Opinion
No. CV 02-0174796 S
January 11, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This matter is before the court on a motion to strike filed by the defendants, Yale University and Patricia Aronson.
On October 30, 2002, the plaintiff, Noreen Wilcox, filed a six-count complaint against the defendants, Yale University and her supervisor, Patricia Aronson. In her complaint the plaintiff, who was employed as an accountant assistant at Yale University's School of Medicine, alleges that the defendants; (1) denied her individualized educational and advancement opportunities while making such opportunities available to other employees; (2) refused to provide her with a secure workstation; (3) refused to allow her to make personal phone calls and leave work early even though others were allowed that privilege; (4) verbally abused her; (5) failed to provide her with her personnel file despite her request; (6) denied her request for a lateral transfer without providing a reason; and (7) refused to accept her grievance by telling her that only a grievance filed by her union would be accepted.
In counts one, two, three, four, five and six Wilcox alleges causes of action against Yale for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent misrepresentation, failure to pay wages, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively. In addition, the plaintiff alleges causes of action against Patricia Aronson for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress in counts five and six.
On June 16, 2003, the defendants filed a motion to strike counts three, five and six, accompanied by a memorandum of law in support thereof. On August 11, 2003, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion, and the matter was heard on short calendar on October 12, 2004.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). In ruling on a motion to strike, "[we] take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 173, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004).
In their motion to strike the defendants state "[we] . . . move to strike Counts III, V and VI of the plaintiff's complaint . . . In support of this motion, the defendants respectfully refer the court to their Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion to Strike, filed herewith." In their memorandum, the defendants specify that Yale moves to strike count three on the ground that the plaintiff fails to state a fraudulent misrepresentation claim because the complaint lacks any allegation that Yale made a false statement. "The defendants move to strike count five on the basis that an employee can only recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress when the conduct on which the claim is based occurred in the termination context and the conduct the plaintiff relies on did not occur in the termination process. The defendants move to strike count six on the ground that the plaintiff fails to state a intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the conduct alleged in the complaint does not met the necessary standard of "extreme and outrageous."
The plaintiff first contends, amongst other arguments, that the defendants' motion to strike should be denied on the ground that it is fatally defective because Practice Book § 10-41 requires that the party moving to strike a pleading specify the reason or reasons for its claim that the pleading is insufficient. "Practice Book § 10-41 requires that a motion to strike raising a claim of insufficiency shall distinctly specify the reason or reasons for each such claimed insufficiency. Motions to strike that do not specify the grounds of insufficiency are fatally defective and, absent a waiver by the party opposing the motion, should not be granted . . . Our Supreme Court has stated that a motion to strike that does not specify the grounds of insufficiency is fatally defective . . . and that Practice Book § [10-42], which requires a motion to strike be accompanied by an appropriate memorandum of law citing the legal authorities upon which the motion relies, does not dispense with the requirement of [Practice Book 10-41] that the reasons for the claimed pleading deficiency be specified in the motion itself, Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 683 n. 5, 513 A.2d 66 (1986)." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barasso v. Rear Still Hill Road, LLC, 64 Conn.App. 9, 13-14, 779 A.2d 198 (2001). In Barasso, the court found that the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's special defense was fatally defective and denied the plaintiff's motion because, like the defendants in this case, it merely stated "[a] [m]emorandum of law in support of this motion, which discusses the legal insufficiency of each [s]pecial [d]efense is attached." Id., 14. Because the defendants here, like the plaintiff in Barasso, have failed to specify the reasons for each claimed deficiency, as required by Practice Book § 10-41, their motion is fatally defective. For the foregoing reasons and because the plaintiff has not waived what the Supreme Court has found to be a fatal defect, the court denies the defendants' motion to strike.
Practice Book § 10-41 provides: "Each motion to strike raising any of the claims of legal insufficiency enumerated in the preceding sections shall separately set forth each such claim of insufficiency and shall distinctly specify the reason or reasons for each such claimed insufficiency."
Matasavage, J.