Whitney v. Thomas

20 Citing cases

  1. Matter of Town of Brookhaven

    78 Misc. 2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)   Cited 8 times

    Claimant is entitled to rely on the presumptive regularity of his tax deed but the presumption serves only to shift the burden of proof to the party seeking to overthrow the deed ( Bunner v. Eastman, 50 Barb. 639). When that party comes forward with proof that the assessment of the tax, or any other portion of the proceedings prior to the conveyance, was not in conformity with statutory provisions, the presumption is rebutted ( Whitney v. Thomas, 23 N.Y. 281), it disappears ( People ex rel. Wallington Apts. v. Miller, 288 N.Y. 31), and the case becomes one for proof ( Matter of Magna v. Hegeman Harris Co., 258 N.Y. 82 [CARDOZO, J.]). In a tax title case the tax purchaser must then prove the regularity and validity of the tax proceedings to establish and sustain his title as at common law (85 C.J.S., Taxation, § 963, subd. b, par. [2]).

  2. Kiamesha Development Corp. v. Guild Prop

    4 N.Y.2d 378 (N.Y. 1958)   Cited 72 times
    In Kiamesha Development Corp. v. Guild Prop. (4 N.Y.2d 378), the court stated at page 387: "We are in accord with the determination of Trial Term that when all the errors are taken together they show that the property was so erroneously described that it could not reasonably be identified as the property described in plaintiff's deed.

    Its ownership of the property is now contested by virtue of jurisdictionally defective tax sale proceedings by a corporation which obtained a tax deed for $41.84 (including fees), though said corporation was not the purchaser at the tax sale, had no assignment from the purchaser, and was not in existence on the date of the issuance of the tax sale certificate to it. We have often said that the nature of tax sales is such that the owner's title should not be divested unless the statutory requirements are "strictly observed" ( Helterline v. People, 295 N.Y. 245, 251, supra; Werking v. Amity Estates, 2 N.Y.2d 43, 49, supra; Whitney v. Thomas, 23 N.Y. 281, 286). Under the facts of this case, defendant cannot enlist the court's aid in exacting from plaintiff the heavy penalty of surrendering this valuable property, and at the same time ask that the deficiencies in its claim to title be disregarded. The judgment appealed from should be reversed, the judgment of Trial Term reinstated, and so much of this appeal as is taken from the order of the Appellate Division dismissed, with costs.

  3. State ex Rel. Flaugh v. Jaudon

    286 Mo. 181 (Mo. 1921)   Cited 15 times
    In State v. Jaudon, 286 Mo. 181, 227 S.W. 48, the Supreme Court held that six tax-payers could legally be joined as relators to compel the city of Kansas City and its treasurer to accept as full payment of their taxes the sums which would have been due in the absence of an illegal twenty per cent increase in the assessments and overruled the objection that there was a misjoinder of relators.

    Tax assessment made by the assessor is the basis of the tax and if the assessment is void the tax is void. Hannibal ex rel. v. Bowman, 98 Mo. App. 103; State ex rel. Wyatt v. Wabash Ry. Co., 114 Mo. 11; State ex rel. v. Edwards, 136 Mo. 360; State ex rel. v. Thompson, 149 Mo. 441; Welty on Assessments, p. 36; Cooly on Taxation (2 Ed.), p. 42, note 35; Hamilton v. Ansden, 88 Ind. 304; Whitney v. Thomas, 23 N.Y. 281. (4) If the valuation is to be increased the taxpayer should be given notice. Art. 5, sec. 15, City Charter; State ex rel. v. Alt. 224 Mo. 507; Haga v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 710; County of Santa Clara v. Railway, 18 F. 409. (5) Mandamus is an entirely proper, efficient and allowable remedy, especially in case of such moment, as the one at bar.

  4. Rexford v. Phillips

    74 S.E. 337 (N.C. 1912)   Cited 20 times
    In Rexford v. Phillips, 159 N.C. 213, the tax deed was avoided because the land had never been put on the tax list by any one having proper authority for the purpose, and it was held, therefore, that there was no tax lawfully due from the owner, justifying a sale, a principle again affirmed by this Court in Stone v. Phillips, 176 N.C. 457.

    He does not forfeit it by not listing, but by not paying. There was no listing in this case, because authority is nowhere given to a list-taker to enter property on the lists for assessment. The Legislature provided these safeguards for the just protection of the taxpayer, and the law must be enforced as it is written. Black on Tax Titles (2 Ed.), sec. 105; Whitney v. Taylor, 23 N.Y. 281; Desmond v. (218) Bobbitt, 117 Mass. 233; Bell v. Fry, 5 Dana, 341; Mansfield v. Martin, 3 Mass. 419; Pearson v. Creed, 78 Cal. 144; Dubris v. Webster, 7 Hun., 371. The provisions of the law are adequate for the proper listing of property and the collection of taxes, and the Legislature did not intend that it should be confiscated without notice. The facts stated in the record present a strong case for the application of the rule and the enforcement of these plain provisions of the statute, for it is agreed by the parties that the sheriff and the defendant knew before the sale that they were attempting to sell C. H. Rexford's land, whereas authority was only given to sell 4,352 acres, listed in the name of J. W. Kitchin.

