Here, the special assets manager's affidavit referred to payoff statements listing the total amount owed by each of the Guarantors. These payoff statements, which were attached as exhibits to the affidavit, qualified as business records since the special assets manager testified that he had personal knowledge that the statements were made in the regular course of the Bank's business. Cf. Ishak, supra, 283 Ga.App. at 519, 642 S.E.2d 143 (loan history report admissible as a business record where bank president averred that, based upon his personal knowledge, the report was maintained in the ordinary course of business); Wickes Lumber v. Energy Efficient Homes, 157 Ga.App. 303, 303(1), 277 S.E.2d 298 (1981) (summary account statement was admissible where company's accounts receivable clerk identified it as a business record). [Since] the [payoff statements] conform[ed] to the provisions of the [Business Records Act], they themselves stand as a witness of the correctness of the account and ma[d]e a prima facie case which shift[ed] the burden of proof to the defendant debtor to show the items contained in the records, or some of them, [were] not correct.

]' [Cit.]" Wickes Lumber v. Energy Efficient Homes, 157 Ga. App. 303-304 ( 277 S.E.2d 298) (1981). The trial court erred by excluding Moore's testimony as to the amount of the account and by directing a verdict against appellant.

Appellee's evidence was sufficient to shift the burden to appellant of showing that a genuine issue of fact remained. See generally Wickes Lumber v. Energy Efficient Homes, 157 Ga. App. 303 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 298) (1981); Clark v. Assur. Co. of America, 156 Ga. App. 526 (2) ( 275 S.E.2d 111) (1980). "An invoice is evidence of goods sold; moreover, it is evidence of goods delivered.

Hence, as the testimony of McLendon and Chattahoochee's ledger entries, invoices, and repair bills established a prima facie case for plaintiff, the burden of the defense of a partial failure of consideration was on the defendant. Andrews v. Adams Drive, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 32 (4) ( 234 S.E.2d 835); Wickes Lumber v. Energy Efficient Homes, 157 Ga. App. 303 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 298). It was apparent that the defendant relied solely on the defense of breach of implied warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code as he requested nine charges based on various provisions of the UCC. He questioned McLendon as to whether he was a merchant, whether he sold parts used in the repair of tractors, that he expected the repaired tractor to be suitable for the purpose for which it was intended, and that the repaired tractor was merchantable. It was shown that the "short block" installed by Chattahoochee was the basic part of the engine — but it was not a whole engine.

However, the loan disbursement sheet did not reflect the crediting of the $210,000 foreclosure proceeds and appellee submitted no other admissible evidence to show the crediting of this amount. While there appears in the record, labelled "Exhibit D," an accounting of the foreclosure proceeds and computation of the deficiency balance, we find no identification of this document in anyone's affidavit showing it to be either a business record (see Wickes Lumber v. Energy Efficient Homes, 157 Ga. App. 303 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 298) (1981) or a summary of business records (see Tyner v. Sheriff, 164 Ga. App. 360 (2) ( 297 S.E.2d 114) (1982)). We are thus unable to consider this document because it would not be admissible as evidence.

]" (Emphasis supplied.) Wickes Lumber v. Energy Efficient Homes, 157 Ga. App. 303 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 298) (1981). Moreover, such summaries are not themselves "true and complete" extracts of the "books or records of any incorporated company" within the meaning of Code Ann. § 38-626 and the twenty-day notice provision of that statute is irrelevant in a determination of the admissibility of the summaries.

Morris v. Nat. Western Life Ins. Co., 208 Ga.App. 443, 444(1)(c), 430 S.E.2d 813 (1993). See, e.g., Walter R. Thomas Assocs. v. Media Dynamite, 284 Ga.App. 413, 417(1)(b), 643 S.E.2d 883 (2007) (summary of invoices admissible given that invoices themselves were admitted). Compare E.H. Crump Co. of Ga. v. Millar, 200 Ga.App. 598, 600(3), 409 S.E.2d 235 (1991) (summary of commissions under an employment agreement created for use in litigation was not made in the regular course of business and was not admissible as evidence on summary judgment); Wickes Lumber v. Energy Efficient Homes, 157 Ga.App. 303, 277 S.E.2d 298 (1981) (monthly account statement was itself an admissible business record). Our search of the record reveals no underlying business records were available to the court or Patterson.