Identification of the defendant as the person who committed the offense charged is an element of the offense that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Miller v. State, 667 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Lewis v. State, No. 03-13-00275-CR, 2015 WL 1810389, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 16, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Wiggins v. State, 255 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref'd). Because appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as it relates to identity, we will focus our analysis on the evidence linking him to the assault.
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the person who committed the offense charged. Miller v. State, 667 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Lewis v. State, No. 03-13-00275-CR, 2015 WL 1810389, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 16, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Wiggins v. State, 255 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref'd). No one method or formalized procedure is required for the State to prove the identity of the accused.
The State must prove identity—that the accused is the person who committed the charged offense—beyond a reasonable doubt. Wiggins v. State, 255 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.); Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). The State may prove identity by "either direct or circumstantial evidence, coupled with all reasonable inferences from that evidence."
"Identification of the defendant as the person who committed the offense charged is part of the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Wiggins v. State, 255 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (citing Miller v. State, 667 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984))
However, no one method or formalized procedure is required for the State to prove the identity of the accused. Wiggins v. State, 255 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.); Clark v. State, 47 S.W.3d 211, 214-15 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, no pet.); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref'd). The absence of a formal in-court identification does not in and of itself render the evidence insufficient on the issue of identity.
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the person who committed the offense charged. Miller v. State, 667 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Wiggins v. State, 255 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref'd). No one method or formalized procedure is required for the State to prove the identity of the accused; identity may be proven by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or even inferences.
Identification of the defendant as the person who committed the charged offense is part of the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Wiggins v. State, 255 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref'd) ("There is no question that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the person who committed the crime charged."). The State may prove a defendant's identity as the perpetrator of an offense by direct or circumstantial evidence or by reasonable inferences from the evidence.
"[T]o sustain an arson conviction, the State must show, in addition to the other elements, that the accused set the fire or was 'criminally connected therewith.'" Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525 (quoting Bussey v. State, 474 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)); see Wiggins v. State, 255 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) ("Identification of the defendant as the person who committed the offense charged is part of the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."). The State may prove the defendant's identity and criminal culpability "by either direct or circumstantial evidence, coupled with all reasonable inferences from that evidence."
In that circumstance, the sufficiency of the evidence is determined from the cumulative effect of all of the evidence; each fact in isolation need not establish the guilt of the accused. See Wiggins v. State, 255 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (citing Alexander v. State, 740 S.W.2d 749, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). B. Legally sufficient evidence established appellant's identity as the perpetrator of the Shell carjacking.
Jimenez did not threaten Barletta and his children until after Barletta arrested him for driving while intoxicated, supporting a finding that Jimenez's threats were a result of Barletta arresting him—on account of Barletta's service as a police officer. See, e.g., Martin v. State, Nos. 09-15-00087-CR, 09-15-00088-CR, 2017 WL 218270, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 18, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Brock v. State, 495 S.W.3d 1, 16-18 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. ref'd); Wiggins v. State, 255 S.W.3d 766, 773 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.); Hughes v. State, No. 01-01-00698-CR, 2002 WL 2025434, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2002, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication); cf. Helleson v. State, 5 S.W.3d 393, 395 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd) (finding evidence of defendant's post-arrest, violent threats to police officer factually sufficient to support retaliation conviction). Indeed, Barletta's belief was that Jimenez's threats were a result of his functions as a police officer.