The defendants also argue that the State should not be permitted to first raise the standing issue on appeal. While conceding their burden of proof on this issue, the defendants assert that fundamental unfairness results because they were never prompted to make a record on that point. Where the prosecution has failed to make any trial court challenge to standing, the government may not raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Steagald v. United States (1981), 451 U.S. 204, 209, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1646, 68 L.Ed.2d 38, 43; United States v. Ford (10th Cir. 1975), 525 F.2d 1308; Wilderberger v. State (1988), 74 Md. App. 107, 119 n. 7, 536 A.2d 718, 723 n. 7; Williams v. United States (D.C.App. 1990), 576 A.2d 700. Likewise, in resolving a claim of unlawful search and seizure, an appellate court should not invoke lack of standing, sua sponte. The search warrant was based on the following affidavit:
Issues not raised at trial generally will not be considered by this court, Sparks v. United States, 358 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1976), and we see no reason to deviate from this general rule where we affirm the trial judge's decision not to suppress the evidence. See also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 209, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1646, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981) (government, through its assertions, concessions, and acquiescence in the courts below lost right to raise for first time in the Supreme Court factual issues which challenge petitioner's standing); United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308, 1310 (10th Cir. 1975) (government cannot challenge standing in Fourth Amendment case for first time on appeal); Wilderberger v. State, 74 Md. App. 107, 119 n. 7, 536 A.2d 718, 723 n. 7 (1988). The government's reliance on Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227-28, 92 S.Ct. 2284, 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 308 (1972), is misplaced since that case stands simply for the proposition that a defendant must be given an opportunity to establish standing before the appellate court can affirm the trial court's decision on the basis of the defendant's lack of standing where the government first raised the issue of standing in the defendant's direct appeal.
Officer Burnett also possessed sufficient probable cause to arrest Dixon. It is undisputed that Dixon stepped out of his vehicle and moved toward Officer Burnett while he was attempting to restrain Hayes. The parties cannot agree on whether Dixon actually assaulted Officer Burnett, but that is not required to establish hindering. A number of facts evidence that Dixon was hindering, such as Dixon's behavior, his statements to Officer Burnett to take his hands off his wife, and his movement away from the car after the officer ordered him to stay back. Cf. Wildberger v. State, 74 Md.App. 107, 114 (1988) (affirming hindering conviction where individual moved toward officer after being told she would be arrested if she interfered, yelled obscenities, and told officer not to touch her daughter). Because the court finds sufficient probable cause of the crime of hindering to sustain the arrests, there is no need to discuss the other offenses discussed by Defendants. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, there is no constitutional violation stemming from Plaintiffs' seizure and summary judgment will be granted on this claim.
Were it not for the express limitation on jurisdiction set forth in ICARA Section 5(b), an argument could be made that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, authorizes the warrant sought, but, in view of ICARA's plain language, this Court's ability to take the child from its present custodian is restricted to that of a state court of the forum, which the All Writs Act does not empower. The Court has also considered other provisions of Maryland law, specifically Family Law Code § 5-709, see Wildberger v. State, 74 Md.App. 107, 536 A.2d 718 (1988), and Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code §§ 3-814 and 3-815, but it finds that none of these statutes applies to child custody cases in general or this one in particular. See 60 Op.Att'y.Gen. (Md.) 419 (1975) (Cts. Jud. Proc. Code § 3-814 applies only in juvenile petition cases, and does not generally authorize issuance of a warrant for a child).
While the State contends that this element of the four-part test announced in Cover is inapplicable to the instant case, Maryland case law has consistently held that the four-part test, including the element of actual obstruction or hindrance, is applicable to the common law offense of obstructing and hindering a police officer. See Sheinbein, 372 Md. at 242–43, 812 A.2d at 991; Antoine H., 319 Md. at 104, 570 A.2d at 1240; Cover, 297 Md. at 413, 466 A.2d at 1284; Nieves, 160 Md.App. at 656, 866 A.2d at 875; Wildberger v. State, 74 Md.App. 107, 114, 536 A.2d 718, 721 (1988); Sibiga v. State, 65 Md.App. 69, 80–81, 499 A.2d 484, 490 (1985). We hold, therefore, that the test is applicable regardless of which category of the offense is under analysis.
It is well settled that when the State fails to "make any trial court challenge to standing, the government may not raise the issue for the first time on appeal." Everroad v. State, 590 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Ind. 1992) (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981); United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1975); Wildberger v. State, 536 A.2d 718, 723 n.7 (1988); Williams v. United States, 576 A.2d 700 (D.C. 1990)); Bradley v. State, 4 N.E.3d 831 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (quoting Everroad, 590 N.E.2d at 569). Thus, the State waived any standing challenge for our review by failing to raise the issue below.
The standard for review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is whether, "after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original), see also Bayne v. State, 98 Md. App. 149, 154, 632 A.2d 476 (1993), Brackins v. State, 84 Md. App. 157, 164, 578 A.2d 300 (1990); Wildberger v. State, 74 Md. App. 107, 110, 536 A.2d 718 (1988). The reviewing court is not concerned with "whether the trial court's verdict is in accord with the weight of the evidence, but only with whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence . . . ."
The standard for review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is whether, "after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original), see also Bayne v. State, 98 Md. App. 149, 154, 632 A.2d 476 (1993), Brackins v. State, 84 Md. App. 157, 164, 578 A.2d 300 (1990); Wildberger v. State, 74 Md. App. 107, 110, 536 A.2d 718 (1988). The reviewing court is not concerned with "whether the trial court's verdict is in accord with the weight of the evidence, but only with whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence . . . ."
The standard for review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is whether, "after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original), see also Bayne v. State, 98 Md. App. 149, 154, 632 A.2d 476 (1993), Brackins v. State, 84 Md. App. 157, 164, 578 A.2d 300 (1990); Wildberger v. State, 74 Md. App. 107, 110, 536 A.2d 718 (1988). The reviewing court is not concerned with "whether the trial court's verdict is in accord with the weight of the evidence, but only with whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence . . ."
Preliminarily, we note that, as appellants concede, our standard for review of the evidence is "whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, reh. den., 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979) (emphasis in original); State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 424 A.2d 720 (1981); Wallace v. State, 63 Md. App. 399, 492 A.2d 970, cert. denied, 304 Md. 301, 498 A.2d 1186 (1985); Wildberger v. State, 74 Md. App. 107, 536 A.2d 718 (1988). A. Conspiracy