Opinion
2:23-CV-00635-LK-DWC
06-21-2023
ABRYEL WILDER, on behalf of minor C.H., Petitioner, v. WHITEHOUSE, et al., Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
David W. Christel, Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Abryel Wilder, filing on behalf of C.H., has filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Dkt. 1. The Court has reviewed the Petition and the responses to the Court's Order to Show Cause and concludes the Petition fails to name a proper respondent, it is inappropriate for the Court to intervene in this case, and the Petition is unexhausted. Therefore, the Court recommends the Petition be dismissed without prejudice and this case be closed.
I. Background
On May 1, 2023, Abryel Wilder, filing on behalf of C.H., filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 appearing to challenge C.H.'s pending state court criminal case, Pierce County Superior Court Case No. 22-1-03398-5. See Dkt. 1. Petitioner appears to contend his constitutional rights were violated related to his pending state criminal proceedings. Id. He requests immediate release from custody. Id. On May 9, 2023, the Court reviewed the Petition, notified Petitioner of the deficiencies of the Petition, and directed Petitioner to show cause why this case should not be dismissed or file an amended petition. Dkt. 4. On June 7, 2023, Wilder filed her response to the Order to Show Cause and, on June 13, 2023, the Court received a document from C.H. See Dkts. 5-7.
II. Discussion
A. Improper Respondent
Initially, the Court notes the Petition names the Whitehouse, the Department of Health, the Department of License, the Department of Revenue, and the Secretary of State as respondents in this action. Dkt. 1. “The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the proper respondent to a habeas petition is ‘the person who has custody over [the petitioner].'” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2242); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Thus, when a petitioner is in physical confinement, “the proper respondent is the warden [or custodian] of the facility where the prisoner is being held....” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435, (emphasis added). “Failure to name the petitioner's custodian as a respondent deprives federal courts of personal jurisdiction.” Stanley v. California Supreme Ct., 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (May 18, 1994). In contrast “a habeas petitioner who challenges a form of ‘custody' other than present physical confinement may name as respondent the entity or person who exercises legal control with respect to the challenged ‘custody.'” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 438; Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Court of Ken., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973).
Here, it is not clear from the Petition where C.H. is detained; however, based on the relief requested, C.H. appears to be detained in Pierce County. The Petition does not name the proper respondent; rather, Petitioner names the Whitehouse, the Department of Health, the Department of License, the Department of Revenue, and the Secretary of State. See Dkt. 1. In the responses to the Court's Order to Show Cause, Petitioner does not name the proper respondent and appears to name more improper respondents. See Dkts. 5-6. As Petitioner has not named a proper respondent, the Court recommends the Petition be dismissed.
B. Younger Abstention
Even assuming the Petition named the proper respondent, Petitioner is still not be entitled to the relief sought in this action. Because C.H. appears to be awaiting adjudication of his pending criminal charges in the Pierce County Superior Court, resolution of Petitioner's claims would necessarily require this Court to become involved in C.H.'s ongoing state court criminal proceedings.
Generally, the federal courts will not intervene in a pending state court criminal proceeding absent extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable harm is both great and immediate. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger requires a federal court to abstain from interference with pending state judicial proceedings when: “(1) there is ‘an ongoing state judicial proceeding'; (2) the proceeding ‘implicate[s] important state interests'; (3) there is ‘an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges'; and (4) the requested relief ‘seek[s] to enjoin' or has ‘the practical effect of enjoining' the ongoing state judicial proceeding.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014)).
All the Younger criteria are satisfied here. First, Petitioner is a pre-trial detainee with ongoing state proceedings. Second, as these proceedings involve a criminal prosecution, they implicate important state interests. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49, (1986); Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Third, Petitioner has failed to allege facts showing he has been denied an adequate opportunity to address the alleged constitutional violations in the state court proceedings. Fourth, Petitioner seeks release from custody based on the alleged violation of his rights. If this Court were to conclude that Petitioner was entitled to such relief, this would have the practical effect of enjoining Petitioner's ongoing state court proceedings.
Under the circumstances presented in this case, federal intervention with Petitioner's pending state criminal proceedings would be inappropriate under the Younger abstention doctrine. Therefore, the Court finds the Petition should be dismissed.
C. Exhaustion
“[A] state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). Petitioner's claims will be considered exhausted only after “the state courts [have been afforded] a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without interference from the federal judiciary.” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986). “[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
Although there is no exhaustion requirement mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held exhaustion is necessary as a matter of comity unless special circumstances warrant federal intervention prior to a state criminal trial. Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1980); see Younger, 401 U.S. 37. Petitioner fails to show state court remedies were exhausted by presenting federal constitutional or statutory claims to the Washington state trial and appellate courts in the ongoing criminal proceedings against him. See Dkts. 1, 5-7. Petitioner has also not shown special circumstances warrant federal intervention in this case. See Dkts. 1, 5-7. Therefore, the Court finds the Petition should be dismissed for failure to properly exhaust.
D. Next Friend
Finally, the instant petition has been filed by C.H.'s mother, acting on C.H.'s behalf. See Dkt. 1. The federal habeas statute provides that the “[a]pplication for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 17. Federal courts recognize that under appropriate circumstances, habeas petitions can be brought by third parties, such as family members or agents, on behalf of a prisoner - which is known as next-friend standing. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 161-64 (1990). The prerequisites for “next friend” standing in habeas proceedings are: (1) that the “next friend” provide an adequate explanation - such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence or other disability - as to why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action; and (2) that the “next friend” must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf she seeks to litigate. See id.
C.H.'s mother has not provided an adequate explanation for why she is proceeding on C.H.'s behalf. See Dkts. 1, 2, 5-6. For example, while C.H. appears to be a minor, there is insufficient information to conclude Wilder is C.H.'s legal guardian and that C.H. is aware of the content of Wilder's filings. The Court is not fully persuaded, based on the record currently before it, that Wilder should be granted “next friend” standing. As the Court finds the Petition should be dismissed, the Court finds it unnecessary to determine if Wilder has established she meets the prerequisites for “next friend” standing at this time.
III. Certificate of Appealability
A state prisoner who is proceeding under § 2241 must obtain a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) under § 2253(c)(1)(A) to challenge process issued by a state court. Wilson v. Belleque, 554 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2009). A COA may be issued only where a petitioner has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). A petitioner satisfies this standard “by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El. v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
No jurist of reason could disagree with this Court's evaluation of Petitioner's claims or would conclude the issues presented in the Petition should proceed further. Therefore, the Court concludes Petitioner is not entitled to a COA with respect to the Petition. If Petitioner believes the Court should issue a COA, he should set forth his reasons in his objections to this Report and Recommendation.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends the Petition (Dkt. 1) be dismissed without prejudice. The Court also recommends a COA not be issued. As Petitioner has not exhausted available state remedies, the Court finds an appeal would not be taken in good faith and, thus, recommends denying any request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this report to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of de novo review by the district judge, See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and can result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985); Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Accommodating the time limit imposed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the Clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on July 7, 2023, as noted in the caption.