Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-1238(JBS)
December 10, 1999
Daniel Wilborn, Jr., Plaintiff Pro Se.
John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, By: Ila Bhatnagar, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondents
OPINION
In this federal civil rights case, plaintiff Daniel Wilborn, a former prison guard, has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Donald Lewis, Maureen Gunter, Virginia Gunter, Myriam Campos, Donnie McNeil, Bruce Assante, Charles Moore and Joseph Carroll alleging that they violated his civil rights by conspiring to terminate his employment at New Jersey's Riverfront State Prison. This Court previously dismissed a portion of Wilborn's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., as against the New Jersey Department of Corrections ("DOC") and all defendants in their official capacities.
The Court presently considers defendants' second motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), with which defendants raise additional defenses not included in the initial 12(b)(6) motion. Among these are the defenses of claim preclusion and qualified immunity. As the other claims are already dismissed, only Mr. Wilborn's individual capacity claims against these defendants are before the Court. (See Court's April 13, 1999 Mem. Order at 3.)
Notwithstanding the fact that a 12(b)(6) motion is a motion for judgment on the pleadings alone, in this second round of motion practice both parties have attached additional documentation in support of their respective arguments. Specifically, defendants' Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss is accompanied by the May 21, 1999 Affidavit of Deputy Attorney General Ila Bhatnagar, which includes three exhibits. Plaintiff has also provided additional documentation, having appended to his Opposition Brief a lengthy appendix of at least 93 exhibits. Moreover, plaintiff, apparently recognizing the irregularity of the defendants' present motion, has captioned his response "Plaintiff's Brief and Appendix in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment." Because both parties now present matters outside the pleadings, and because plaintiff has properly recognized the present motion as one for summary judgment, the Court will exercise its discretion to treat defendants' motion as one for summary judgment, and will dispose of it under Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P.
The primary issues for decision in motion for summary judgment are (1) whether plaintiff's claims against defendants Campos, Moore, and Gerrish are barred by res judicata and the entire controversy doctrine because a state court has already dismissed on the merits claims similar to those asserted in the present Complaint; and (2) whether all defendants are qualifiedly immune from plaintiff's remaining claims are barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. For reasons discussed herein, the Court will resolve both questions in favor of the defendants, and will dismiss plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
Wilborn generally alleges that these defendants, acting under color of state law, conspired to and did unlawfully deprive him of his employment as a Corrections Officer at Riverfront State Prison through fraud, duress, sexual and racial discrimination without due process of law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶ 14.) As far as can be surmised from the record before the Court, this case stems from plaintiff's objections to a series of disciplinary measures taken against him by the New Jersey Department of Corrections ("DOC"). These disciplinary actions, which ultimately led to plaintiff's termination from employment, initially were made in response to the DOC's findings that plaintiff had sexually harassed fellow Corrections Officer Myriam Campos, and subsequently led to the discovery that Wilborn had lied to DOC investigators about whether he had employed inmate Robert Koch to draft civil pleadings against Campos and others.
The record shows that plaintiff was the subject of two separate investigations. The DOC initiated the first of these after defendant Campos alleged that plaintiff had sexually harassed her at work. At an informal pretermination hearing on March 28, 1996, over which defendant Gerrish presided as hearing officer, plaintiff was found to have harassed Campos and was given a sanction of thirty days unpaid suspension. (Pl's Ex. 10.) An appeal was taken, and an ALJ reduced this sanction to fifteen days in a decision dated March 20, 1997 (Pl's Ex. 40.) This reduction was subsequently vacated, and the thirty-day suspension was reinstated in the New Jersey Merit System Board's final decision in the matter, dated September 5, 1997. (Pl's Ex. 48.)
At the same time that plaintiff was seeking to administratively overturn the thirty-day suspension, he collaterally attacked his suspension in New Jersey state court. In his Amended Complaint filed June 25, 1996 with the Camden County Superior Court, plaintiff brought claims of slander, falsification of official documents, conspiracy, unlawful employment practices, sex discrimination, racial discrimination, harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and official misconduct against defendants Campos, Moore, and Gerrish. (Def's Ex. A at 1.) Specifically, the Complaint alleged that plaintiff was harmed by (1) the defendants' wilful support of a false sexual harassment claim, in violation of his rights to due process and equal protection; (2) the defendants' conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his property when Moore was allowed to initiate the harassment claim, conduct the investigation himself, and sit on the hearing board which decided whether to suspend Wilborn; and (3) the defendants' conspiracy with Campos to file a false report of sexual harassment. (Id. at 4-5.) In an Opinion dated September 27, 1996, the Honorable John B. Mariano dismissed plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Def's Ex. B.)
Shortly after plaintiff filed this state court suit, however, the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's drafting of his complaint led to a second DOC investigation, this time by the division of internal affairs. Remarkably, this investigation revealed that Wilborn, a prison guard, had employed Riverfront inmate Robert Koch to draft the legal papers used in Wilborn's suit. Koch, who worked in the prison legal library and was conversant in New Jersey law, admitted in an April 23, 1999 statement that he had prepared such materials for plaintiff. (Pl's Ex. 28.) After this conduct came to light, the DOC on May 3, 1996 suspended Wilborn without pay for supplying Koch with confidential information and for lying to investigators about his arrangement with Koch. (Pl's Ex. 50.) After a hearing on these allegations on July 31, 1996, the DOC removed plaintiff from employment effective August 23, 1996. (Id.) This decision to remove was affirmed on July 22, 1997 by Administrative Law Judge Joseph F. Martone. (Pl's Ex. 78.)
Plaintiff filed the present Complaint on March 16, 1998, alleging,inter alia: a conspiracy among all defendants to deny him his civil and constitutional rights; the willful decision of defendants Lewis, Gunter, Jackson and others to target minority employees for investigation and prosecution; and the knowing, reckless or negligent failure of defendants Lewis and Gunter to properly train employees.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
A court may grant summary judgment only when the materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if it is supported by evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" only if a dispute about it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Id. In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and extend all reasonable inferences to that party.Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). However, "when the record is such that it would not support a rational finding that an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or defense exists, summary judgment must be entered for the moving party." Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 341 (3d Cir. 1990).
B. Res Judicata and the Entire Controversy Doctrine
Defendants argue that the claims against defendants Moore, Campos and Gerrish are barred by res judicata, also known as claim preclusion. In determining whether claims in the instant matter are barred by res judicata, this Court looks to the well-settled rule recited in Paramount Aviation Corporation v. Augusta, 178 F.3d 132, 135-36 (3d Cir. 1997), that "federal courts should apply the general rule that the preclusive effect of a judgment is determined by the preclusion law of the issuing court". Because the instant case involves previous decisions of a state court, this Court must look to New Jersey preclusion doctrines.
Under New Jersey law the analysis for res judicata requires: "(1) the judgment in the prior action must be valid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action must be identical to or in privity with those in the prior action; and (3) the claim in the later action must grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one." Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel and Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 412 (1991). A cause of action "that has been finally determined on the merits by a tribunal having jurisdiction cannot be relitigated by those parties or their privies in a new proceeding."Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991). Thus, if a claim could have been presented in the first action (because the court would have had jurisdiction), it will be precluded in the second action, Watkins, 124 N.J. at 413.
In this case, it is clear that the present action by Mr. Wilborn as against Moore, Gerrish and Campos violates res judicata. Plaintiff in the present Complaint attempts to raise many of the same claims (conspiracy, sex and race discrimination, official misconduct, and violation of federal constitutional rights) as were dismissed from state court for failure to state a valid claim. (See Def's Ex. B.) As a dismissal for failure to state a claim counts as final judgment on the merits, this Court is compelled to give full faith and credit to that judgment, and res judicata precludes further litigation of those claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
In addition to traditional res judicata, New Jersey has another claim preclusion theory which, under Paramount Aviation, this Court must apply: the entire controversy doctrine. While similar to res judicata principles, the entire controversy doctrine, which is unique to New Jersey, "encompasses traditional concepts of claims joinder as well as party joinder." Fornarotto v. American Waterworks Co., Inc., 144 F.3d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1998).
The fundamental principle behind the inclusion policy of the entire controversy doctrine is that the adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in one court; accordingly, all parties involved in a litigation should at the very least present in that proceeding all of their claims and defenses that are related to the underlying controversy.Id. (quoting Venuto v. Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 761 (3d Cir. 1997)). As explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court, the main test under the entire controversy doctrine is whether "the claims against the different parties arise from related facts or the same transaction or series of transactions. It is the core set of facts that provides the link between distinct claims against the same or different parties and triggers the requirement that they be determined in one proceeding." DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267-68 (1995) (internal citations omitted). Thus, though the parties and the claims in the second suit may be different than those in the first suit, the second suit may nonetheless be barred because it concerns the series of transactions already at issue in the first suit. It is through this formula, which is broader than traditional res judicata, that the New Jersey Legislature, in adopting the doctrine through Rule 4:30A of the New Jersey Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to promote "judicial economy and efficiency by avoiding fragmented, multiple and duplicative litigation." Fornarotto, 144 F.3d at 278 (citing Venuto, 117 F.3d at 761).
Here, the Entire Controversy Doctrine bars any additional claims based on plaintiff's allegations that Campos's sexual harassment charges arose from conspiracy and fraud rather than valid concerns. Plaintiff's present suit raises claims that allegedly arose against all defendants prior to his state court filing against Moore, Gerrish and Campos. Further, Wilborn does not allege that he somehow only recently became aware of these new claims against the defendants. All of plaintiff's present claims which are premised on civil rights violations arising from the sexual harassment investigation are simply further grievances premised on the same set of circumstances alleged in June 1996. Judge Mariano already has dismissed all claims pertinent to the sexual harassment investigation for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, all claims raised by plaintiff, or which could have been raised by him, during the state court case are barred from being asserted in this case. In short, these defendants have conclusively established that the claims asserted against them which arose prior to the state court filing are barred by the New Jersey entire controversy doctrine, and judgment is due defendants as a matter of law.
Therefore, the only remaining claims are those which arise from facts independent of the sexual harassment investigation. Specifically, the Court now considers only those claims which assert civil rights violations against defendants Assante, Carroll, Gunter, Jackson, and Lewis for their respective roles in the investigation which uncovered plaintiff's alleged collusion with inmate Koch and ultimately led to plaintiff's firing.
C. Qualified Immunity
Turning to an analysis of plaintiff's remaining claims, Wilborn alleges that his firing came as the result of a general conspiracy to deprive him of his employment in violation of his civil rights, (Cts. I-III VII), and as a result of DOC officials' failure to adequately train its personnel, (Cts. IV-VII). He is suing for recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.Id.
Section 1983 does not establish substantive rights. Rather, it provides a remedy for the violation of rights already existing under federal law.Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 806 (1985). Therefore, a prima facie case under § 1983 requires that plaintiff show first that a person deprived him or her of a federal right, and second, that the person responsible for the deprivation acted under color of law as described in the statute. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995).
In response to plaintiff's allegations against them in their individual capacities, defendants assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Under this doctrine, government officials are immune not only from trial, but from suit altogether. See e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). When material facts are not in dispute, the district court may decide whether a government official has established the defense of qualified immunity as a matter of law.Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
Mr. Wilborn alleges that the state officials involved unlawfully terminated his employment, and that their supervisors failed to adequately train them to do otherwise. In analyzing such claims, the Court must determine whether the officials' conduct violated clearly established law. This test is an objective one, and "governmental officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known." Harlow, 547 U.S. at 817-18. Under this standard, a defense of qualified immunity may not be rebutted by evidence that the defendant's conduct was malicious or improperly motivated, nor do bare allegations of malice establish a constitutional claim.Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998).
In this case, the material facts are not in dispute. The record before the Court establishes that plaintiff was fired after DOC officials investigated and found that he had colluded with an inmate to draft legal papers used in his state court suit. It is uncontroverted that New Jersey law provides that public employees are subject to major discipline for a wide variety of offenses connected to his employment, and may be discharged with sufficient cause. N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)10.
The decision of whether or not to discipline an employee for misconduct is a discretionary one, and state employees making such a discretionary decision are immune from suit under § 1983 unless the plaintiff can show that the decision was sufficiently unreasonable to rebut the presumption of immunity. Good v. Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989).
Turning to the issue of whether these defendants' conduct was sufficiently unreasonable to destroy their immunity to § 1983 suit, the Court finds it significant that Mr. Wilborn does not deny that inmate Koch composed legal paperwork for his personal use. (See, Pl's Ex. 57.) In light of this admission, the DOC discharged Wilborn for unauthorized contact with an inmate, undue familiarity with an inmate, and divulging confidential information without proper authority. (Id.) The Court finds that plaintiff has not shown that defendants' actions were objectively unreasonable or in violation of clearly established federal rights. Instead, the Court finds the defendants' decision to terminate Wilborn from employment well supported by applicable regulations and by facts showing that Wilborn seriously breached of DOC policy by using the services of a prison inmate to sue fellow prison guards. If Wilborn's fraternization with inmate Koch had gone undiscovered, it is reasonable to presume he would have felt obliged to repay Koch with favors, potentially leading to breaches in prison security. Moreover, the contents of Wilborn's complaint as drafted by Koch contained allegations against other prison guards. A situation in which an inmate knows that there is strife and mistrust between his guards could have dangerous consequences for prison order. Thus the fraternization between Wilborn and Koch jeopardized the core concerns of prison administration for good order and security.
In light of the seriousness of the charges against Wilborn, there is no doubt that the decision to remove him from employment was reasonable. This Court finds that no reasonable person in the defendants' position would have believed that the decision to fire Wilborn on these grounds violates any well-established right of Mr. Wilborn. Accordingly, the Court holds that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions in connection with Wilborn's termination for his unauthorized arrangement with inmate Koch, and will dismiss all of plaintiff's claims premised on wrongful termination from employment. As the Court now dismisses plaintiff's civil rights claims, it also dismisses as meritless his failure to train claims, which are premised upon a finding of a violation of his civil rights.
Having dismissed the § 1983 claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction, this Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims for which it does not have original jurisdiction [such as state law claims where there is no diversity between the parties] once the district court "has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction").
CONCLUSION
For reasons discussed above, the Court now dismisses plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety. The accompanying Order is entered.
O R D E R
This matter having come before the Court upon the defendants' motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); and the Court having considered the submissions of the parties; and for the reasons stated in the Opinion of today's date;
It is this, ___ day of December, 1999, hereby
ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) be, and hereby is, GRANTED and plaintiff's Complaint be, and hereby is, DISMISSED.