Opinion
Case No. 2:98-CV-202 ST
May 20, 2003
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT BOARD OF EDUCATION'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING THE CASE
On July 29, 2002, defendant Board of Education of Grand County ("Board of Education") filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's ADA claim, arguing that Plaintiff's impairment did not substantially limit her major life activities. Board of Education also seeks to dismiss the state law claims. On the same day, defendant Bill Meador ("Meador") (collectively, "Defendants"), filed a Summary Judgment Motion, arguing Utah's Termination and Evaluation Acts did not apply to his conduct. On September 16, 2002, Plaintiff responded to both Summary Judgment motions. On September 19, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking summary judgment on the ADA claim and state law claims. Defendants responded on November 17, 2002. On April 25, 2003, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Affidavit. In their response Defendants did not object to Plaintiff filing the supplemental affidavit. The Court heard oral argument on the motions on May 12, 2003 Upon consideration of the motions, evidence produced at the hearing, memoranda, and being otherwise fully informed, the Court rules as follows:
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In reviewing the record, the Court views the evidence and draws any inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Coosewoon v. Meridian Oil Co., 25 F.3d 920, 929 (10th Cir. 1994). Accepting all of the facts in the light most favorable to nonmoving party, considering each parties' motion, the Court finds as follows:
I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
Given that the Defendants did not oppose the Plaintiff's filing of the supplemental affidavit, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File the Supplemental Affidavit and considers it in relation to defendant Board of Education's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
II DEFENDANT BOARD OF EDUCATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. ADA Claim:
In order to make a claim under the Americans with Disability Act ("ADA"), a plaintiff must demonstrate as a threshold matter that she is a "qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The Plaintiff asserts she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The ADA defines a disability, in relevant part, as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). In determining whether any of the Plaintiff's major life activities has been affected, the ADA regulations counsel that a court should also consider the following factors:
The Plaintiff's only claim is that she suffered from an actual impairment, accordingly, the Court will not consider the "record of" or "regarded as" prongs.
i. The nature and severity of the impairment;
ii. The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
iii. The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1254 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)).
The major life activities the Plaintiff has identified as substantially limited are interacting with others, sleeping, and working. Applying the above standards, the Court finds as follows:
1. Interacting with Others:
The Tenth Circuit has not clearly held that interacting with others is a major life activity and there is a split among the circuit courts on this question, as set forth in the parties' briefs. The two Tenth Circuit opinions on this issue held, without deciding if the ability to get along with others was a major life activity, that the plaintiff's had not proven they were not significantly restricted in their ability to interact with others relative to the average person in the general population. See Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 499 (10th Cir. 2000). The chief case cited by the Plaintiff in support of her position that the ability to get along with others is a major life activity is McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999). Defendants mainly rely upon Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997).
Having considered the cases on both sides of the split of authority, the Court finds that the First Circuit's position is more persuasive. As stated in Soileau, the "regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ["EEOC"] under the ADA do not list such an ability among the exemplars of major life activities." Soileau, 105 F.3d at 15. The Court notes that, while the EEOC Compliance Manual does list interacting with others as a major life activity, the manual is not binding upon the Court and is "not entitled to any special deference." Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 n. 5 (10th Cir. 1999). Additionally, as stated in Soileau, the ability to get along with others is an elastic concept and would be "unworkable as a definition." 105 F.3d at 15. Accordingly, given that the Tenth Circuit has not ruled on the issue, the Court finds that interacting with others is not a major life activity for the reasons set forth above.
Even assuming that a claim may be made that the ability to get along with others is, or may be, a major life activity under the ADA, the evidence here does not show that the Plaintiff was significantly restricted in her ability to interact with others relative to the average person in the general population. As the courts in Steele, 241 F.3d at 1255, Doyal, 213 F.3d at 499, and McAlindin, recognize, "[m]ere trouble getting along with coworkers is not sufficient to show a substantial limitation." McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235. "`[A] plaintiff must show that [her] `relations with others were characterized on a regular basis by severe problems, for example, consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or failure to communicate when necessary.'" Steele, 241 F.3d at 1255 (internal citations omitted).
