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Whitted v. Langley

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Northern Division
Sep 5, 2000
Civil Action No. 99-0592-CB-L (S.D. Ala. Sep. 5, 2000)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 99-0592-CB-L

September 5, 2000


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION


This action is before the Court on Plaintiffs "Motion to Amend the Complaint" (Doc. 29). This matter has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4). It is recommended that the motion be denied for the reasons set forth herein.

I. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Complaint.

In his motion (Doc. 29), Plaintiff seeks to add claims against Defendants Langley and Reese. Plaintiff alleges in his first claim that he was forced to enter into a plea agreement in order to be transferred away from the abuse that he suffered at the Marengo County Detention Center. Second, Plaintiff claims that he was placed in lock down on February 6, 2000, and remained there until May 1, 2000, without being able to exercise outdoors. For his third claim, Plaintiff contends that while he was in lock down he was only allowed to shower once a week and that the shower stall was a couple of feet from Plaintiffs cell. There is no demand for judgment for the relief that he seeks.

Leave to amend a complaint after responsive pleadings have been filed "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); see Shipner v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 401, 407 (11th Cir. 1989). "[T]he district court may consider such factors as `undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.'" Nolin v. Douglas County, 903 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Foman v. Davis 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)), overruled on other grounds McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1994). Permission to amend may be denied when the claim, as amended, is subject to dismissal. See Halliburton Assocs. v. Henderson, Few Co., 774 F.2d 441, 444 (11th Cir. 1985).

III. Discussion

A. Absence of Demand for Judgment in the Amended Complaint.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs amended complaint is due to be denied because the amended complaint, if allowed, would be subject to dismissal for the following reasons. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain: "(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction . . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks." Plaintiffs amended complaint does not contain a demand for judgment. Therefore, Plaintiffs amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Brancaccio v. Reno, 964 F. Supp. 1, 2 n. 4 (D.D.C.) (dismissed action against defendants in their individual capacities pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because complaint did not contain a statement showing that plaintiff was entitled to relief and a demand for judgment for the relief sought), aff'd. 1997 WL 634544 (D.C. Cir. 1997);Player v. Phoenix, No. 92 Civ. 401 (CSH), 1992 WL 350780, at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1992) (unpublished) (dismissed action sua sponte for failure to state a claim due to the lack of a demand for judgment in the amended complaint); Dupree v. Lubbock County Jail, 805 F. Supp. 20, 21 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (dismissed action sua sponta for failure to state a claim because there was no demand for judgment in the complaint or amended complaint). Thus, if Plaintiff were to proceed on his amended complaint, the amended complaint would be subject to a sua sponte dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), Lampliter Dinner Theater, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 1036, 1045-46 n. 10 (11th Cir. 1986), or under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

B. Plaintiffs Claims in the Amended Complaint.

Even though Plaintiffs motion to amend is due to be denied because the amended complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to demand a judgment for the relief that Plaintiff seeks, the Court will examine the substantive aspects of Plaintiffs three claims. Plaintiffs first claim is that he pleaded guilty in order to be transferred away from the abuse to which he was subjected at the Marengo County Detention Center. By this claim, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff is attacking the voluntariness of his guilty plea. In a § 1983 action in order to recover damages for an unconstitutional conviction, it must be established that the conviction "has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called unto question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254."Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Plaintiff, however, has not shown that his conviction has been invalidated by one of these prescribed means. Therefore, Plaintiff does not have a damages claim under § 1983. Id. at 489, 114 S.Ct. at 2372 ("a prisoner has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impunged by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus."); accord Moreland v. Evans, No. 94-2248, 1996 WL 547344, at 1, n. 2 (10th Cir. Sept. 26, 1996) (unpublished) (holding the plaintiffs claim that his mistreatment in jail caused him to plead guilty, which made his plea involuntary, cannot be raise in a § 1983 action until the conviction is reversed or set aside). Furthermore, if Plaintiff had requested injunctive relief, a request for injunctive relief on this type of claim in a § 1983 action is construed to be a request for habeas corpus relief, which is not cognizable in a § 1983 action. Abella v Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1066 (11th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs first claim would be subject to dismissal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

Next, Plaintiff complains in his second and third claims that he was locked down from February 6, 2000, to May 1, 2000, without any outdoor exercise and was allowed only to shower once a week and that the shower stall was a couple of feet from his cell. Plaintiff claims that these are violations of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff does not claim that he sustained any injury, physical or mental, that resulted from these conditions, nor did he connect a request for relief to these claims. As stated above, by Plaintiffs failure to demand judgment for the relief that he seeks, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiffs status for the period of time about which he complains is not clear. Nonetheless, no distinction is made in this circuit between the legal standards to be applied to a pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment claims and a convicted felon's Eighth Amendment claims. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1995); Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994); Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1096, 106 S.Ct. 1492, 89 L.Ed.2d 894 (1986).

However, if Plaintiff had requested damages for any mental or emotional injury that he suffered as a result of these conditions, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) precludes a damages recovery because Plaintiff has not established a physical injury that he suffered as a result of these conditions. Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286-87 (11th. Cir.), modified on other grounds 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, if Plaintiff requested injunctive relief, his request would be moot because he has been transferred to Kilby Correctional Facility from the Marengo County Detention Center (Doc. 28) and is no longer being subjected to the conditions of which he complains. Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1046, 109 S.Ct. 876, 102 L.Ed.2d 999 (1989); see Dupree, 805 F. Supp. at 21. Accordingly, Plaintiffs second and third claims would be subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1997e(e) provides: "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury."

IV. Conclusion.

Based upon the reason that Plaintiffs amended complaint is subject to dismissal, it is recommended that Plaintiffs "Motion to Amend the Complaint" (Doc. 29) be denied. Halliburton, 774 F.2d at 444.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections to this Report and Recommendation.


Summaries of

Whitted v. Langley

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Northern Division
Sep 5, 2000
Civil Action No. 99-0592-CB-L (S.D. Ala. Sep. 5, 2000)
Case details for

Whitted v. Langley

Case Details

Full title:WILLIAM HENRY WHITTED, Plaintiff, v. JESSE LANGLEY, et al., Defendants

Court:United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Northern Division

Date published: Sep 5, 2000

Citations

Civil Action No. 99-0592-CB-L (S.D. Ala. Sep. 5, 2000)