Summary
concluding municipal court had jurisdiction to prosecute juvenile for violation of shoplifting ordinance
Summary of this case from R.E.N. v. Colorado SpringsOpinion
No. 79CA0235
Decided July 26, 1979. Rehearing denied August 16, 1979. Certiorari denied October 22, 1979.
Juvenile, charged with shoplifting goods valued at less than $200 in violation of municipal ordinance, successfully sought, in district court, a stay of the municipal court proceedings.
Reversed
1. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY — Child — Charged With Shoplifting — Municipal Ordinance — Possibility — General Theft Charge — Not Deprive — Municipal Court — Jurisdiction. Although child charged with shoplifting under municipal ordinance could have been charged under general theft statute, in which case juvenile court would have been vested with exclusive jurisdiction of the matter, that possibility did not deprive municipal court of jurisdiction of the matter, and, inasmuch as imprisonment was not a possible penalty for violation of the municipal ordinance, the child was not entitled to have the matter transferred to the juvenile court.
Appeal from the District Court of Adams County, Honorable Abraham Bowling, Judge.
G. Philip Bryson, for plaintiff-appellee.
Charles L. Sharp, Jr., for defendant-appellant.
Shelly Wigent, a juvenile, was charged with shoplifting goods valued at less than $200, in violation of an ordinance of the City of Northglenn. She petitioned the district court to stay proceedings in the municipal court, contending that the Children's Code divests that court of jurisdiction. The trial court granted her petition and we reverse.
The Children's Code, § 19-1-104, C.R.S. 1973, provides that the juvenile court shall have "exclusive original jurisdiction" in proceedings concerning any "delinquent child." "Delinquent child" is defined in § 19-1-103(9)(a), C.R.S. 1973, as:
"Any child ten years of age or older who . . . has violated:
(I) Any federal or state law, except traffic and game and fish laws or regulations;
(II) Any municipal ordinance except traffic ordinances, the penalty for which may be a jail sentence . . . ." (emphasis added)
The Northglenn municipal code provides for a maximum penalty of a $300 fine for shoplifting, and makes no provision for imprisonment. Thus, it is argued on behalf of the defendant court that this statute does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the juvenile court.
Wigent asserts, however, that because she could have been charged under the general theft statute and thereby would have been within the terms of § 19-1-103(9)(a)(I), C.R.S. 1973, exclusive jurisdiction rests with the juvenile court. We do not find this argument persuasive.
The General Assembly has directed that statutes be construed to reach a reasonable result. Section 2-4-201(1)(c), C.R.S. 1973. The use of the language "has violated" in the quoted portion of the Children's Code is the cause of the difficulty here. We do not agree with Wigent that if an act is one for which a charge could be brought under a state statute, the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction. Rather, only when an individual is charged with a violation is the jurisdiction of the municipal court lost. It is our view that the intent of the General Assembly was to consider this protection of the Children's Code necessary not at some indefinable time when an act that might be charged as a violation of state law occurs; but rather that it applies when a charge is actually brought following that violation. After all, one can be neither tried for nor convicted in any court of an offense with which he is not charged.
[1] Consequently, we conclude that where a violation charged is of a municipal ordinance that does not carry a jail sentence, the General Assembly has not intended by the Children's Code to give sole and exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile court. Thus, the order staying further proceedings in the municipal court is reversed.
JUDGE COYTE and JUDGE VAN CISE concur.