With us no claim is barred until the limitation of the statute has accrued. Hill v. Nash, 73 Miss. 862, 19 So. 707; Houston v. Building Association, 31 So. 540, 80 Miss. 42; Westbrook v. Munger, 61 Miss. 336; Cox v. Mortgage Co., 40 So. 739, 88 Miss. 97.

It is not necessary, in order to avoid the sale, to show that there was any actual fraud or unfairness in the transaction, when a mortgage had violated the principle that a trustee can never be a purchaser. Houston v. Building Association, 80 Miss. 39. A joint adventurer who undertakes to purchase property or exercise an option thereon for the joint account of himself and his associates occupies a fiduciary relation to them as respects such property, and is bound in good faith to fulfill his obligations as trustee for them therein.

In authorizing pledgee to purchase wherefor there was no contract; being entered with indispensable party not before the court. 46 C.J. 1006; Byrd v. Clark, 52 Miss. 623; Houston v. Building Loan Association, 80 Miss. 38; Smith v. Beard, 90 So. 593; Alabama, etc. Ry. v. Thomas, 86 Miss. 27, 38 So. 770, 42 C.J. 47. An equity court should sua sponte refuse to proceed when indispensable parties are not before it.

The foregoing are only a few cases, but we have referred to each and every case in the Mississippi Reports where the word "mortgagor" is used, and in no case is the word used interchangeably with the word "vendee," who had assumed the indebtedness. Houston v. Building Association, 80 Miss. 31. The authorities are well settled that a plain and unambiguous statute is its own construer, and that nothing shall be added thereto.

There is no evidence whatsoever an anything said or done by appellee during the lapse of the years out of which an estoppel can be worked, and it has been settled in this state beyond a question that no period of time sought of the bar of the Statutes of Limitations can be used as a mere bar of limits, or as furnishing any laches which would constitute of an equitable bar to the bringing of a suit. For authorities of this point, see Cox v. Mortgage Company, 88 Miss. 97, 4 So. 739. Also: Hill v. Nash, 73 Miss. 826, 19 So. 707; Houston v. Building Ass'n, 80 Miss. 31, 31 So. 540. Argued orally by Chas. S. Brown, for appellants, and by R.W. Thompson, for appellee.