Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-1754, SECTION "T" (1)
November 26, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff, Dwayne Wilkerson, a state prisoner incarcerated at the St. Charles Correctional Center, Killona, Louisiana, filed this civil action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Sheriff Greg Champagne, Warden Roland Ladreyt, Assistant Warden Raquel Lewis, and Kenneth Decorte. In this lawsuit, plaintiff challenges various conditions of his confinement. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.
Rec. Doc. 1.
Rec. Doc. 10.
On September 16, 2003, the Court held a Spears hearing to allow plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to advise the Court of the nature and factual basis of his claims. Plaintiff's testimony was given under oath and recorded. At the hearing, plaintiff testified regarding the nine claims asserted in this lawsuit.
See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). "[T]he Spears procedure affords the plaintiff an opportunity to verbalize his complaints, in a manner of communication more comfortable to many prisoners." Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1998). The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that a Spears hearing is in the nature of a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) motion for more definite statement. Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 1996). Spears hearing testimony becomes a part of the total filing by the pro se applicant. Id. (footnotes and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff filed this complaint in forma pauperis . An in forma pauperis complaint may be dismissed if it is determined that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court has broad discretion in determining the frivolous nature of the complaint.Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 325 (5th Cir. 1986).modified on other grounds, Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 1993). In making that determination, the Court has "not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown). Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, a complaint is frivolous "if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994); Booker, 2 F.3d at 115 n. 6. Construing plaintiff's complaint broadly, and fully considering plaintiff's testimony during the Spears hearing, the Court finds that plaintiff's allegations lack any arguable basis in law and should be dismissed as frivolous and for failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Rec. Doc. 2.
The court must liberally construe a pro se civil rights complaint. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994).
Before turning to plaintiff's specific claims, the Court will make two preliminary observations.
First, most of plaintiff's claims concern prison conditions and amenities. However, a prisoner is not entitled to relief simply because prison conditions are unpleasant, as the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons. Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1999). Instead, an inmate filing suit pursuant to § 1983 is entitled to relief based on the conditions of his confinement only when the conditions are so inhumane that they violate the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 351-52. This constitutional protection is violated only where (1) the deprivation was sufficiently serious as to have resulted in the inmate being denied the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and (2) the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.Id. at 352.
Second, the Court notes that plaintiff has not alleged either in his complaint or at the Spears hearing that he has suffered any physical harm or injury with respect to any of his claims. A prisoner is not entitled to recover under § 1983 for purely mental or emotional injuries. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
With these general principles in mind, the Court will now examine each of plaintiff's claims.
Claim I
Plaintiff complains that inmates who work in the kitchen are not screened or tested for HIV and other infectious diseases. Although plaintiff is offended by this practice, he is not entitled to relief because he has not suffered physical harm caused by the practice and, in any event, the practice is not unconstitutional. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Hodges v. Frasier, No. 97-50917 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 1999) (unpublished) (the fact that HIV+ inmates are involved in food preparation or service does not amount to a constitutional violation).
Claim II
Plaintiff complains that meals are served off of old, cracked, dirty food trays. Again, plaintiff is not entitled to relief because he has not suffered physical harm as a result of this allegedly unsanitary practice. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Moreover, the situation described by plaintiff is not sufficiently serious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Jackson v. Griffith, No. 1:93-CV-424, 1995 WL 21939, at *4-5 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 1995) (Hines, M.J.) (claim regarding unsanitary food trays resulting from overcrowded conditions dismissed as frivolous), adopted, 1995 WL 313655 (Feb. 8, 1995) (Fisher, J.).
Claim III
Plaintiff complains that meals are no longer hot by the time they are actually served to inmates. The fact that food is not served at the temperature plaintiff would prefer does not amount to an injury of constitutional magnitude. See Sardon v. Peters, No. 04-C-7505, 1995 WL 609147, at*8(N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 1995).
