E.2d 74 (2003) (the “Guilford County case”), this Court determined only that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and did not determine the issue in the instant case—whether Plaintiff was entitled to damages under a theory of medical malpractice. We disagree.
In the Guilford County case, this Court determined, inter alia, whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Defendants because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was disabled. Id. at 665, 582 S.E.2d at 77. This Court reasoned that “the negative effects of treatment measures for an impairment, including the side effects of medication, must be considered in determining whether a disability exists.” Id. at 666, 582 S.E.2d at 77 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, we specifically analyzed “whether plaintiff's ability to work was substantially limited by side effects from her ADD medication Adderall.” Id. at 667, 582 S.E .2d at 78. We held as follows:
In this case, there is no evidence plaintiff was unable, due to side effects from Adderall, to perform a major life activity, i.e. work, that an average person could perform. From the time plaintiff started taking Adderall until after she lost her position with DSS, she never reported any side effects to her doctor, and her doctor did not observe any side effects during any of plaintiff's office visits, including after plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff also made no requests for ADA accommodations based on ADD until 17 December 1999, the date she was recommended for termination. Moreover, plaintiff had been taking the increased dosage of 40 milligrams of Adderall per day for at least a month prior to her first performance evaluation at DSS on 19 July 1999 on which she received the second-highest rating. This tends to indicate that the use of the drug had no impact on plaintiff's job performance and that other, non-drug-related factors contributed to the decline in her work performance leading to her poor evaluation in December 1999 and subsequent termination from DSS. As we see nothing in this record to substantiate plaintiff's disability claim, the trial court did not err in granting defendants' summary judgment motion with respect to this claim.
Id. (Emphasis added).
In the present action for medical malpractice, Plaintiff's complaint alleges in part that “Dr. Farah's negligent failure and omission to titrate Plaintiff's dosage of Adderall and his direction that Plaintiff take, or his acquiescence in Plaintiff taking, Adderall at a dosage level of 20 mg. twice a day was the direct and proximate cause of ... her loss of employment[.]” We conclude the question of whether Adderall was the cause of Plaintiff's loss of employment, a required element of the medical malpractice action, was previously raised and determined in the Guilford County case. See Summers, 351 N.C. at 622, 528 S.E.2d at 20 (stating that collateral estoppel “precludes relitigation of a fact, question or right in issue when there has been a final judgment or decree, necessarily determining the fact, question or right in issue ... and there is a later suit involving an issue as to the identical fact, question or right theretofore determined”) (quotation omitted); see also Crocker v. Roethling, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 719 S.E.2d 83, 86 (2011) (stating that to prevail in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must show “(1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a breach of such standard of care by the defendant; (3) the injuries suffered by the plaintiff were proximately caused by such breach; and (4) ... damages”) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added).
In the Guilford County case, this Court found that “there is no evidence plaintiff was unable, due to side effects from Adderall, to ... work” and that “the use of the drug [Adderall] had no impact on plaintiff's job performance and that other, non-drug-related factors contributed to the decline in her work performance leading to her poor evaluation in December 1999 and subsequent termination from DSS.” Wilkins, 158 N.C.App. at 667, 582 S.E.2d at 78. Although the “dispositive issue[ ]” in the Guilford County case was whether Plaintiff suffered from a disability, id. at 665, 582 S.E.2d at 76, the question of “whether plaintiff's ability to work was substantially limited by side effects from her ADD medication Adderall,” was an underlying determinative issue that the Guilford County court considered and answered in deciding whether Plaintiff had a disability. Id. at 667; 582 S.E.2d at 78;see King v. Grindstaff, 284 N .C. 348, 360, 200 S.E.2d 799, 808 (1973) (concluding that collateral estoppel applied to the issues of the truck driver's actionable negligence and the imputability of his negligence to the lessee in a wrongful death action where these issues were “determinative of [the lessee's] liability” and had been “considered ... and answered” by a federal court in a prior action for personal injury); see also City of Asheville, 192 N.C.App. at 17, 665 S.E.2d at 117 (stating that “[a] very close examination of matters actually litigated must be made in order to determine if the underlying issues are in fact identical”) (citation omitted and emphasis added).
Whether Adderall was the cause of Plaintiff's loss of employment was a “fact [or] question ... in issue[,]” Summers, 351 N.C. at 622, 528 S.E.2d at 20, that was actually litigated and determined in the Guilford County case; thus, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff's present action arising out of the termination of her employment as a result of the effects of the drug Adderall. See id. at 623; 528 S.E.2d at 20. (“When a fact has been ... decided in a court of record, neither of the parties shall be allowed to call it in question, and have it tried over again at any time thereafter, so long as the judgment or decree stands unreversed.”) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by entering partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
AFFIRMED. Judges ELMORE and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).