¶7 The evident purpose of the warning clause required by our statute is to keep the petition free from the taint of duplicate, false, fraudulent and unauthorized signatures. The warning clause is just as essential to guard against and prevent fraud, deception or corruption of the initiative and referendum process as are such other indispensable requirements of the statute as (1) the pre-circulation filing of a copy of the petition required by 34 O.S. 1961 § 8 ; In re Referendum Petition No. 1, City of Guymon, supra; Whitson v. City of Kingfisher, 176 Okl. 145, 54 P.2d 616 ; (2) timely post-circulation filing of the petition in compliance with 34 O.S. 1961 § 8 ; State ex rel. Hunzicker v. Pulliam, 168 Okl. 632, 37 P.2d 417, 96 A.L.R. 1294 ; Foster v. Young, 149 Okl. 19, 299 P. 162 ; and (3) the execution of a circulator's verification prescribed by 34 O.S. 1961 § 6. In re Initiative Petition No. 23, etc., 35 Okl. 49, 127 P. 862, 864 ; In re State Question No. 138, etc., 114 Okl. 285, 244 P. 801 ; In re Referendum Petition No. 35, etc., 78 Okl. 47, 186 P. 485....

We must therefore determine the effect of the failure to file a true copy of the initiative petition with the Municipal Clerk as required by 11 O.S. 1981 § 15-103[ 11-15-103]. This Court has, at least on four previous occasions held that a citizen seeking to procure an amendment to a municipal charter by use of the initiative petition must file a true copy of such petition with the municipal clerk prior to circulating the same for signatures. Foster v. Young, 149 Okla. 19, 299 P. 162, 166 (1931); In re Referendum Petition No. 2 of Cushing, 157 Okla. 54, 10 P.2d 271, 280 (1932); Whitson v. City of Kingfisher, 176 Okla. 145, 54 P.2d 616, 620 (1936). Even though the issue of jurisdiction was not raised by the parties, this Court has the power and duty to inquire into the propriety of our jurisdiction as well as the jurisdiction of the court from which appeal arises.

Foster v. Young, 149 Okla. 19, 299 P. 162 (1931). Amendment of the verification required by statute and held to be mandatory in Whitson v. City of Kingfisher, 176 Okla. 145, 54 P.2d 616 (1936), would not render the instant petition valid under the rule last announced in In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Okla. Nos. 74-1 74-2, 534 P.2d 3 (Okla. 1975). Okla. Const., Art. 18, § 4 provides, inter alia, "The powers of the initiative and referendum . . . are hereby reserved to the people of every municipal corporation now existing or which shall hereafter be created within this State, with reference to all legislative authority . . . ." (emphasis added).

The evident purpose of the warning clause required by our statute is to keep the petition free from the taint of duplicate, false, fraudulent and unauthorized signatures. The warning clause is just as essential to guard against and prevent fraud, deception or corruption of the initiative and referendum process as are such other indispensable requirements of the statute as (1) the pre-circulation filing of a copy of the petition required by 34 O.S. 1961 § 8[ 34-8]; In re Referendum Petition No. 1, City of Guymon, supra; Whitson v. City of Kingfisher, 176 Okla. 145, 54 P.2d 616; (2) timely post-circulation filing of the petition in compliance with 34 O.S. 1961 § 8[ 34-8]; State ex rel. Hunzicker v. Pulliam, 168 Okla. 632, 37 P.2d 417, 96 A.L.R. 1294; Foster v. Young, 149 Okla. 19, 299 P. 162; and (3) the execution of a circulator's verification prescribed by 34 O.S. 1961 § 6[ 34-6]. In re Initiative Petition No. 23, etc., 35 Okla. 49, 127 P. 862, 864; In re State Question No. 138, etc., 114 Okla. 285, 244 P. 801; In re Referendum Petition No. 35, etc., 78 Okla. 47, 186 P. 485.

"The initiative and referendum powers are hereby reserved to the people of each municipality on all questions which such municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action; such powers shall be exercised in the manner now or hereafter provided by law." This provision of the Constitution is not self-executing ( Shryock, a Taxpayer, v. City of Zanesville, 92 Ohio St. 375, 383, 110 N.E. 937; City of Youngstown v. Craver et al., Board of Elections, 127 Ohio St. 195, 203, 187 N.E. 715), and, therefore, where a municipality has not adopted its own system for the initiative and referendum, which under the home-rule provisions of the Constitution it may do, it is limited in the exercise of the initiative and referendum power to the provisions of the Revised Code. Cf. State, ex rel. Huckestein, City Recorder, v. Poulsen, 140 Ore., 623, 15 P.2d 372; Whitson v. City of Kingfisher, 176 Okla. 145, 54 P.2d 616; and Seufert v. Stadelman, 178 Ore., 646, 167 P.2d 936. The provisions enacted by the General Assembly with reference to the initiative and referendum in municipal corporations are contained in Sections 731.28 to 731.

