Wiley v. State

89 Citing cases

  1. Fleming v. State

    604 So. 2d 280 (Miss. 1992)   Cited 229 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding the absence of timely objection causes the defendant to be procedurally barred from asserting the alleged error on appeal

    See Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 167 (Miss. 1991); Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Miss. 1991); State v. Ferguson, 576 So.2d 1252, 1254-55 (Miss. 1991); Flores v. State, 574 So.2d 1314, 1322 (Miss.

  2. Taylor v. State

    672 So. 2d 1246 (Miss. 1996)   Cited 237 times
    Holding that the State may respond in its closing arguments to defense counsel's failure to follow through on promises of proof to come made during opening statements

    Any delay as a result of action by the State, without "good cause," causes the time to be counted against the State. A delay caused by the actions of the defendant, such as a continuance, tolls the running of the time period for that length of time, and is subtracted from the total amount of the delay. Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Miss. 1991); Flores, 574 So.2d at 1318. A bad motive on the part of the prosecution significantly affects the balancing test.

  3. Newell v. State

    175 So. 3d 1260 (Miss. 2015)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that "[t]he Court of Appeals should have addressed Newell's arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence ... even if it also determined that the trial court had committed an error in the exclusion of evidence"

    Under the second Barker prong, β€œthe state must prove either that the defendant prompted the delay or that the state did, but with good cause.” Ross v. State, 605 So.2d 17, 22 (Miss.1992) (citing Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1012 (Miss.1991) ). For example, β€œ β€˜well-taken’ motions for continuance may justify a delay in criminal cases.”

  4. Hersick v. State

    2003 KA 151 (Miss. 2004)   Cited 55 times
    In Hersick, the appellant contended that the indictment against him was fatally flawed because while it stated that Hersick attempted kidnapping, the indictment failed to specify the specific manner in which the kidnapping took place.

    Therefore, the State bears the concomitant burden of showing that either the delay was caused by the defendant or that the delay was for a good cause. Where the State is unable to do either, this factor must be weighed against the State. Smith v. State, 550 So.2d at 409; Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1012 (Miss. 1991). ΒΆ 8.

  5. Sharp v. State

    1999 KA 1488 (Miss. 2001)   Cited 85 times
    Recognizing that each delay must be considered separately, "because only those delays attributable to the State count toward the 270 days."

    "The necessary time for the accused and his counsel to prepare his trial must necessarily be left largely to the sound discretion of the trial judge, bearing in mind the facts and circumstances of the particular case." Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1012 (Miss. 1991); Gilmore v. State, 225 Miss. 173, 189, 82 So.2d 838, 846 (1955). Accounting for 82 days, this time does not appear to be overly lengthy for preparation for a drug related offense and therefore does not count against either the State or the defendant.

  6. Ross v. State

    605 So. 2d 17 (Miss. 1992)   Cited 37 times
    Maintaining that a defendant's assertion of prejudice attributable solely to incarceration, with no other harm, is typically not sufficient to warrant reversal

    The basic rule governing reason for delay is twofold: the state must prove either that the defendant prompted the delay or that the state did, but with good cause. Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1012 (Miss. 1991); see also Flores v. State, 574 So.2d at 1318; Vickery, 535 So.2d at 1375, 1377. Once the state establishes that the reason for delay justifies tolling the clock, the clock is tolled until the next reasonably available term of court. See Nations v. State, 481 So.2d 760, 762 (Miss.

  7. Scott v. State

    2005 KA 915 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 1 times

    Hersick v. State, 904 So.2d 116, 121 (ΒΆ 8) (Miss. 2004) (citing Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Miss. 1991)). Therefore, the time attributable to Scott's continuances is subtracted from the total delay, leaving approximately thirteen and one half months that are attributable to the State.

  8. Skaggs v. State

    676 So. 2d 897 (Miss. 1996)   Cited 51 times

    No single factor is dispositive. Barker; Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008 (Miss. 1991). The weight given each necessarily turns on the facts and circumstances of each case, the quality of evidence available on each factor, and, in the absence of evidence, identification of the party with the risk of nonpersuasion.

  9. Spencer v. State

    592 So. 2d 1382 (Miss. 1991)   Cited 34 times
    Finding that defendant's failure to assert his right to a speedy trial until the eve of trial, 535 days after his arrest, caused the third Barker factor to weigh against him

    1991); Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165 (Miss. 1991); Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008 (Miss. 1991); Anderson v. State, 577 So.2d 390 (Miss. 1991); Barnes v. State, 577 So.2d 840 (Miss.

  10. Craig v. State

    45 So. 3d 699 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 2 times

    Id. Since it is the State's responsibility to provide a defendant with a speedy trial, this factor is weighed against the State unless it can show either that the delay was caused by the defendant or that the delay was for a good cause. Id.; Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1012 (Miss. 1991). In this case, the delay was caused by an overcrowded docket with older, previously scheduled cases being tried before Craig's case.