Opinion
No. 4-847 / 04-0319
Filed February 9, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monona County, John D. Ackerman, Judge.
Defendant appeals the jury's award of damages to plaintiffs in this tort suit. AFFIRMED.
Robert M. Holliday, Jennifer Jaskolka-Brown, and Jill Mataya Corry of Sullivan Ward, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
David L. Reinschmidt and Colby M. Lessmann of Munger, Reinschmidt Denne, Sioux City, for appellees.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., Mahan, Miller, and Vaitheswaran, JJ., and Nelson, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2003).
I. Background Facts Proceedings
On October 3, 2000, while Doug Wiggs was harvesting his soybean crop, he struck a guide wire which had been inadvertently left in the field by Northwest Iowa Power Cooperative (NIPCO). Wiggs filed suit against NIPCO, alleging damage to his combine and beanhead, as well as lost income for the period of time it took to fix his machinery. He sought damages of $75,229.
NIPCO admitted liability, but challenged the amount of damages. In particular, NIPCO challenged Wiggs's claim of lost income for custom farm work he was not able to perform for Charles Clift. Wiggs and Clift agreed that Wiggs would not be paid for his services, but that he and Clift would exchange labor through a bartering system.
Prior to trial, Wiggs filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit NIPCO's expert, Tom Ahlers, from testifying that Wiggs had violated the law by improperly reporting his income on his tax returns. Although Wiggs claimed he performed custom farm work for many years, he showed income from this farm work only on his 2000 tax return. Ahlers believed Wiggs may not have reported his bartering income. The district court ruled Ahlers could only testify that Wiggs's income from custom farm work should have been reported on a separate line of his tax return, and this was not done. NIPCO presented an offer of proof of Ahlers's proposed testimony concerning violations of the tax code.
The case was submitted to a jury, which awarded Wiggs damages of $64,970. The special verdict form showed the jury awarded Wiggs the entire amount he requested for loss of income, but awarded him slightly less than the amount he sought for the repair of his machinery. NIPCO appealed.
II. Standard of Review
This case was tried at law, and our review is for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. On appeal, the jury's findings of fact are binding upon us if they are supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( a).
III. Expert Testimony
NIPCO contends the district court should have permitted Ahlers to testify to the irregularities and illegalities in Wiggs's tax returns. NIPCO asserts the evidence is relevant because it casts doubts on Wiggs's claims of lost income from custom farm work and on his credibility in general.
Our review of evidentiary issues is for an abuse of discretion. State v. Martinez, 621 N.W.2d 689, 695 (Iowa Ct.App. 2000). The district court's decision will be upheld unless the court's discretion is based on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Most, 578 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
The admissibility of the evidence in question is based on Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.608(b), which provides:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness's credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 5.609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
In the present case, NIPCO sought to establish specific instances of misconduct of Wiggs through the direct testimony of Ahlers. As the district court found, NIPCO was "trying to admit extrinsic evidence relating to credibility." Showing specific instances of conduct through extrinsic evidence, such as tax returns, is not permitted by rule 5.608(b). See State v. Knox, 536 N.W.2d 735, 740 (Iowa 1995) ("[O]rdinarily inquiry into specific instances of conduct is not allowed."). We note that NIPCO is not asserting that it should have been able to cross-examine Wiggs concerning alleged improprieties in his tax returns. See State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 28 (Iowa 1999) (noting the narrow scope of rule 5.608(b) permitting the cross-examination of a witness concerning specific instances of conduct).
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Ahlers's testimony based on rule 5.608(b).
IV. Damages
NIPCO claims Wiggs did not present sufficient evidence that he suffered any loss of income because he was unable to perform custom farm work for Clift during the period of time his machinery was being repaired. NIPCO claims the jury's award of damages is excessive in the amount of $5440.
NIPCO points out that Wiggs testified he was able to harvest Clift's beans and corn, although he borrowed a combine from his brother to do so. NIPCO asserts Wiggs should not be able to claim lost income when he was able to complete the work. The evidence clearly shows, however, that Wiggs actually only harvested Clift's beans. Wiggs did not seek damages based on Clift's beans. Wiggs was unable to harvest Clift's corn, and Wiggs sought damages only for lost income in regard to the corn.
NIPCO also claims Wiggs's assertions of damages in regard to Clift's corn are speculative because Wiggs was to be paid by an exchange of labor. "Damages are denied where the evidence is speculative and uncertain whether damages have been sustained." Olson v. Nieman's, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d 299, 309 (Iowa 1998). "But if the uncertainty is only in the amount of damages, a fact finder may allow recovery provided there is a reasonable basis in the evidence from which the fact finder can infer or approximate the damages." Field v. Palmer, 592 N.W.2d 347, 353 (Iowa 1999).
Here, there was a reasonable basis in the evidence to allow the jury to determine Wiggs's lost income because he was unable to harvest Clift's corn. Wiggs testified the usual payment for custom farming was $22 per acre, plus $.08 per bushel of grain harvested. Clift had 160 acres in corn. We conclude the jury's award of damages is supported by sufficient evidence.
NIPCO asserts the damages associated with Clift are $5440. The following figures support the jury's award: 160 acres × $22 = $3520. 160 acres × 150 bushels per acre × $.08 = $1920. $3520 + $1920 = $5440.
We affirm the jury's verdict. Costs of this appeal are assessed to NIPCO.