The Court finds unpersuasive, Plaintiff's argument that the Court cannot decide the issue of whether the Plaintiff's disability was a substantial impairment within the context of a motion for summary judgment. In support of that argument, Plaintiff relies on Bristol v. the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Clear Creek, 281 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2002). The Court finds Bristol does not stand for the proposition that the substantial limitation issue must always be resolved by a fact finder. To the contrary, in Bristol, the trial court ruled that, in a case tried to the jury, the substantial limitation issue as a legal one that the court alone, rather than the jury. should decide. 281 F.3d at 1155. The Tenth Circuit reversed this decision, concluding that the issue, in the context of a jury trial, was a factual question for the jury, rather than a legal one for the court. Id. at 1157. This Court finds the determination of whether there is a substantial limitation is properly before this Court. See, e.g., Rakity v. Dillion Companies, Inc., 302 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2002) (Tenth Circuit affirming trial court granting summary judgment where the Plaintiff failed to present evidence showing there was a triable question of fact concerning the substantial limitation issue); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 499 (10th Cir. 2000) (same); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942-44 (10th Cir. 1994) (same).
In our case, like the plaintiff in Steele, Plaintiff has failed to show she was impaired on a daily basis with interacting with people outside of her work. The basis of the Plaintiff's claim stems only from interactions at her work. Plaintiff has failed to put forth evidence that she had trouble getting along with people outside of work in general. In fact, the psychological evaluation of Plaintiff stated that she was engaged in social activities, and states she was "active" and "socially gregarious." Plaintiff has failed to prove she has substantial limitations dealing with her depression outside the work place.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Board of Education's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the interacting with others claim.
2. Sleeping:
While the Tenth Circuit has held that sleeping is a major life activity, Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 1999), the Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support her allegation that her sleep was significantly restricted. In order to establish a substantial limitation in the major life activity of sleeping, a plaintiff is required to "establish that she was unable to sleep or was significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration of her ability to sleep as compared to the average person in the general population. . . ." Id. The Court finds unpersuasive Plaintiff's conclusory statement that "depression interfered with her ability to sleep." The allegation is unsupported by the record in this case. In addition to Plaintiff's failure to cite specific factual support for her statement, the face of the complaint is void of any allegations that Plaintiff's ability to sleep was substantially restricted. Further, the psychological evaluation of Plaintiff states that she claimed few "somatic complaints." The Court therefore finds the Plaintiff has failed to show a material issue of fact on this claim. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with regard to the claim of sleep as a major activity.
3. Working:
The Tenth Circuit has held that working is a major life activity. MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 94 F.3d 1437, 1444 (10th Cir. 1996). To demonstrate that an impairment substantially limits the major life activity of working, an individual must show significant restriction "in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
The Court finds the Plaintiff has failed to present evidence of the number and types of jobs within the geographic area to which she has reasonable access. See e.g., Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 943-44 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating plaintiff failed to demonstrate he was restricted from performing a class of jobs, "the geographical area to which he had access, or the number and types of jobs demanding similar training. . . ."); Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) (stating, "[t]o be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice."). The Court finds unpersuasive, Plaintiff's reliance on her psychologist's affidavit or report. The psychologist did not express an opinion about other employment, or the geographical area to which Plaintiff had access; he only stated that "she would have been unable to fulfill any social role that would have demanded much interaction with others, let alone teaching children and interfacing with parents and staff. She needed simple employment with immediate concrete results that could meet her financial needs." The psychologist appears to only disqualify the Plaintiff from work in the teaching profession.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant Board's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with regard to Plaintiff's claim of work as a major life activity. Board's Motion for Summary Judgment on the ADA claim is therefore GRANTED in its entirety. For the same reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to the ADA cause of action.
B. Supplemental Jurisdiction:
With regard to defendant Meador's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the state law claims, the Court declines to rule upon the motions. A district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction when the "court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (1993). The Court has dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims over which it had original jurisdiction. The only remaining claims are Plaintiff's state law claims under the Termination and Evaluation Act. Because these claims deal solely with state law, they are better left to the jurisdiction of the state courts. The Court therefore declines to issue a ruling on the Motions. The Court remands the state law claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS defendant Board of Education's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with regard to the ADA claim. The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with regard to the ADA claim. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and therefore does not rule on defendant Meador's Motion for Summary Judgment or Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the state law claims. The Court REMANDS Plaintiff's remaining state law claims.
SO ORDERED.