Claim IV
Plaintiff complains that there are no cold-water fountains and that the available water coolers are unsanitary. At the Spears hearing, plaintiff testified that the water coolers are also used as refrigeration devices for storage of milk cartons, jugs of Kool-Aid, and similar items. Plaintiff also testified that the coolers are old and smell bad.
To the extent that plaintiff is asserting that he is entitled to cold drinking water, he is incorrect. The failure to provide cold water for drinking does not amount to a constitutional violation. Dunlap v. City of Tupelo, No, 195CV67SD, 1996 WL 33370640 (Mar. 8, 1996) (no violation found where inmate had access to only hot water which had to cool before it could be used for drinking), aff'd, 103 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1996).
To the extent that plaintiff is claiming that the water coolers are unsanitary, the situation described by plaintiff is not sufficiently serious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Moreover, he has suffered no physical harm. Therefore, again, he is not entitled to relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
Claim V
Plaintiff complains that the jail does not provide sufficient alternative beverages, such as Kool-Aid, juice, tea, and lemonade. At theSpears hearing, plaintiff testified that milk is served every morning; however, other alternatives to water are provided only every other day.
Plaintiff's constitutional rights are not violated simply because of the limited beverage options. He is provided milk and one other beverage, either water or an alternative beverage, every day. That he would prefer a wider selection of beverages each day is of no moment. See Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (the Constitution requires only that inmates be provided well-balanced meals containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1378 (5th Cir. 1981) (reasonably adequate meals, not variety, is all that is constitutionally required),overruled on other grounds, International Woodworkers of America v. Champion International Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986).
Claim VI
Plaintiff claims that the toilets leak water. However, "[l]eaky toilets and puddles are unpleasant but not unconstitutional." Smith v. Melvin, No. 95-2531, 1996 WL 467658, at *2 (7th Cir. July 26, 1996) (unpublished). Moreover, plaintiff is again not entitled to relief because he has not suffered physical harm as a result of the alleged leaks. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).Claim VII
Plaintiff claims that the jail does not provide free hygiene supplies. At the Spears hearing, plaintiff testified that in the past he has been denied basic hygiene supplies on the ground that he had sufficient funds in his inmate account to purchase the items from the commissary. This Court has no hesitation in finding that the Constitution does not require that free hygiene supplies be provided to non-indigent inmates. See Roach v. Klingman, 412 F. Supp. 521, 526-27 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Although plaintiff's Spears hearing testimony was somewhat unclean he seemed to indicate that at times other inmates with no funds were denied hygiene supplies. However, plaintiff was not denied supplies when he had no funds, and he does not have standing to bring claims on behalf of other inmates.
Claim VIII
Plaintiff complains that inmates are charged excessive medical co-payments. Plaintiff contends that inmates are charged $7.00 for sick calls, $10.00 for dental appointments, and $20.00 for emergency care. It is not unconstitutional to require non-indigent prisoners to pay for their medical care. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Belt, 957 F. Supp. 97, 100 (W.D. La. 1996); see also Breakiron v. Neal, 166 F. Supp.2d 1110, 1114-16 (N.D. Tex. 2001). Plaintiff does not allege that he has been denied medical care because of an inability to pay the required co-payment.
The Court notes that Louisiana law expressly allows inmates to be charged for their medical care. See La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 15:831(C).
Claim IX
Plaintiff complains that the grievance procedure is inadequate. However, inmates have no constitutional right to access to an adequate administrative grievance procedure. See, e.g., Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991); Flowers v. Tate, Nos. 90-3742 and 90-3796, 1991 WL 22009, at * 1(6th Cir. Feb. 22, 1991) (unpublished);Jones v. Williams, No. Civ. A. 4:99-CV-779-B, 2001 WL 283101, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2001); Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F. Supp.2d 626, 638 (W.D. La. 2000); Ishaaq v. Compton, 900 F. Supp. 935, 940 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); Brown v. Dodson, 863 F. Supp. 284, 285 (W.D. Va. 1994).
Therefore, plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because no federally-protected rights have been implicated and plaintiff has suffered no cognizable harm.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).