We have repeatedly held that in matters of only municipal concern, it was the duty of citizens seeking to procure municipal legislation by the use of initiative petitions to comply with the provisions of section 8 and file a copy of such initiative petition with the city clerk prior to circulating the same for signature. In re Initiative Petition No. 2 of Cushing, 157 Okla. 54, 10. P.2d 271; In re Initiative Petition No. 4 for Repeal of Charter of City of Cushing, 165 Okla. 8, 23 P.2d 677; Whitson v. City of Kingfisher, 176 Okla. 145, 54 P.2d 616. These holdings were based upon the provision of section 8, supra, rendered applicable to municipalities by section 51, supra.

It is pointed out by the city that plaintiff's premise is at fault in the facts recited, and that while the ordinance contains an emergency clause, it was not adopted as an emergency ordinance on the day it was introduced, but was adopted in regular course several days after it was introduced. We think the city is correct in citing and relying on Whitson v. City of Kingfisher, 176 Okla. 145, 54 P.2d 616, even if plaintiff's fact basis had been sound. The judgment is affirmed.

In re Initiative Petition, City of Okmulgee, supra; In re Referendum Petition No. 1, Town of Haskell, 182 Okla. 419. 77 P.2d 1152; Foster v. Young, supra. A failure to comply with a substantial requirement provided by statute and governing initiative petitions renders such petition invalid and ineffective. Whitson v. City of Kingfisher, 176 Okla. 145, 54 P.2d 616; In re State Question 138, 114 Okla. 285, 244 P. 801; In re Referendum Petition No. 35, 78 Okla. 47, 186 P. 485; In re Referendum Petition No. 31, 68 Okla. 147, 172 P. 639. In view of the conclusion thus reached, it is unnecessary to discuss the remaining contention.

The appellee contends that Chapter 4.32.010 is a valid exercise of municipal authority pursuant to 11 O.S. 1981 § 22-108[ 11-22-108] which grants municipalities the power to restrict or prohibit gaming and gambling within their corporate limits. Citing Ex Parte Draughn, 55 Okla. Cr. 139, 26 P.2d 437 (1933), Whitson v. City of Ada, 171 Okla. 491, 44 P.2d 829 (1935), Whitson v. City of Cherokee, 173 Okla. 208, 46 P.2d 907 (1935), and Whitson v. City of Kingfisher, 176 Okla. 145, 54 P.2d 616 (1936), appellee claims that the courts of this State have long upheld similar municipal ordinances enacted pursuant to the same statute. However, a review of those cases reveals that the city ordinances in question prohibited any operation of pool halls within the city limits.

Numerous decisions from the various jurisdictions exist from which general language can be lifted which says that the invalidity of an emergency clause does not void a statute or ordinance but merely postpones its effective date as a nonemergency measure. Typical are Michelson v. City of Sacramento, 173 Cal. 108, 159 P. 431; Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or. 118, 74 P. 710, 75 P. 222; Bickel v. Warner-Quinlan Asphalt Co., 70 Okl. 138, 174 P. 537; State ex rel. Ryers v. Gibson, 183 Or. 120, 191 P.2d 392; Barton v. Recorder's Court of Vale, 60 Or. 273, 119 P. 349; Johnson v. City of Muskogee, 194 Okl. 513, 153 P.2d 118; Whitson v. City of Kingfisher, 176 Okl. 145, 54 P.2d 616; Ex parte Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 99 P. 517, 132 Am.St.Rep. 75; McCall v. State ex rel. Daniels, 156 Fla. 437, 23 So.2d 492. Of course, all of these decisions involved the validity of an emergency clause. What has to be remembered always in analyzing them, however, is that they did not involve the question whether a statute or ordinance enacted as an emergency measure with an invalid emergency clause was a valid statute or ordinance, notwithstanding there had been no compliance with requirements essential to validate the measure as a nonemergency statute or ordinance.