Widener v. State

9 Citing cases

  1. Ewing v. State

    120 Tex. Crim. 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1932)   Cited 4 times

    The following comment upon bills of the same nature set forth in the opinion of this court in the case of Widener v. State, 109 Tex.Crim. Rep., 5 S.W.2d 138, 139, is pertinent as bearing upon the proper disposition of the bills under discussion: "By bills of exception Nos. 1 and 2, appellant complains of the misconduct of the county attorney in improperly impeaching one of his witnesses.

  2. Murphy v. State

    777 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)   Cited 128 times
    In Murphy v. State, 777 S.W.2d 44, 63 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988), we noted that the admissibility of evidence at the punishment phase of a non-capital felony offense is a function of policy rather than relevance.

    Distinguishable, then as now, were two permissible uses for specific misconduct, First was the use of a convection, or the pendenct of an indictment or complaint, for a felony or other offense involving moral turpitude, to attack the chatacter for truth and veracity of an accused who has testified in his own behalf. Widener v. State, 109 Tex.Crim. 423, 5 S.W.2d 138 (1928); Branch's Annotated Pinal Code, § 167, p. 101 (1st ed. 1916). Today, of course, only final convictions for such offenses may be put to this use.

  3. Scarber v. State

    244 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951)   Cited 3 times

    The charges in the justice of the peace court cannot be utilized by the state in the manner set out in the bills. See Wharton v. State, 137 Tex.Crim. R., 132 S.W.2d 877; 45 Tex.Jur., Sec. 241, p. 102; Branch's Ann. P.C., Sec. 167, p. 101; Newton v. State, 94 Tex.Crim. R., 250 S.W. 1036; and Widener v. State, 109 Tex.Crim. R., 5 S.W.2d 138. For the errors pointed out the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded.

  4. Cooper v. State

    136 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940)   Cited 1 times

    McMurray v. State, 45 S.W.2d 607. In Widener v. State, 5 S.W.2d 138, we said: "By bills of exception Nos. 1 and 2, appellant complains of the misconduct of the county attorney in improperly impeaching one of his witnesses. While appellant's bills show that the method of impeachment was improper, they contain no statement of facts showing the materiality of the testimony of the impeached witness.

  5. LeFors v. State

    94 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 1936)   Cited 3 times

    Appellant's objection to the argument was sustained and the jury instructed not to consider it for any purpose. The bill fails to show to what witnesses counsel for the State referred, and fails to show that said witnesses had given material testimony for appellant. If the witnesses to whom reference was made had not given material testimony in behalf of appellant it would seem that the remark of counsel for the State could not have prejudiced appellant. This court has uniformly held that the improper impeachment of a witness who has given testimony of no materiality will not constitute ground for reversal. Widener v. State, 5 S.W.2d 138, and authorities cited. Bills of exception 7 and 8 relate to the cross-examination of two witnesses for appellant. It is appellant's contention that the questions propounded by counsel for the State to said witnesses charged them with falsifying and that said imputation was prejudicial to the extent that a reversal of the judgment should follow.

  6. Welburn, Jr. v. State

    87 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1935)   Cited 4 times

    This court has uniformerly held that a bill of exception complaining of the improper impeachment of a witness is incomplete if it fails to show that the impeached witness gave material testimony in behalf of the defendant on trial. Ewing v. State, 49, S.W.2d 450; Widener v. State, 5 S.W.2d 138; Miller v. State, 150 S.W. 635; Holmes v. State, 150 S.W. 926. We think it follows that a bill complaining of the improper sustaining of a witness is incomplete if it fails to show that the witness gave material testimony against the defendant on trial.

  7. Mize v. State

    29 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 1930)

    The court refers to the statement of facts in which it appears that the appellant testified that he remembered being arrested but did not know under what law or the name of the officers. The reception of this testimony was obnoxious to a rule of evidence which has often been applied, as is illustrated by the decisions of this court in Brown v. State, 289 S.W. 386; Reich v. State, 13 S.W.2d 697; Widener v. State, 5 S.W.2d 138; Wright v. State, 140 S.W. 1105. It appears from the statement of facts that the appellant was also asked on cross-examination if on a former trial of the case for which he was then on trial he had not entered a plea of guilty. He answered that he did plead guilty but that he was not guilty; that he did not tell the court that he was guilty but that he pleaded guilty. He stated that he was brought into court and the judge asked him the following question: "Are you going to plead guilty or not guilty?

  8. Wilhite v. State

    27 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1930)   Cited 1 times

    The bill of exception is insufficient to manifest error. It fails to show what testimony the wife of appellant gave. If her testimony was immaterial, her improper impeachment would not have been harmful to appellant. Miller v. State, 67 Tex.Crim. R., 150 S.W. 635; Holmes v. State, 68 Tex.Crim. R., 150 S.W. 926; Widener v. State, 5 S.W.2d 138. It is certified in the bill that the testimony was admitted for the purpose of contradicting appellant's wife. It is stated as a ground of objection only that the effect of the testimony was to impeach the wife on an immaterial matter. The statement of the objection in the bill is not a certificate of the judge that the facts which form the basis of the objection are true; it merely shows that such an objection was made.

  9. Stapleton v. State

    22 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1930)   Cited 1 times

    Again, as far as the bill reflects the matter, the witness Price testified to no fact other than that he (the witness) heard a shot and ran away. Hence, if impeachment of the witness was improper, the error was harmless. Widener v. State, 5 S.W.2d 138; Miller v. State, 150 S.W. 635; Holmes v. State, 150 S.W. 926. If bill of exception No. 2 should be considered, it would appear that the deputy sheriff was asked if appellant made a statement to him at the time he (appellant) handed him a shotgun.