Opinion
No. 144-3.
September 24, 1970.
[1] Criminal Law — Sentence — Parole — Proceedings to Revoke — Determination of Rights. The procedural rights of a parolee at a revocation hearing held prior to July 1, 1969 are determined solely from the applicable statutes. [See Ann. 29 A.L.R.2d 1074; 39 Am. Jur., Pardon, Reprieve and Amnesty (1st ed. § 95).]
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Walla Walla County, No. 57771, John C. Tuttle, J., entered December 10, 1969.
Robert R. Whitney, pro se.
Slade Gorton, Attorney General, and William L. Britton, Assistant, for respondent.
Affirmed.
Application for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner appeals from a denial of the writ.
Although Robert R. Whitney is technically before this court on appeal from an order denying his application for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of the State of Washington in and for Walla Walla County, we prefer to treat this as an original writ due to the nature of the record before us and the allegations contained in appellant's writ.
The sole issue raised by the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus is whether the appellant had the right to be represented by counsel during a parole revocation hearing held on June 20, 1969.
[1] Since the date of the revocation hearing in question is prior to July 1, 1969, the appellant's writ is controlled by the case of Riggins v. Rhay, 75 Wn.2d 271, 279, 450 P.2d 806 (1969), wherein it states:
[P]rocedural rights a parolee may have, when faced with the prospect of revocation, are to be determined solely from the applicable statutes.
At the time in question the statutes pertinent to parole revocation hearings did not allow for representation of the parolee by an attorney.
Therefore, the application of Robert R. Whitney for writ of habeas corpus is denied, and the above-entitled appeal is dismissed.