Opinion
3:21-cv-00255-MMD-CLB
01-11-2022
RACHEL MARIE WHITTED, Plaintiff, v. OMD TIMEKEEPER, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
MIRANDA M. DU, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Rachel Marie Whitted brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that she claims she suffered while incarcerated at the Northern Nevada Correctional Center. (ECF No. 1-1.) On December 8, 2021, this Court ordered Whitted to update her address within 30 days. (ECF No. 3.) That deadline has expired without an updated address from Whitted, and her mail from the Court is being returned as undeliverable. (ECF No. 4.)
District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party's failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public's interest in the expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to Defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130).
The first two factors, the public's interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the Court's interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Whitted's claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to Defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the Court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor-the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits-is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.
The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to correct the party's failure that brought about the Court's need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of last drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court's order as satisfying this element[, ]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[, ]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986).
Because this action cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the Court and Defendants to send Whitted case-related documents, filings, and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Whitted is low. Thus, issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the Court's finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances, and the fifth factor therefore favors dismissal. Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal.
It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Whitted's failure to file an updated address in compliance with this Court's December 8, 2021, order. (ECF No. 3.)
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No. other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Whitted wishes to pursue her claims, she must file a complaint in a new case and provide the Court with her current address.