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concluding that the trial court did not err in failing to issue findings and conclusions in proceedings regarding an arbitration award
Summary of this case from Black v. ShorOpinion
No. 05-06-00769-CV
Opinion Filed October 4, 2007.
On Appeal from the 193rd District Court of Dallas County, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 03-11160-L.
Before Justices MORRIS, BRIDGES and O'NEILL.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from an order confirming an arbitration award. Mary Wiggins brought age and sex discrimination claims against her former employer, Southern Energy Homes of Texas, Inc. ("Southern Energy"). Wiggins seeks reversal of the trial court's confirmation of an arbitration award on two issues. One, Wiggins asserts that the arbitration award was procured by fraud. Two, she seeks remand because the trial court did not issue findings of fact after granting Southern Energy's motion to confirm. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Following a two day arbitration, the arbitrator ruled in favor of Southern Energy finding there was no discrimination. Wiggins filed suit in the district court to vacate the arbitration award claiming the award was obtained by fraud because Southern Energy had failed to produce a requested document during the arbitration process. The trial court thereafter granted the employer's motion to confirm the arbitration award.
Texas substantive law favors arbitration. Crossmark, Inc. v. Hazar, 124 S.W.3d 422, 429 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied). An arbitration award has the same effect as the judgment of a court of last resort. Id. A reviewing court lacks jurisdiction to review complaints that do not assert statutory, common law, or public policy grounds to vacate or modify the award. Id. (citing CVN Group, Inc. v. Delgado, 95 S.W.3d 234, 239 (Tex. 2002)). Instead, if the party opposing a motion to confirm fails to present grounds that the award itself was obtained "by corruption, fraud, or other undue means," a trial court must confirm an arbitration award. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 171.088(a)(1) (Vernon 2005)
The Texas General Arbitration Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. §§ 171.001- 171.098 (Vernon 2005) ("TGAA") also allows the trial court to vacate an arbitration award in several other circumstances not at issue in this appeal. See Crossmark, 124 S.W.3d at 430 (discussing TGAA § 171.088). However, because judicial review of arbitration proceedings adds expense and delay, such review should be limited and expeditious. Id. (citing CVN Group, 95 S.W.3d at 238).
In her first issue, Wiggins asks this court to set aside the arbitration award because the award was procured by fraud. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 171.088(a)(1) (Vernon 2005)(requiring, on application of a party, vacation of an award obtained by corruption, fraud or other undue means). However, no new evidence of fraud was submitted to the trial court. The sole basis for Wiggins' first issue is Southern Energy's failure, during the arbitration, to produce an audit report of Wiggins' job performance. The arbitrator was aware of Southern Energy's failure to produce the document and based his finding of no discrimination on extensive evidence before him, including Wiggins' failure to rebut employer testimony that aspects of her performance were deficient. Southern Energy's conduct in not finding and producing one specific document does not constitute "corruption, fraud or other undue means" necessitating vitiation of an arbitration award. We resolve Wiggins' first issue against her.
In her second issue, Wiggins asserts the trial court erred in not issuing its own findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, the TGAA specifically provides that an application to confirm an arbitrator's decision is heard in the same manner and on the same notice as a motion in a civil case. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 171.093 (Vernon 2005). Where there are no facts to find, findings of fact have no place. Linwood v. NCNB Tex., 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. 1994) (findings of facts not required in summary judgment proceeding); Willms v. America's Tire Co., Inc., 190 S.W.3d 796, 810 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet.denied). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296 only requires findings of fact where there has been an evidentiary hearing before the trial court upon conflicting evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 296; Chavez v. Housing Auth. of El Paso, 897 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, writ denied), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1188, 116 S. Ct. 1674, 134 L .Ed.2d 778 (1996). Here, no evidence was heard by the trial court; so no findings of fact were required. Accordingly, Wiggins second issue is resolved against her.
Conclusion
Having resolved both of appellant's issues against her, we affirm the trial court's judgment.