Wilder v. State

7 Citing cases

  1. Manuel v. State

    289 Ga. 383 (Ga. 2011)   Cited 31 times

    It has long been the rule in this state that "`the trial judge is vested with the strongest of discretions to review the case and to set the verdict aside if he is not satisfied with it.'" Bhansali v. Moneada, 275 Ga. App. 221, 222 (1) ( 620 SE2d 404) (2005). See also Alvelo v. State, supra at 438 (1); Ricketts v. Williams, 242 Ga. 303, 304 ( 248 SE2d 673) (1978); Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337 ( 18 SE2d 546) (1942); Mills v. State, 188 Ga. 616, 625 ( 4 SE2d 453) (1939); Thompson v. Warren, 118 Ga. 644 ( 45 SE 912) (1903); Rutland v. State, supra; Holton v. Jones, 174 Ga. App. 654, 655 ( 331 SE2d 26) (1985). We are unable to discern how the trial court can declare that it personally disagreed with the jury's verdict and not believe that the verdict was strongly against the weight of the evidence.

  2. Joyner v. Joyner

    29 S.E.2d 266 (Ga. 1944)

    In this case, it affirmatively appears from the language of the order that the judge did not exercise the discretion so vested in him, but denied the application for temporary alimony and attorneys' fees upon the erroneous theory that all questions "entitling the wife to . . alimony were for a jury and not the judge to decide," and that it would not be proper to allow such relief "in advance of a jury's verdict upon the issues involved." Compare Rogers v. State, 101 Ga. 561 (2) ( 28 S.E. 978); Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Harden, 113 Ga. 453 ( 38 S.E. 949); Thompson v. Warren, 118 Ga. 644 ( 45 S.E. 912); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 120 Ga. 67 ( 47 S.E. 501, 102 Am. St. Rep. 71, 1 Ann. Cas. 606); Livingston v. Taylor, 132 Ga. 1 (7) ( 63 S.E. 694); Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337 ( 18 S.E.2d 546). Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed for apparent failure of the judge to exercise the discretion vested in him by law, under the circumstances.

  3. Stinson v. Daniel

    193 Ga. 844 (Ga. 1942)   Cited 12 times
    In Stinson v. Daniel, 193 Ga. 844, 851 (20 S.E.2d 257), which involved the question of whether there had been delivery of a deed, the evidence was that the grantor in executing the deed had it recorded and returned to him, where it was found in his papers after his death.

    We merely refer to those two cases. One is Mills v. State, 188 Ga. 616 ( 4 S.E.2d 453). The other is Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337 ( 18 S.E.2d 546). The language of the judge in the instant case in relation to the preponderance of the testimony on the question of delivery we take to be an expression on his part as to where the weight of the evidence lay. His subsequent language in the order, "in the exercise of my discretion," must be held to mean that he complied with his duty with respect to passing upon the motion. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

  4. Hartley v. State

    299 Ga. App. 534 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that the trial court erred by finding that the defendant waived and abandoned motion for new trial claims raised under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 by not arguing those claims at a separate evidentiary hearing when they were already properly raised

    Notably, where a defendant raises a claim under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 in his motion for new trial, the law imposes upon the trial court an affirmative duty to exercise its discretion and weigh the evidence to determine whether a new trial is warranted. See Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148, 149 ( 240 SE2d 41) (1977), vacated on other grounds, Williams v. Ricketts, 438 U. S. 902 ( 98 SC 3119, 57 LE2d 1145) (1978); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 218 Ga. 460 (1) ( 128 SE2d 496) (1962); Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337, 338 (1) ( 18 SE2d 546) (1942); Mills v. State, 188 Ga. 616, 622 ( 4 SE2d 453) (1939). If the record reflects that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion and sit as the thirteenth juror, we will vacate and remand for the trial court to fulfill its affirmative statutory duty. See State v. Jones, 284 Ga. 302, 303-304 (2) ( 667 SE2d 76) (2008); Rutland v. State, 296 Ga. App. 471, 476 (3) ( 675 SE2d 506) (2009).

  5. Kirkland v. Moore

    195 S.E.2d 667 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 17 times
    In Kirkland v. Moore, 128 Ga. App. 34, 35-37 (195 S.E.2d 667) (1973), involving an automobile/motorcycle collision at an intersection, we held that even though a motor vehicle driver has the right of way at an intersection and has the right to assume that drivers of other vehicles will yield the right of way and exercise the ordinary care required of them, the driver having the right of way is not relieved of his own duty to exercise ordinary care.

    Jurors are the sole and exclusive judges of the weight and credit to be given testimony. Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337, 339 ( 18 S.E.2d 546). If the plaintiff by the exercise of ordinary care could have avoided the consequences of defendant's negligence, plaintiff is not entitled to recover.

  6. Price v. State

    305 Ga. 608 (Ga. 2019)   Cited 25 times
    Rejecting defendant's claim of error that the trial court's order failed to reflect that the trial court evaluated the credibility of the witnesses and weighed the evidence in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to grant a new trial in its role as the "thirteenth juror"

    As we have explained before, when a trial court enters an order denying a motion for new trial and, "without more, recites that the new trial is refused or denied, this will be taken to mean that [the judge] has in the exercise of his discretion approved the verdict." Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337, 338, 18 S.E.2d 546 (1942). See also Butts v. State, 297 Ga. 766, 771-772, 778 S.E.2d 205 (2015).

  7. Butts v. State

    297 Ga. 766 (Ga. 2015)   Cited 33 times
    Explaining that under OCGA § 16-2-20, a jury may infer a common criminal intent from the defendant's presence, companionship, and conduct with another perpetrator before, during, and after the crimes

    Thus, where a trial judge ruling on a new trial motion enters an order that, “without more, recites that the new trial is refused or denied, this will be taken to mean that [the judge] has in the exercise of his discretion approved the verdict.” Wilder v. State, 193 Ga. 337, 338, 18 S.E.2d 546 (1942).As we recently said in a case involving a similar summary denial order: