Wigginton v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc.

25 Citing cases

  1. Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp.

    508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975)   Cited 80 times
    Holding that discovery rule did not apply to commercial transaction because of the “underlying policy considerations which favor certainty and finality in the conduct of commercial affairs”

    Although it is dicta, the following statement by Justice Seidenfeld in Coumoulas v. Service Gas Incorporated, 10 Ill. App.3d 273, 293 N.E.2d 187 (1973) significantly refers to Rozny and Lipsey as "carefully circumscribed cases": "The `discovery' rule, which has been applied in Illinois in carefully circumscribed cases, (See Rozny v. Marnul (1969), 43 Ill.2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656; Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital (1970), 46 Ill.2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450: Wigginton v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill.App.2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118: McDonald v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 780, 274 N.E.2d 121) does not appear to have been extended to include the recovery of property damage due to negligence under circumstances similar to those before us." 293 N.E.2d at 189.

  2. Ravin v. A.H. Robins Co.

    182 Ill. App. 3d 46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 7 times

    " The Nolan court cited with approval Wigginton v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118. That case involved a defective product, and the court made this pronouncement as to the applicable rule (133 Ill. App.2d at 779-80): "In cases involving a disease resulting from neglect, negligence or a defective product we believe that the more logical and tenable position is that the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitation begins to run when the diseased party discovered or should have discovered that he is ill as a result ofsome neglect or negligence on the part of another party or as the result of being wrongfully exposed to a defective product."

  3. Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos

    85 Ill. 2d 161 (Ill. 1981)   Cited 301 times
    In Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill.2d 161, 52 Ill.Dec. 1, 421 N.E.2d 864 (1981), for example, the plaintiff brought a products liability action against a manufacturer of asbestos products.

    We are of the opinion that the preferred rule is that the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of an injury and also knows or reasonably should know that the injury was caused by the wrongful acts of another. Such a rule is supported by the weight of authority in our appellate court. (See, e.g., Ikenn v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital (1979), 73 Ill. App.3d 694, 695; Kristina v. St. James Hospital (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 810, 812; Roper v. Markle (1978), 59 Ill. App.3d 706, 713; Wigginton v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 776, 779-80; McDonald v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 780, 782.) Moreover, this rule is similar to the rule applicable to malpractice claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act ( United States v. Kubrick (1979), 444 U.S. 111, 62 L.Ed.2d 259, 100 S.Ct. 352 (the claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury and its cause)), as well as in accord with authorities from other jurisdictions involving injuries caused by exposure to asbestos materials ( Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. (1978), 284 Md. 70, 82, 394 A.2d 299, 306; Karjala v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. (8th Cir. 1975), 523 F.2d 155, 160-61 (applying Minnesota law); see Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Products Corp. (5th Cir. 1973), 493 F.2d 1076, 1101-02, cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 869). Finally, this rule is in accord with two of our own opinions, where this issue has been discussed but not decided ( Witherell v. Weimer (1981), 85 Ill.2d 146; Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun

  4. Bonney v. the Upjohn Company

    342 N.W.2d 551 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 29 times
    In Bonney, this Court, with Judge MacKENZIE dissenting, applied the discovery rule to a products liability case against a drug manufacturer.

    "Through the processes of design, testing, inspection and collection of data on product safety performance in the field, the manufacturer has virtually exclusive access to much of the information necessary for effective control of dangers facing product consumers. Indeed, the strict principles of modern products liability law evolved in part to motivate manufacturers to use this information to help combat the massive problem of product accidents.' Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich L Rev 1258, 1258 (1976). We do not think that in suits such as the instant one `the passage of time would increase problems of proof or entail the danger of false, fraudulent, frivolous, speculative or uncertain claims.' Wigginton v Reichold Chemicals, Inc, 133 Ill. App.2d 776, 779; 274 N.E.2d 118, 120 (1971)." Raymond v Eli Lilly Co, 117 N.H. 174-175.

