Opinion
Civil Action 4:22-cv-2343-SAL-TER
11-30-2023
RANDY ANTONIO WILEY, a/k/a Randy Antonio Wiley #1360, Plaintiff, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and ANGELA GARCES, Dental Assistant, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS E. ROGERS, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her constitutional rights. She alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs. Presently before the court is Defendant Angela Garces's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 62). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to Defendant's motion could result in the motion being granted and his claims dismissed. Plaintiff did not timely file a response to the motion. However, he filed what was docketed as a Letter (ECF No. 73), in which he addresses his claims against Defendant and attaches supporting documents. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
Defendant South Carolina Department of Corrections has been dismissed from this action. See Order (ECF No. 70).
II. FACTS
Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated at Evans Correctional Institution (Evans), he was in terrible pain and he filled out a request for a dental visit on November 6, 2021, but Defendant Garces did not help him. He further alleges that on November 10, 2021, he went to medical because of the intense pain. He had a headache and could not sleep because of pain in his mouth. Ms. McCall in medical told him he was supposed to sign up for a dental visit. Plaintiff informed McCall that he had requested a dental visit but Defendant Garces had responded to his request only by providing him with a copy of the grooming policy. McCall gave Plaintiff some pills. He was transferred to Allendale Correctional Institution (Allendale) on either November 11, 2021, or November 12, 2021. He had an infection in his mouth and his mouth was decaying. He was seen by dentists at Allendale and at Kirkland, who both told him they could not help him and that he would not have the problems he had if Garces would have seen him. Plaintiff alleges that he had surgery on his mouth on May 7, 2022, and the dentist told him he had permanent nerve damage in his mouth because of Garces's failure to treat him. Am. Compl. pp. 6-8 (ECF No. 15).
The records reveal that on October 25, 2021, Plaintiff filled a Request to Staff Member form which provides “I need to see the dentist for a bad tooth ack.” Garces Aff. ¶ 4 (ECF No. 62-2); Request to Staff Member. This was forwarded to the dental clinic and Garces received this request on October 28, 2021. Garces Aff. ¶ 5; Request to Staff Member. On November 3, 2021, Garces made an entry and informed Plaintiff that he may report to the dentist according to the procedural guidelines which she attached to the form and returned to Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff did not follow procedures to get a dental appointment. Garces Aff. ¶ 6; Request to Staff Member. On November 10, 2021, Plaintiff went to the medical nurse and stated “I went to medical because I was in intense pain.” Nurse Carla McCall emailed Garces that Plaintiff had been to the medical clinic several times due to dental pain. Garces Aff. ¶ 7; Email. Garces checked his records but did not see where Plaintiff made an appointment with the dental clinic. Garces Aff. ¶ 8. However, she contacted Dr. John Fulmer, a dentist at SCDC, who ordered an antibiotic and a pain reliever to treat him until he could get an appointment with the dental clinic. Garces Aff. ¶ 9; Fulmer Physician's Note. However, on November 12, 2021, Plaintiff transferred from Evans to Allendale, which has its own dental clinic. Garces does not work at that facility and she had no further contact with Plaintiff. Garces Aff. ¶ 10.
Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Ackerman, a dentist at Allendale Dental Clinic, on November 26, 2021. Dr. Ackerman examined him and referred him for a specialized panorex x-rays. Garces Aff. ¶ 12. On December 22, 2021, Mr. Wiley had panorex x-rays at Kirkland Correctional Center Dental Clinic in Columbia. He saw the dentist there (Dr. Dixon) and was prescribed penicillin for infection and pain medications. Garces Aff. ¶ 13. On January 10, 2022, Dr. Ackerman reviewed his x-rays and referred him to a dental specialist, Dr. Boykin who specializes in tooth extraction at COA Dental. Garces Aff. ¶ 14. On February 14, 2022, Dr. Boykin examined him and decided to refer him to an oral surgeon. Garces Aff. ¶ 15. On March 7, 2022, Mr. Wiley had oral surgery with two (2) teeth extracted by Dr. Hall at Coastal Oral Surgery in Charleston, South Carolina. Garces Aff. ¶ 16.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Id. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 87475 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4thCir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). A legal action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999). To be successful on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). The parties do not dispute that they were acting under color of state law in their individual capacities at all times relevant to this action.
Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate in part because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that a prisoner exhaust the available administrative remedies before filing a 1983 action concerning conditions of his confinement. 42 U.S.C.1997e(a). In enacting the PLRA, Congress carved out an exception to the general rule that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to filing a civil rights suit. The PLRA amended section 1997e so that it now provides, “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. § 1997e(a). Accordingly, before Plaintiff may proceed with his claims in this Court, he must first exhaust his administrative remedies. The United States Supreme Court has held that “Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly enough, regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002); Jones v. Smith, 266 F.3d 399 (6th Cir.2001) (exhaustion required even though Plaintiff claimed futility); Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3 d 718 (7th Cir.2001) (exhaustion required even though Plaintiff claimed he was afraid); see also Claybrooks v. Newsome, 2001 WL 1089548 (4th Cir., September 18, 2001) (unpublished opinion) (applying Booth v. Churner to affirm district court's denial of relief to Plaintiff). A failure to exhaust all levels of administrative review is not “proper exhaustion” and will bar actions filed by inmates under any federal law, including § 1983. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2386, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006).
SCDC provides inmates with a procedure through which they may file grievances on issues related to their confinement, including actions of staff members toward an inmate. The grievance process is set forth in SCDC Policies/Procedures, “Inmate Grievance System.” To summarize the process, generally, an inmate must first submit a Request to Staff Member Form (“RTSM”) or Automated Request to Staff Member (“ARTSM”). SCDC Policy No. GA-O 1.12 at § 13. Thereafter, the inmate must file a Step 1 Grievance Form (10-5), setting forth the issue grieved. Id. Inmates may then appeal an SCDC decision as to the Step 1 Grievance by filing a Step 2 Grievance Form (10-5A). Id. at §13.7. SCDC's response to a Step 2 Grievance is considered the final Department decision on an issue. Id.
Felecia McKie, Agency Inmate Grievance Coordinator/Chief, Inmate Grievance Branch, avers that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding the alleged lack of dental care by Garces beginning in October of 2021. McKie Aff. ¶¶ 1-2 (ECF No. 62-3).
Plaintiff filed a Step 1 Grievance dated January 4, 2022, in which he alleged that he did not receive any dental care or treatment, and only received a paper from dental with a grooming policy attached. On January 13, 2022, his grievance was returned stating he did not attach the Request to Staff form. Plaintiff did not re-file his Step I Grievance forms with an attached answered RTSM or Kiosk reference number nor did he file a Step 2 Grievance. McKie Aff. ¶ 4.
Plaintiff filed another Step 1 Grievance on March 30, 2022, in which he stated that on March 7, 2022 he had surgery on his mouth that left him with intense pain, and no feeling in the bottom part of his mouth due to inadequate medical care and failure to treat. On April 16, 2022, Plaintiff's grievance was returned for failure to attach the RTSM form. Plaintiff did not re-file his Step 1 Grievance forms with an attached answered RTSM or Kiosk reference number nor did he file a Step 2 Grievance. McKie Aff. ¶ 5.
The evidence in the record reveals that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the issues raised in this action because he failed to remedy his Step 1 Grievances or file Step 2 Grievances. The PLRA provides only one exception to the exhaustion requirement-that inmates need not exhaust “unavailable” remedies. Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016). An exhaustion remedy is unavailable when, inter alia, prison administrators “thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 1860. There is no evidence in the record that the grievance process was ever unavailable to Plaintiff. The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is a robust one. See Ross, 136 S.Ct. at 1856-58. Prisoners must therefore diligently and properly follow the administrative procedures that are available. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. Because Plaintiff failed to do so with respect to the issues raised herein, dismissal of this action is appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 62) be granted and this case be dismissed in its entirety.
The parties are directed to the important information on the following page.