To be sure, in cases similar to the instant action, other courts determined that the similarities between § 40-1-112 and its directaction counterpart-§ 40-2-140-provide a defendant with sufficient notice of a plaintiff's legal theory. See Wiedeman v. Canal Ins. Co., No. 1:15-CV-4182-WSD, 2017 WL 2311435, at *2 (N.D.Ga. May 25, 2017); Coleman v. Arvey, No. 1:14-CV-994-MHS, 2015 WL 12851557, at *1 (N.D.Ga. May 7, 2015). Clearly, Defendants were aware of the possible application of § 40-2-140-enough so that they mentioned it in their Motion.
First, federal courts have consistently held that the direct-action statutes apply to both interstate and intrastate carriers. See McGill, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1265 n.1 (citing Bramlett v. Bajric, No. 1:12-cv-2148-TWT, 2012 WL 4951213, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2012)); Wiedeman v. Canal Ins. Co., No. 1:15-cv-4182-WSD, 2017 WL 2311435, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 25, 2017) (holding that the joinder provisions of § 40-2-140 "apply to both intrastate and interstate motor carriers"); Fordham v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-1252-MHC, 2016 WL 9053345, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2016) (holding plaintiff authorized to bring direct action against insurance provider "under O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112 and O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140"); see also Scarff Bros., Inc. v. Bullseye Dispatch, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00128-WCO, 2016 WL 3128554, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2016) ("Courts have recognized [Section 40-2-140], and others like it, to apply to both intrastate and interstate motor carriers." (citing cases)); Cameron v. Teeberry Logistics, No. 3:12-cv-181-TCB, 2013 WL 7874709 (N.D. Ga. May 21, 2013) (holding that § 40-2-140 authorizes a direct action "not only . . . against insurers of carriers registered in Georgia, but also the insurers of those carriers . . . that are traveling through Georgia but whose base state is a state other than Georgia").