  5. Witherell v. Weimer

    77 Ill. App. 3d 582 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 5 times

    ( Rozny, 43 Ill.2d 54, 70, 250 N.E.2d 656, 664.) This "discovery rule" was incorporated by our legislature into section 21.1 and has been judicially applied to personal injury actions under section 14. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 83, par. 22.1; Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital (1970), 46 Ill.2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450; Wigginton v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118. • 2 Two distinct lines of cases have developed under the "discovery rule."

  6. Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos Magnesia

    74 Ill. App. 3d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 41 times

    II. Plaintiff maintains that she is entitled to apply the discovery rule relative to the statute of limitations as it has developed in Illinois, relying upon Rozny v. Marnul (1969), 43 Ill.2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656; Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital (1970), 46 Ill.2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450; Society of Mount Carmel v. Fox (1975), 31 Ill. App.3d 1060, 335 N.E.2d 588; Wigginton v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118; McDonald v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 780, 274 N.E.2d 121; Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun Bradstreet, Inc. (1975), 61 Ill.2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160; E.J. Korvette v. Esko Roofing Co. (1976), 38 Ill. App.3d 905, 350 N.E.2d 10; Roper v. Markle (1978), 59 Ill. App.3d 706, 375 N.E.2d 934; and Kristina v. St. James Hospital (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 810, 380 N.E.2d 816. Defendants argue to the contrary.

  7. Auster v. Keck

    31 Ill. App. 3d 61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 5 times
    In Auster v. Keck, 31 Ill. App.3d 61, 333 N.E.2d 65, the time of discovery rule was held applicable where architectural malpractice was alleged.

    " In Wigginton v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118, and McDonald v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 780, 274 N.E.2d 121, the plaintiff became diseased because of a defective chemical sold to his employer years before. Citing Lipsey, the Third District Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to enter summary judgment for the defendant.

  8. Curry v. A.H. Robins Co.

    775 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1985)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that a prevailing defendant may be awarded fees incurred in defending against a frivolous claim or portion thereof, even if other claims asserted by the plaintiff were not frivolous

    Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill.2d 146, 52 Ill.Dec. 6, 11, 421 N.E.2d 869, 874 (1981). See also Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill.2d 161, 52 Ill.Dec. 1, 5, 421 N.E.2d 864, 868 (1981); Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill.2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656, 666 (1969); Martinez v. Rosenzweig, 70 Ill.App.3d 155, 26 Ill.Dec. 335, 340, 387 N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (1st Dist. 1979); Wigginton v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 133 Ill.App.2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118, 121 (3rd Dist. 1971). The discovery rule as enunciated does not require that a plaintiff have actual knowledge of the liability of the manufacturer of an allegedly defective product before the limitations period begins.

  9. Peterson v. Instapak Corp.

    690 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Ill. 1988)   Cited 7 times

    Internal injuries from inhaling toxic fumes can fall into either category, depending on whether the circumstances show that plaintiff should have known at once that there was a compensable injury, i.e., whether plaintiff knew or should have known that he suffered an injury, and also knew or should have known that it was wrongfully caused by defendant. McDonald v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 133 Ill. App.2d 780, 274 N.E.2d 121 (3d Dist. 1971); Wigginton v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 133 Ill. App.2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118 (3d Dist. 1971). The distinction between sudden traumatic injury and injury in the form of latent occupational diseases is important because where a plaintiff suffers from a sudden traumatic event, usually encompassing external violence, a reasonable person would know that there is a compensable injury from the time of the event.

  10. Bonney v. Upjohn Co.

    487 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Mich. 1980)   Cited 6 times

    "We do not think that in suits such as the instant one `the passage of time would increase problems of proofs or entail the danger of false, fraudulent, frivolous, speculative or uncertain claims.' Wiggington v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 133 Ill. App.2d 776, 779, 274 N.E.2d 118, 120 (1971). It is manifestly unrealistic and unfair to bar a tort suit before the injured party has an opportunity to discover that he has a cause of action, Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill.2d 32, 41, 262 N.E.2d 450, 455 (1970), at least in a case in which the defendant has not demonstrated that the delay itself has been prejudicial to him.