We leave that question for another day, noting only that the improper influence of even one juror taints a verdict. Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 399-400, 181 P.2d 822, 824-25 (1947); Lovett v. State, 516 A.2d 455, 475 (Del. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018, 107 S.Ct. 1898, 95 L.Ed.2d 504 (1987); United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818, 98 S.Ct. 58, 54 L.Ed.2d 74 (1977).

Consequently, we agree with the people that Michigan's married women's property acts abrogated the common-law rule that a husband could not commit larceny against his wife as regards the property described in those acts. See also Stewart v Commonwealth, 219 Va. 887; 252 S.E.2d 329 (1979); People v Morton, 308 N.Y. 96; 123 N.E.2d 790 (1954); Whitson v State, 65 Ariz. 395; 181 P.2d 822 (1947); State v Herndon, 158 Fla. 115; 27 So.2d 833 (1946); Hunt v State, 72 Ark. 241; 79 S.W. 769 (1904); Beasley v State, 138 Ind. 552; 38 N.E. 35 (1894). But see State v Arnold, 182 Minn. 313; 235 N.W. 373 (1931); Phillips, supra.

Assuming, arguendo, that our juror did "receive evidence," under Whitson only if "such communications refer to the case and have a tendency to color the mind of the juror in such a way as to make impossible a fair and impartial trial — a new trial should be granted." (emphasis supplied) 65 Ariz. at 399, 181 P.2d 822. The communications here do not come within this standard.

Under Arizona law the crime of larceny requires proof of an intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently. State v. Wood, 7 Ariz. App. 22, 435 P.2d 857, 859 (1968); State v. Marsin, 82 Ariz. 1, 307 P.2d 607, 608 (1957); Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 181 P.2d 822, 823 (1947). 3.

And if such communications refer to the case and have a tendency to color the minds of the juror in such a way as to make impossible a fair and impartial trial and are thus prejudicial to the complaining party, a new trial should be granted." Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 399, 181 P.2d 822, 824 (1947). In the present case, however, the conversation was unrelated to the trial. If it was prejudicial at all, it would appear to be prejudicial to the State because a victim of the crime and the State's witness, Ronald Boston, mentioned his prior arrest record in Missouri.

We do not regard this statement as conclusive. People v. DeHaven, 321 Mich. 327, 32 N.W.2d 468 (1948); Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 181 P.2d 822 (1947); 47 Am.Jur.2d, Jury, § 276. On voir dire, the prospective jurors were asked questions concerning purported knowledge of the facts of the case and the list of witnesses was read out.

Defendant claims that it was error not to instruct the jury that the crime of theft "requires a specific felonious intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property." It is true that "intent to permanently deprive the owner of his possession is an essential ingredient of grand theft", Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 181 P.2d 822 (1947); State v. Cravin, 96 Ariz. 346, 395 P.2d 706 (1964), and that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if reasonably supported by the evidence. State v. Randolph, 99 Ariz. 253, 408 P.2d 397 (1965); State v. Reynolds, 11 Ariz. App. 532, 466 P.2d 405 (1970); Rule 272, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. Such is not the case here.

"`* * * great weight must be given to the ruling of the trial court on the question of granting or denying a motion for a new trial because of alleged misconduct of a juror. And the appellate court will not interfere with a matter so peculiarly within the knowledge of the trial judge unless an abuse of discretion exists * * *.' Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 399, 181 P.2d 822, 824; State v. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248, 255, 320 P.2d 446, 450." 89 Ariz. at 164, 359 P.2d at 755.

This Court said: "Admittedly the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his possession is an essential ingredient of the offense. Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 181 P.2d 822." State v. Marsin, supra, at 3, 307 P.2d at 608.

And the appellate court will not interfere with a matter so peculiarly within the knowledge of the trial judge unless an abuse of discretion exists * * *." Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 399, 181 P.2d 822, 824; State v. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248, 255, 320 P.2d 446, 450. The defendant lastly assigns as error the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial based upon the improper cross-examination of the defendant.