Contracts for developing land for oil and gas undoubtedly fall in a class of their own, requiring the application of principles necessary to meet the nature of the business, if justice is to be done. Brown v. Wilson, 58 Okla. 392, 160 P. 94, L.R.A. 1917B, 1184; Chauvenet v. Person, 217 Pa. 464, 66 A. 855, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 417. As has often been said, time is of the essence of such agreements, and courts cannot substitute their own judgment as to what is reasonable, where the parties themselves have provided the measure of diligence. Woodley et al. v. Hollingsworth, 154 La. 686, 98 So. 87; Texala Oil Gas Company v. Caddo Mineral Lands Co., 152 La. 549, 93 So. 788; Talley v. Lawhon, 150 La. 25, 90 So. 427; Wilder v. Norman et al., 147 La. 413, 85 So. 59. Nevertheless the controlling purpose of all such contracts is the production of oil in paying quantities, or a reasonable exploration of the property to test its possibilities. In this instance the lease goes much further than in the average case, by not only requiring almost continuous efforts on the part of the lessee, in that not more than 60 days should elapse after the completion of one well before another was commenced, but it was further stipulated that on this small tract of 10 acres work should be kept up until at least one well had been drilled on all of the lots, consisting of one acre each; otherwise, the rights upon those unexplored should be ipso facto lost by the lapsing of the stipulated time.
Plaintiff's postulation conforms with the above cited codal articles and is fully supported by the jurisprudence in matters involving mineral leases providing for forfeiture or termination of the contract in the event the delay rentals are not delivered to the lessor or his agent on or before the day specified in the contract. See Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co., 119 La. 793, 44 So. 481; Pure Oil Operating Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 143 La. 284, 78 So. 560 and Wilder v. Norman, 147 La. 413, 85 So. 59. Considerations of equity are not admissible for the determination of contractual rights clearly expressed; resort may be had to natural law and reason only where positive law is silent. Article 21, LSA-Civil Code.
ernative is that in case no well is drilled within three months "all rights and obligations secured under this grant and demise shall cease unless" Bishop should "at the expiration of said three months" elect a further extension by paying the quarterly rental in advance. The word "at" as used in connection with other words and in this connection has been frequently considered, as the court will observe by reading the complete analysis of the phrases used by the authorities construing it "in," and as discussed by the following courts: Lord Ranelagh v. Melton, 2 Drew S. 277, 63 English Reprint, 627; Hollmann v. Conlon, 143 Mo. 369, 45 S.W. 275-278; Ferree v. Moquin etc. Coal Co., 29 Misc. Rep. 624, 61 N.Y. Supp. 120; M. Fine Realty Co. v. City of New York, 53 Misc. Rep. 246, 103 N.Y. Supp. 115; National Water Works Co. v. Kansas City, 62 Fed. 853, 10 C.C.A. 653, 27 L.R.A. 827; I.X.L. Furniture etc. House v. Berets, 32 Utah, 454, 91 P. 282; Rowe v. Atlas Oil Co., 147 La. 37, 84 So. 485; Wilder v. Norman, 147 La. 413, 85 So. 59. Since under the authorities above cited the second quarter expired on midnight of September 3, 1925, any payment made on September 4 or 5 was clearly out of time, because with the expiration of the lease, all rights thereunder expired, including the right to continue the same in force by payment of delay rental.