Section 7511 defines "employee" for the provisions that give the Board jurisdiction over appeals by federal employees. Wilder v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. , 675 F.3d 1319, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The statute states that " ‘employee’ means ... a preference eligible in the excepted service who has completed 1 year of current continuous service in the same or similar positions ... in the United States Postal Service ...." § 7511(a)(1)(B)(ii).

Ms. Lucas may not raise her First Amendment argument for the first time in this court. See Wilder v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 675 F.3d 1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012). "Where, as here, the Board denied review of the administrative judge's initial decision, this court will not consider issues not raised before the administrative judge."

This definition does not exclude service as a political appointee: even if political appointees have no right to appeal adverse actions to the Board, they remain part of the civil service and qualify as "[f]ederal civilian employ[ees]" under any reasonable interpretation of that term. See 5 U.S.C. § 2101 ("For the purpose of [title 5] ... the ‘civil service’ consists of all appointive positions in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the Government of the United States, except positions in the uniformed services...."); Wilder v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. , 675 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding OPM's interpretation of § 7511 —that "[f]ederal civilian employment" as opposed to military service counts toward "current continuous service"—reasonable and consistent with the statute). After working at the USDA for almost eight years, Mr. Avalos resigned on September 17, 2016, and began working at HUD the next day.

Delegation of such authority can be shown, for example, by an agency's power to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. at 227, 121 S.Ct. 2164 ; see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC , 793 F.3d 1268, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ; Mercier v. United States , 786 F.3d 971, 977-78 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ; Wilder v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. , 675 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ; Carrow v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. , 564 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Applying those principles, we hold that OPM's interpretation of the in-lieu-of holiday provisions of section 6103(b) as inapplicable to part-time employees is entitled to deference.

No costs.Wilder v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 675 F.3d 1319, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and there is no contention that Banks's employment with the Postal Service does not qualify as "current continuous service" under the statute.

” Id. at 842–43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If the statute does not answer the specific question, meaning that it is “silent or ambiguous,” then the court must discern “whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778; Wilder v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 675 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2012). “If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.

” Id. at 842–43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If the statute does not answer the specific question, meaning that it is “silent or ambiguous,” then the court must discern whether the agency provided “a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778; Wilder v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 675 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2012). “If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.

Because Congress authorized the PTO to prescribe regulations, the validity of the regulation is analyzed according to the familiar Chevron framework. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) ; Wilder v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 675 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2012). Under Chevron, the first question is “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”

When reviewing an agency's statutory interpretation, this court applies the two-step framework established in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. 20141301, 778 F.3d 1271, 1282, 2015 WL 448667, at *8 (Fed.Cir. Feb. 4, 2015) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) and Wilder v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 675 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2012)). II. Congress Did Not Address the Precise Question at Issue

Because Congress authorized the PTO to prescribe regulations, the validity of the regulation is analyzed according to the familiar Chevron framework. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001); Wilder v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 675 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2012). Under Chevron, the first question is “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.