See Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 167 (Miss. 1991); Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Miss. 1991); State v. Ferguson, 576 So.2d 1252, 1254-55 (Miss. 1991); Flores v. State, 574 So.2d 1314, 1322 (Miss.
Any delay as a result of action by the State, without "good cause," causes the time to be counted against the State. A delay caused by the actions of the defendant, such as a continuance, tolls the running of the time period for that length of time, and is subtracted from the total amount of the delay. Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Miss. 1991); Flores, 574 So.2d at 1318. A bad motive on the part of the prosecution significantly affects the balancing test.
Under the second Barker prong, βthe state must prove either that the defendant prompted the delay or that the state did, but with good cause.β Ross v. State, 605 So.2d 17, 22 (Miss.1992) (citing Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1012 (Miss.1991) ). For example, β βwell-takenβ motions for continuance may justify a delay in criminal cases.β
Therefore, the State bears the concomitant burden of showing that either the delay was caused by the defendant or that the delay was for a good cause. Where the State is unable to do either, this factor must be weighed against the State. Smith v. State, 550 So.2d at 409; Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1012 (Miss. 1991). ΒΆ 8.
"The necessary time for the accused and his counsel to prepare his trial must necessarily be left largely to the sound discretion of the trial judge, bearing in mind the facts and circumstances of the particular case." Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1012 (Miss. 1991); Gilmore v. State, 225 Miss. 173, 189, 82 So.2d 838, 846 (1955). Accounting for 82 days, this time does not appear to be overly lengthy for preparation for a drug related offense and therefore does not count against either the State or the defendant.
The basic rule governing reason for delay is twofold: the state must prove either that the defendant prompted the delay or that the state did, but with good cause. Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1012 (Miss. 1991); see also Flores v. State, 574 So.2d at 1318; Vickery, 535 So.2d at 1375, 1377. Once the state establishes that the reason for delay justifies tolling the clock, the clock is tolled until the next reasonably available term of court. See Nations v. State, 481 So.2d 760, 762 (Miss.
Hersick v. State, 904 So.2d 116, 121 (ΒΆ 8) (Miss. 2004) (citing Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Miss. 1991)). Therefore, the time attributable to Scott's continuances is subtracted from the total delay, leaving approximately thirteen and one half months that are attributable to the State.
No single factor is dispositive. Barker; Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008 (Miss. 1991). The weight given each necessarily turns on the facts and circumstances of each case, the quality of evidence available on each factor, and, in the absence of evidence, identification of the party with the risk of nonpersuasion.
1991); Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165 (Miss. 1991); Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008 (Miss. 1991); Anderson v. State, 577 So.2d 390 (Miss. 1991); Barnes v. State, 577 So.2d 840 (Miss.
Id. Since it is the State's responsibility to provide a defendant with a speedy trial, this factor is weighed against the State unless it can show either that the delay was caused by the defendant or that the delay was for a good cause. Id.; Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1012 (Miss. 1991). In this case, the delay was caused by an overcrowded docket with older, previously scheduled cases being tried before Craig's case.