Opinion
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:17-CV-380-TWT
05-16-2018
ELEANOR WILKINS, Plaintiff, v. BELK, INC., Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a slip and fall case. It is before the Court on the Defendant Belk, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 20]. For the following reasons, Belk's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
I. Background
On January 9, 2015, the Plaintiff, Eleanor Wilkins, went to the Belk store located on Riverside Drive in Macon, Georgia, to exchange some men's shirts. After entering the store, she went up the escalator to the men's department on the second floor. Once there, she perused the sales racks in the men's department for about fifteen to twenty minutes. According to Wilkins, there were so many racks placed closely together that she "had to push [her] way through to the racks." While looking at one rack, Wilkins moved to her right. As she did so, her foot caught the metal base of the rack she was looking at, causing her to lose her balance, fall onto her right side, and fracture her hip. Wilkins sued Belk for negligence in failing to keep the aisles and walkways in the store clear and failing to warn patrons of potential hazards. Belk now moves for summary judgment.
Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("SMF") ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 2.
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶ 5.
Id. at ¶¶ 6-8.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties show no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should view the evidence and any inferences that may be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. The party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. "A mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be a sufficient showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party."
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
III. Discussion
Under Georgia law, business owners can be held liable to their customers if they fail to "exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe." However, the mere fact that someone fell "proves nothing. Such happenings are commonplace wherever humans go." The determining factor is whether the owner has superior knowledge of the hazard. Therefore, in order for Wilkins to recover, she must prove that "(1) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and (2) that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care due to actions or conditions within the control of the owner/occupier."
Baldwin County Hosp. Authority v. Martinez, 204 Ga. App. 840, 842 (1992) (quotations omitted).
Id.
Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 748 (1997).
In this case, the rack which Wilkins tripped on was a static condition. "When nothing obstructs the invitee's ability to see [a] static condition, the proprietor may safely assume that the invitee will see it and will realize any associated risks." "Thus, under Georgia law, if the condition is open and obvious, an invitee may avoid it through the exercise of ordinary care."
See Becton v. Tire King of N. Columbus, Inc., 246 Ga. App. 57, 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) ("[a] static condition is one that does not change and is dangerous only if someone fails to see it and walks into it").
Pope v. Target Stores, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-81-WCO, 2006 WL 734603, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2006), aff'd sub nom. Pope v. Target Corp., 226 F. App'x 878 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Poythress v. Savannah Airport Comm'n, 229 Ga. App. 303, 306 (1997)).
Id. at *3.
No one disputes that the rack was in plain view. In fact, the parties agree that Wilkins was aware of the rack she tripped on, nothing obstructed the view of the base of the rack, and the area was well lit. Wilkins' only argument is that she did not see the base and that the number of racks and the amount of clothes on them caused a distraction to her. Courts have regularly rejected both arguments.
Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 14-18.
In an extremely similar case, this Court rejected a plaintiff's claim that she tripped over the base of a clothing rack at a Target store because the base was obstructed by the clothes on the rack. The Court found that the plaintiff's "familiarity with the construction of clothing racks in general and her previous experience both working and shopping in similar retail stores" would have given her knowledge that the clothing rack she tripped on had a base. This knowledge put her on equal footing with the defendant store. And regarding the plaintiff's obstruction argument, the Court said that if she was correct that the clothing obstructed the base, then "plaintiff must have been walking so close to the rack that her foot came under the clothes and hit the base. If the base of the rack was not obstructed by clothing, then the plaintiff could have seen it." Either way, the Court found that the use of ordinary care would have avoided the situation.
Pope, 2006 WL 734603, at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
And in another similar case, a woman tripped and fell over a cart that had been left in the aisle. The plaintiff was aware of the cart, but argued that a corner which she did not see caused her to fall. The court, however, found for the defendant because the plaintiff "had actual knowledge of the [cart] which caused her to fall prior to encountering it; she merely did not appreciate its dimensions." Because she had actual knowledge of the cart generally, even if she did not see a constituent portion of the cart, her knowledge was equal to that of the defendant and she had the responsibility to use ordinary care to avoid it.
Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P, 2007 WL 2275309 at *1 (M.D. Ga. August 7, 2007).
Id.
Id. at *4.
This case is no different. Although Wilkins did not look down at the bottom of the racks, she did have actual knowledge of the rack she tripped on as a whole, and nothing obstructed her view of the base. "Although a plaintiff is not required to look continuously at the floor for defects, once an invitee observes an object in her path, she is required to use ordinary care to negotiate around it." And even if she could not have seen the base, in order to trip over it, she would have had to have been walking so close to it that she would not have been using ordinary care.
Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s SMF ¶ 15.
Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 15-18.
Smith, 2007 WL 2275309 at *4 (quotations omitted). See also Pope v. Target Corporation, 226 Fed. Appx. 878, 879 (2007) ("If the base of the rack was not obstructed by clothing, then plaintiff could have seen it . . . [and] could have avoided tripping over the base of the rack through the exercise of ordinary care.").
Pope, 2006 WL 734603, at *3.
Further, just like the plaintiff in Pope, Wilkins was familiar with clothing racks in general, as she had often shopped at this particular Belk store. And although the Plaintiff argues she was distracted because of "the mass amounts of shirts on the clearance rack," shopping at the clearance rack was one of her reasons for going to the store. This "cannot be accepted under the distraction theory because that was the very activity that brought" Wilkins to Belk in the first place. Thus, she had knowledge of the hazard equal to that of the Defendant, which precludes her recovery.
Wilkins Dep., at 29:11-14 [Doc. 19].
Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., at 10.
Pl.'s Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 4.
Bartlett v. McDonough Bedding Co., 313 Ga. App. 657, 660 (2012). --------
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Defendant Belk, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 20] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this 16 day of May, 2018.
/s/Thomas W. Thrash
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge