“A restriction on visitation must be based on a preponderance of the evidence and accompanied by a detailed demonstration of the physical or emotional harm likely to result from visitation.” Wigginton v. Wigginton, 2005 ND 31, ¶ 9, 692 N.W.2d 108. [¶ 9] Heidt argues the district court failed to properly weigh evidence of domestic violence in increasing Schurmann's parenting time.

However, a restriction on visitation must be based on a preponderance of the evidence and be accompanied by a detailed demonstration of the physical or emotional harm likely to result from visitation. See, e.g., Simburger, at ¶ 15; Wigginton v. Wigginton, 2005 ND 31, ¶ 9, 692 N.W.2d 108; Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 835 (N.D. 1993). [¶ 10] Furthermore, a district court generally cannot delegate to anyone the power to decide questions of child custody or related issues.

[¶ 12] A trial court's decision on visitation is a finding of fact and will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Wigginton v. Wigginton, 2005 ND 31, ¶ 8, 692 N.W.2d 108. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if, after review of the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. Id.

" [¶ 20] This case is distinguishable from the circumstances in the recently decided case of Wigginton v. Wigginton, 2005 ND 31, ¶ 7, 692 N.W.2d 108, wherein the mother was awarded custody of the parties' two minor children with visitation for the father "to be conducted at the sole discretion of" the mother. The trial court found that the children's father continued to use methamphetamine within a few days of the trial and his use of contraband drugs "harmed his relationship with his children and did place his children in danger."

This Court has previously upheld reasonable visitations "conducted at the sole discretion of" the custodial parent. Wigginton v. Wigginton, 2005 ND 31, ¶ 10, 692 N.W.2d 108; Wolt v. Wolt, 2010 ND 26, ¶ 39, 778 N.W.2d 786 (district court's decision permitting custodial parent to monitor phone calls between children and noncustodial parent was not clearly erroneous); but see Paulson v. Paulson, 2005 ND 72, ¶¶ 19-21, 694 N.W.2d 681 (concluding the district court impermissibly delegated authority to decide visitation to a third party when no finding was made that unrestricted visitation was likely to endanger the child's physical or emotional health).

For example, the North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged the "highly unusual" nature of orders granting visitation subject to a custodial parent’s discretion but nevertheless upheld the trial court’s visitation order, which granted the father visitation at the mother’s discretion, because there was a need to protect the children from the father’s drug use. Wigginton v. Wigginton, 692 N.W.2d 108 (N.D. 2005); see id., at 112–13. Similarly, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals upheld a visitation order that permitted the mother to refuse the father’s visitation with their children "if she believe[d] that he is under the influence of drugs or alcohol or that he is placing the children in an unsafe environment or a place of danger …. " Watkins v. Lee, 227 So. 3d 84, 85 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).

Id. (citing Wigginton v. Wigginton, 2005 ND 31, ¶ 11, 692 N.W.2d 108). A court may grant a custodial parent total discretion over the time and manner of the noncustodial parent's visitation only in "exceptional circumstances" and only if the custodial parent shows "a willingness to foster the parent-child relationship." Taylor v. Taylor, 2022 ND 39, ¶ 23, 970 N.W.2d 209.

Id. (citing Wigginton v. Wigginton , 2005 ND 31, ¶ 11, 692 N.W.2d 108 ). A court may grant a custodial parent total discretion over the time and manner of the noncustodial parent's visitation only in "exceptional circumstances" and only if the custodial parent shows "a willingness to foster the parent-child relationship."

[¶7] This Court reviews the district court's decision on parenting time under the clearly erroneous standard. Wigginton v. Wigginton, 2005 ND 31, ¶ 8, 692 N.W.2d 108. "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or if, upon review of the entire record, this Court believes a mistake has been made."

Under this standard, we review questions of law de novo, and findings of fact are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Id. (quoting Wigginton v. Wigginton , 2005 ND 31, ¶ 13, 692 N.W.2d 108 ).