  5. Rexford v. Phillips

    156 N.C. 213 (N.C. 1912)   Cited 10 times

    He does not forfeit it by not listing, but by not paying. There was no listing in this case, because authority is nowhere given to a list-taker to enter property on the lists for assessment. The Legislature provided these safeguards for the just protection of the taxpayer, and the law must be enforced as it is written. Black on Tax Titles (2 Ed.), sec. 105; Whitney v. Taylor, 23 N.Y. 281; Desmond v. (218) Bobbitt, 117 Mass. 233; Bell v. Fry, 5 Dana, 341; Mansfield v. Martin, 3 Mass. 419; Pearson v. Creed, 78 Cal. 144; Dubris v. Webster, 7 Hun., 371. The provisions of the law are adequate for the proper listing of property and the collection of taxes, and the Legislature did not intend that it should be confiscated without notice. The facts stated in the record present a strong case for the application of the rule and the enforcement of these plain provisions of the statute, for it is agreed by the parties that the sheriff and the defendant knew before the sale that they were attempting to sell C. H. Rexford's land, whereas authority was only given to sell 4,352 acres, listed in the name of J. W. Kitchin.

  6. State v. Ernst

    26 Nev. 113 (Nev. 1901)   Cited 4 times

    A judgment obtained upon such an assessment cannot stand. (Welty on Assessments, secs. 64 and 112, and authorities cited; People v. Sneath Arnold, 28 Cal. 614-15; Roe v. Williams, 20 Wis. 228; Baker v. Blake, 36 Me. 435-6; Whitney v. Thomas, 23 N. Y. 281, 284-5.) II.

  7. Collins v. Long Island City

    30 N.E. 835 (N.Y. 1892)   Cited 9 times
    In Collins v. Long Island City (132 N.Y. 321), in which city there was a like provision as to the placing of the lands of non-residents on the roll, the court, in commenting upon the method of complying with this provision, say (at p. 325): "If the land is vacant and owned by a non-resident of the city, the first column of the roll should state, instead of the name of the owner, such a designation or description of the land as the statute requires."

    Hence it follows that they have jurisdiction of the land and may subject it to an assessment, and so initiate a lien thereon for a tax ultimately to be laid, but none to charge the owner with its payment, and the land is to be assessed without the name of an owner, and set down in the roll apart from the names of the taxable inhabitants. And this requirement of a classification of resident and non-resident lands is imperative. ( Whitney v. Thomas, 23 N.Y. 281; Crooke v. Andrews, 40 id. 547; Newell v. Wheeler, 48 id. 486.) Lands of residents are not, under the first assessment, subjected to the lien of the tax, and it can, by virtue of that assessment, be collected only from the owner.

  8. People ex rel. Morgenthau v. Cady

    11 N.E. 810 (N.Y. 1887)   Cited 3 times

    We are of the opinion that the words "belonging to the same owner" in the above section do not mean simply the technical owner of the title, but as therein used they mean the person in whose name as owner or occupant the lots are assessed. The assessment rolls are the only record the comptroller has before him from which to decide who is the owner and in cases where the land was assessed to the occupant, (as in some cases it might be, 1 R.S., 389, § 2; Whitney v. Thomas, 23 N.Y. 281, 285,) the comptroller would be without any evidence of ownership. It cannot be supposed that under such circumstances the statute contemplated a search by the comptroller through the register's office to find out whether the lands which were assessed to different occupants but which were contiguous were not owned by the same owner, for the purpose of deciding whether to advertise them in one parcel or not. For this purpose the person assessed must be assumed to be the owner. If contiguous lots were assessed to the same occupants it would be reasonable to say that the statute contemplated an advertisement of both lots in one parcel, while if they were assessed to different occupants it would justify a separate advertisement by the comptroller even though it should subsequently turn out that the lots belonged to the same owner, unless some proof of ownership should have been given before advertising, and some demand should have been made to advertise in one parcel.

  9. People v. Hagadorn

    10 N.E. 891 (N.Y. 1887)   Cited 36 times
    In People v. Hagadorn (104 N.Y. 516) the facts were similar to those in the case before us. There the board of supervisors fixed the ratio of tax upon the aggregate amount of valuation and without extending it, signed the roll and delivered it to the supervisor of the town with authority to complete and enter against the taxpayers the respective amounts of their tax.

    It is also equally clear that a return of the non-payment of taxes, so levied, conferred no authority upon the comptroller to sell the land thus taxed. ( Thompson v. Burhans, 61 N.Y. 52; Whitney v. Thomas, 23 N.Y. 281.) It is, however, claimed that the taxes for the respective years 1866 and 1867, having been lawfully imposed and there having been default made in the payment thereof, the comptroller acquired jurisdiction to sell and convey such lands, although the sale was also made, for an aggregate sum including the illegal taxes for other years.

  10. Congregation Yetev v. County of Sullivan

    89 A.D.2d 722 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)

    We note that the first assessment of the property was made in 1973 to White Lake San-Ruth Corporation which was then neither the owner nor occupier of the property. The notice of tax assessment was tantamount to no assessment ( Whitney v Thomas, 23 N.Y. 281). Land may be assessed to either the owner or occupant if both reside where the property is located. However, if the owner is a nonresident, it must be assessed to the occupant (5A Warren's Weed, New York Real Property, § 1.07, p Tax-13; see Stewart v. Crysler, 100 N.Y. 378, 382). A valid assessment is essential to a valid tax lien ( Jackson v. Smith, 153 App. Div. 724, affd 213 N.Y. 630). The assessment here was made neither on the owner nor occupier. It was thus void and the subsequent tax sale void as well.