Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-1403 DAR.
March 17, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The court (Penn, J.) entered a default judgment against defendant Dorothy Shepherd, and thereafter, with the consent of the parties, referred this action to the undersigned for an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of the judgment to be entered. See February 11, 2004 Memorandum Order (Docket No. 83) at 1; January 4, 2004 Memorandum Order (Docket No. 82) at 1; November 21, 2003 Order (Docket No. 80) at 1; October 23, 2003 Order (Docket No. 79) at 1. The evidentiary hearing was scheduled for May 10, 2004, then continued to May 27, 2004 upon the motion of plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a trial brief in advance of the hearing; no trial brief was filed on behalf of defendant Shepherd.
Plaintiff's claims against defendant Shepherd were for assault and battery (Count I); deprivation of civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV). The undersigned denied the Motion of Defendant Dorothy Shepherd to Vacate Default Judgment. March 14, 2005 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Docket No. 96) at 8.
See Plaintiff's Trial Brief (Docket No. 87).
At the hearing, plaintiff testified and offered the testimony of her son and defendant Shepherd, and additionally, offered six exhibits into evidence. Plaintiff established that defendant Shepherd authored the memorandum through which the jail visits were requested; was aware that other students had been subjected to strip searches at the time she took plaintiff's son to the jail on May 17, 2001; and was present when plaintiff's son and others were led to a room where the strip searches were undertaken, but did nothing to intervene. In his closing argument, the Assistant Attorney General, D.C., who represented defendant Shepherd conceded that the child on whose behalf this action was brought was injured; the same counsel acknowledged that the young man suffered emotional distress as a consequence of having been forced to strip, subjected to intrusive search, and exposed to others being searched. The same counsel suggested that judgment be entered against defendant Shepherd in an amount between $50,000 and $75,000. Plaintiff requested judgment in the amount of "several hundred thousand dollars."
Plaintiff, in her post-hearing submission, states as a conclusion of law that "[a]s [defendant Shepherd's] employer, the District of Columbia is liable under the theory of respondent superior for the tortuous acts of Dorothy Shepherd." Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Plaintiff's Proposed Findings and Conclusions") (Docket No. 90) at 4. Plaintiff further states that "[b]ecause the District of Columbia's liability is vicarious, a finding of liability against Ms. Shepherd is tantamount to liability against the District of Columbia and therefore, the damages awarded in this matter are to be entered jointly and severally as to Dorothy Shepherd and the District of Columbia." Id. at 4-5.
The court dismissed plaintiff's common law claims against defendant District of Columbia on November 8, 2002, and dismissed plaintiff's constitutional and Section 1983 claims against defendant District of Columbia on October 17, 2003. See October 17, 2003 Order (Docket No. 77) at 1; November 8, 2002 Order (Docket No. 66) at 1.
The Attorney General, D.C., in a written submission filed on behalf of both the District of Columbia and defendant Shepherd, submits that "the District of Columbia is no longer a party to this case[,]" and that the doctrine of res judicata "bar[s] [plaintiff] from seeking monetary relief against the District of Columbia[.]" Response of District of Columbia and Defendant Shepherd Dorothy Shepherd to Plaintiff's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Defendants' Response") (Docket No. 92) at 1. Plaintiff, in her reply, asserts that the court, in the memorandum opinion and order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant District of Columbia with respect to plaintiff's common law claims, "[made] no finding . . . regarding the District of Columbia's vicarious liability for the actions of defendant Shepherd for which the doctrine of res judicata could apply." Reply of the Plaintiff to the Response of the District of Columbia and Dorothy Shepherd to Her Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Plaintiff's Reply") (Docket No. 94) at 1.
The written arguments of the parties with respect to the amount of the judgment against defendant Shepherd parallel their oral arguments at the evidentiary hearing. Specifically, plaintiff seeks an award of at least $400,000 for her assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, and "at least nominal damages" with respect to her constitutional claim. Plaintiff's Proposed Findings and Conclusions at 5. Defendant Shepherd submits that "a more moderate verdict would be appropriate[,]" since plaintiff offered "little in the way of evidence to support such a significant claim." Defendants' Response at 2.
DISCUSSION
Because defendant Shepherd concedes that the child on whose behalf this action was brought was injured, and limits her request with respect to the amount of the judgment to "a more moderate [judgment]" than the one proposed by plaintiff, the undersigned's findings and conclusions are necessarily limited to the issue of the District of Columbia's vicarious liability for actions of defendant Shepherd. The undersigned concludes that nothing in the record of this action warrants a finding that the District of Columbia is vicariously liable for the acts of defendant Shepherd. First, the undersigned finds that plaintiff, in her complaint, never alleged that the District of Columbia was vicariously liable for any of the alleged torts of defendant Shepherd. See Complaint (Docket No. 1), Counts I, II and IV.
Moreover, the court, in its Memorandum Opinion (Docket No. 78), concluded and agreed with the parties, based on case law and the arguments presented by the parties in their motion and oppositions, "that the defendants cannot be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Memorandum Opinion at 5; Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the District's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 56) at 6. Hence, the court did rule on the matter of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to the District of Columbia. Consequently, plaintiff is barred by res judicata from raising the argument here.
Finally, the court has already dismissed all of plaintiff's claims against the District of Columbia. Plaintiff correctly observes that the court previously did not decide the issue of the District's vicarious liability for the alleged common law torts of defendant Shepherd; however, the court cannot do so now, since the District is no longer a party. Thus, while the extent of defendant's Shepherd's liability can be determined on the basis of the evidentiary hearing conducted by the undersigned, a new theory of liability with respect to the District of Columbia cannot.
See n., supra.
On the basis of these findings, the undersigned will enter judgment only against defendant Shepherd. Upon consideration of the record herein, the undersigned finds that a judgment in the amount of $75,000 will fairly compensate the child on whose behalf this action was brought for the injuries proximately caused by defendant Shepherd's assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The undersigned further finds that a judgment in the amount of $100.00 will fairly compensate the child for the alleged violation by defendant Shepherd of the child's constitutional rights.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment against defendant Shepherd in favor of plaintiff in the sums for which this Memorandum and Order provides.
It is
SO ORDERED.