Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:98CVP-473-S
September 9, 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on motion of the defendants, William Seabold, Tony Williams, and Mindy Tanner, to dismiss in this § 1983 action. The plaintiff, Vickey Wilhoite, pro se, has failed to respond to the motion. Because this Court has considered the plaintiff's undisputed medical records in addition to the pleadings, this Court will treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment.
Wilhoite filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants have denied him proper medical care. Wilhoite claims that he has been injured since he came to the Kentucky State Reformatory ("KSR") and that the defendants were aware of his injuries. He alleges that he has been deprived of medications and that the institution has refused to treat him despite his repeated requests. He claims that, as a result, his condition has deteriorated and has suffered further injury.
The defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law for two reasons. First, they contend that the plaintiff, in describing the conduct as gross negligence, has failed to allege an Eighth Amendment violation. Second, they argue that, because plaintiff's allegations are based on mere conclusions and opinions, he fails to show the necessary causal connection between the named defendants and the supposed constitutional deprivations.
Failure to file an opposing memorandum may be sufficient grounds for granting the requested relief. See LR 7.1(c)(1). Nevertheless, in the interests of justice, this Court will review and address the merits of the defendants' motion.
In order to support a motion for summary judgment, a moving party must prove the absence of a genuine issue of any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding a summary judgment motion, a judge's role is not to weigh the evidence or determine its truth, but to determine if a genuine question of fact exists. Id. at 249. "[W]hether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250. In making these determinations, the Court is to view all facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. White v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 909 F.2d 941 (6th Cir. 1990).
Wilhoite must show that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the defendants deprived him of that right under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
In order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must establish the defendants' deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105 (1976). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held with respect to the proof required to establish deliberate indifference to medical needs that:
Officials may be shown to be deliberately indifferent to such serious needs without evidence of conscience intent to inflict pain. However, the conduct for which liability attaches must be more culpable than mere negligence; it must demonstrate deliberateness tantamount to intent to punish. Knowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances clearly indicating the existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference.Horn by Parks v. Madison County Fiscal Ct., 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 199 (1994). In United States v. State of Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 154 n. 7 (6th Cir. 1991), the Court further explained:
This court notes the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, No. 89-7376, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271, 1991 U.S. Lexis 3490 (June 17, 1991), which has not only reaffirmed the principle that eighth amendment impingements anchored in conditions of confinement must be objectively demonstrated, id. at 303, but also has announced that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that prison authorities subjectively intended such violations. Id. It is noted, however, that the subjective intentions of prison authorities must be demonstrated by objective manifestations of such intent, and cannot be proved by factually unsupported, conclusory opinions of the court or of the prisoners or their representatives.See also, Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125 (6th Cir. 1994).
Wilhoite has made non-specific allegations against the defendants that they have refused him treatment and medications. He does not provide any times, dates, or circumstances during which these refusals occurred. He does not identify any specific attempts to receive treatment nor does he name any specific parties with whom he spoke. In fact, Wilhoite's medical records indicate that he did receive consistent medical treatment and prescriptions throughout his incarceration at KSR. Specifically, Wilhoite was examined in December, January, March, and July immediately preceding the filing of this action in July 1998. See, Williams Letter. Wilhoite's lack of specific allegations as to the defendants' refusals to treat him and Wilhoite's medical records lead this Court to conclude that he is unable to establish a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
The defendants, Seabold, Williams, and Tanner, are the warden, deputy warden, and medical director, respectively. They hold supervisory positions and are not involved in the day-to-day management of KSR. Defendants argue that Wilhoite has failed to show a causal link connecting them to the alleged violation.
In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff in § 1983 cases must establish a direct causal link between the misconduct and each supervisor. Id. at 370-71. In interpreting Rizzo, the Sixth Circuit has further held:
. . . a failure of a supervisory official to supervise, control, or train the offending individual [employees] is not actionable absent a showing that the official either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending [employees].
Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982).
Wilhoite has not shown a direct causal link between the alleged misconduct and any actions of these supervisors. Merely having supervisory authority over Kentucky State Reformatory employees is insufficient. There is a complete absence of evidence to establish obduracy or wantonness in the conduct of any of the defendants identified above. See, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). The subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim requires that Wilhoite produce some evidence that each defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind to establish that they acted with deliberate indifference. He has failed to meet this burden.
Finally, to the extent that the defendants have been sued in their official capacity, and Wilhoite seeks money damages, the claims against them are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and must be dismissed. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Viewing all the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to Wilhoite, this Court finds that Wilhoite fails to establish a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Seabold, Williams and Tanner are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A separate order will be entered herein this date in accordance with this opinion.
ORDER
Motion having been made by the defendants, William Seabold, Tony Williams, and Mindy Tanner, for summary judgment, and for the reasons set forth in the memorandum opinion entered herein this date, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the defendants' motion is GRANTED and the plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.