Opinion
No. 05-05-00671-CV
Opinion issued January 9, 2006.
On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 05-00165-J.
Affirmed.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, WRIGHT, and MAZZANT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
L. Lee Whitnum appeals a take-nothing judgment granted in favor of Jack P. Gunter, M.D. Whitnum asserted a breach of contract claim against Gunter in connection with alleged failed results of cosmetic surgery. Gunter moved for and obtained summary judgment based upon the statute of frauds. In four issues, Whitnum generally contends fact issues exist and the trial judge failed to make findings of fact. We affirm.
Gunter performed nose reconstruction surgery on Whitnum. Whitnum ultimately sued Gunter, claiming Gunter promised, but did not provide, a specific result. Gunter filed an answer denying the claim and asserting Whitnum's claims were barred by the statute of frauds. Gunter moved for summary judgment asserting there was no enforceable agreement, promise, or contract between him and Whitnum about the results of the surgery. The trial judge granted Gunter's motion.
This Court reviews a summary judgment de novo to determine whether a party's right to prevail is established as a matter of law. Dickey v. Club Corp. of Am., 12 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied). The standards for reviewing motions for summary judgment are well established. Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985); Thompson v. Curtis, 127 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
In her first issue, Whitnum argues there is an enforceable verbal contract outside the scope of the statute of frauds that Gunter breached by failing to re-do the work. However, Whitnum has cited no authority in support of this issue. Consequently, she has waived the issue due to inadequate briefing. Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h); Johnson v. Structured Asset Servs., 148 S.W.3d 711, 725 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
In her second issue, Whitnum argues she raised a fact issue as to whether a contract existed that would satisfy the statute of frauds. Specifically, she argues a November 14, 2002 letter from Gunter constituted a contract. Initially, we note that Whitnum's entire argument on this issue consists of four sentences in which she generally cites two cases. Whitnum neither explains how the letter constitutes a contract that would avoid application of the statute of frauds nor explains how the two cases cited are relevant. Under these circumstances, we conclude this issue is also inadequately briefed. Johnson, 149 S.W.2d 711, at 725.
In her third and fourth issues, Whitnum argues the trial judge failed to make certain findings of fact and failed to indicate the factual basis of her ruling. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are improper in summary judgment because if summary judgment is proper, there are no facts to find, and the legal conclusions have already been stated in the motion and the response. IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex. 1997). A trial court should not make, and the appellate court cannot consider, such findings and conclusions in connection with a summary judgment. Id. We resolve Whitnum's third and fourth issues against her.
We affirm the trial court's order granting Gunter's motion for summary judgment.