That contention is not supported by the evidence and is in conflict with the law of this state, wherein the rule followed is that the particular qualifications of a witness to give an opinion as to the value of lands, as shown by his examination, go only to the probative force of the opinion. Wichita Falls N.W. Ry. Co. v. Harvey et ux. 44 Okla. 321, 144 P. 581. It cannot be said that the evidence offered was incompetent. The record shows testimony on behalf of Mr. Creekmore in conformity with the rule stated in the case last cited and in conformity with the rule stated in Incorporated Town of Sallisaw v. Priest, 61 Okla. 9, 159 P. 1093, from which we quote as follows:
As further grounds for reversal, the Authority urges that lack of qualification of the Defendants' (Landowners') witnesses renders them incompetent to testify. We do not agree. Since, in Wichita Falls N.W. Ry. Co. v. Harvey, 44 Okla. 321, 144 P. 581 and Wichita Falls N.W. Ry. Co. v. McAlary, 44 Okla. 326, 144 P. 583, we have been committed to the following rule: "The question, when opinion evidence is offered, as to whether the witness has been shown to possess sufficient qualifications to express an opinion, is addressed very largely to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its ruling that the witness is sufficiently qualified will not ordinarily be disturbed unless it clearly appears that this discretion has been abused."
Both the witnesses were qualified to express an opinion as to the value of land. Wichita Falls N.W. Ry. Co. v. Harvey, 44 Okla. 321, 144 P. 581. This Court is committed to the rule that in condemnation proceedings the question of the qualifications of an expert witness is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling that a witness is sufficiently qualified will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that this discretion has been abused.
The witness need not know of any sales and he need not be a technical expert. See Montana R. Co. v. Warren, supra, (affirmed) 137 U.S. 348, 11 S.Ct. 96, 34 L.Ed. 681; Wichita Falls N.W. Ry. Co. v. Harvey, 44 Okla. 321, 144 P. 581; San Diego Land Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 20 P. 372, 3 L.R.A. 83; City of Tulsa v. Creekmore, 167 Okla. 298, 29 P.2d 101, 103; Portland Seattle Ry. Co. v. Skamania Boom Co., 59 Wn. 191, 109 P. 814; Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference, 20 Idaho 568, 119 P. 60, 62, 38 L.R.A., N.S., 497; Wilson v. Pacific Power Light Co., 171 Wn. 232, 17 P.2d 846, 847; Lewis, Eminent Domain, section 654, page 1118, section 656, page 1127, section 685, page 1175 (3rd Ed.). The foundation laid for the two witnesses demonstrated that they had particular and peculiar means for forming an intelligent and correct judgment as to the value of the property.
Both of the witnesses were shown to have knowledge and peculiar experience which they had applied on inspection to the lands here involved. See Wichita Falls N.W. Ry. Co. v. Harvey, 44 Okla. 321, 144 P. 581. Whether witnesses are shown to be sufficiently qualified to testify is a matter which rests largely within the discretion of the trial court, and unless it is shown such discretion has been abused to the substantial prejudice of the complaining party, this court will ordinarily not interfere with the ruling of the trial court thereon.
The amount of knowledge which a witness must possess before a party is entitled to his opinion as an expert is a matter which must be left largely to the discretion of the trial court, and its ruling thereon will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Wichita Falls N.W. Ry. v. Harvey, 44 Okla. 321, 144 P. 581; A., T. S.F. Ry. v. Baker, 37 Okla. 48, 130 P. 577. The record disclosed that there was sufficient showing to justify the admission of the evidence complained of.
This objection was addressed largely to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and when in the opinion of the trial court a witness offered as an expert is shown to possess sufficient qualification to express an opinion, its ruling that the witness has sufficiently qualified will not ordinarily be disturbed, unless it clearly appears that the court committed an abuse of discretion in admitting such testimony. Wichita Falls N.W. Ry. Co. v. Harvey, 44 Okla. 321, 144 P. 581; A., T. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Baker. 37 Okla. 48, 130 P. 577. There was sufficient showing to justify the admission of the evidence complained of.
The second assignment of error relied upon is the ruling of the court admitting the testimony of certain witnesses touching the matter of value and condition of the mercantile stock prior to the fire, and we think that the rulings of the trial court are subject to criticism; and while this court holds that the fitness of the witnesses to testify as to values is a question of fact, addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, yet the court in this case did not confine the testimony to the limits that should have been observed, but we cannot say that there is shown any clear abuse of discretion. 8 Enc. of P. P. 747; Yates v. Garrett, 19 Okla. 449, 921 P. 747 Yates v. Garrett, 19 Okla. 449, 92 P. 142; Wichita Falls N.W. R. Co. v. McAlary, 44 Okla. 326, 144 P. 583; A., T. S. F. R. Co. v. Baker, 37 Okla. 48, 120 P. 577; W. F. N.W. R. Co. v. Harvey, 44 Okla. 321, 144 P. 581; Adams v. State, 5 Okla. Cr. 347, 114 P. 347; Continental Ins. Co. v. Horton, 28 Mich. 173; Ragensten v. Ottenheimer, 70 Or. 600, 140 P. 747; Enos v. St. Paul F. M. Ins. Co., 4 S.D. 639, 57 N.W. 919, 46 Am. St. Rep. 796; Graves v. Merchants' Bankers' Ins. Co. 82 Iowa, 637, 49 N. W, 65, 31 Am. St. Rep. 507. The next assignment urged by the plaintiff in error is that the court erred in its instruction No. 3, followed by the assignment that the court erred in failing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 5, which assignments may be considered together.
These witnesses were all farmers. All testified in their direct testimony that they were acquainted with the land in question and the market value of land in that vicinity. While it is true that under the skillful cross-examination of counsel for plaintiff in error some of these witnesses seemed to contradict their direct testimony in some particulars, yet they come squarely within the rule as announced in the following cases, and the weight of their testimony became a question for the jury: Wichita Falls N.W. Ry. Co. v. Harvey et ux., 44 Okla. 321, 144 P. 581; Wichita Falls N.W. Ry. Co. v. McAlary, 44 Okla. 326, 144 P. 583; Idaho-Western Railway Co. v. Columbia Conference, etc., 20 Idaho, 568, 119 P. 60, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 497; Raleigh, C. S. R. Co. v. Mecklenburg Mfg. Co., 166 N.C. 168, 82 S.E. 5, L. R. A. 1916A, 1079. As it does not appear there was any abuse of discretion upon the part of the trial court with reference to his rulings on the testimony of these witnesses, his rulings thereon will be permitted to stand.
Complaint is made as to the competency of certain witnesses to testify as to the value of the land appropriated by the railway company and as to the damage thereby done to McAlary's land. Among the witnesses who testified in this regard were neighbors and farmers in the neighborhood in which the land in question was situated. The competency of this class of testimony has been decided by this court in the case of Wichita Falls Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Harvey, ante, 144 P. 581, a companion case to the case at bar, in which the court said: "The value of property (meaning lands) does not here involve a question of science or skill upon which only an expert possessed of technical training can speak?