No. 05-03-00205-CR
November 26, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court, No. 4, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F02-50123-HK.
Before Justices BRIDGES, FRANCIS, and LANG-MIERS.
ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS, Justice.
Lynn William Whitfield appeals his conviction for theft of property valued at $1500 or more but less than $20,000. Appellant waived a jury trial and pleaded not guilty before the court. The trial court found appellant guilty, found two enhancement paragraphs true, and sentenced appellant to three years confinement. In two points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
At 3:30 a.m. on April 16, 2002, Dallas police officer Dean Winfield was on routine patrol when he saw a truck stopped near the intersection of Lakeland and Ferguson Road. Two men were trying to tie a trailer to the back of a truck. Winfield identified appellant and Glenn Nash as the men he saw trying to tie the trailer. When Winfield stopped to help, he noticed the trailer did not have a license plate, there were no hitching mechanisms on the truck or the trailer, there were no lights connected from the truck to the trailer, and the trailer was attached to the truck with a clothing belt. Winfield became suspicious and questioned both appellant and Nash. The men told Winfield the trailer was a barbeque trailer that they picked up from their boss, and they were going to use it to do some barbequing. Winfield testified both appellant and Nash stated they got the trailer from their boss who lived down the street, and appellant stated he was helping Nash transport the trailer to Nash's residence in the Balch Springs area. When Winfield looked inside the trailer, he saw antique toys, a passport, and miscellaneous property, but nothing relating to barbequing. Winfield used information from the passport to contact the owner of the trailer, who lived only a half of a mile away. Winfield arrested appellant and Nash. David Reagan, the owner of the trailer, testified he did not know appellant or Nash and did not give anyone permission to take his trailer. Reagan testified he kept antique toys from his late father and other items inside the trailer, and he specifically disassembled the hitching mechanism on the trailer so no one could steal it. Reagan kept the trailer next to a garage in the back yard. Reagan testified the trailer always sat next to the garage, and was parked there at the time Reagan went to bed. At approximately 3:30 a.m. the next day, police called Reagan and told him they had his trailer. Reagan drove to the location and identified the trailer and its contents. Reagan testified the trailer and its contents were valued at $3555. Glenn Nash testified for the defense. At the beginning of Nash's testimony, he stated he knew this testimony was going to be different from what he said at his own plea hearing. Nash testified the questions at his plea hearing were not clear to him because he was tired and "coming down on drugs at the time." The trial judge pointed out that Nash had been in jail for two months when he entered his guilty plea on June 18, 2002, and Nash could not have had access to drugs during that time period. A transcription of Nash's plea hearing was admitted into evidence. During questioning by his own attorney, Nash testified: (1) appellant committed the offense with him, (2) he did not force appellant to help him, (3) he and appellant "went by and picked up the trailer out of the man's yard," (4) appellant helped him hook the trailer back up when the trailer disconnected, (5) appellant knew the trailer did not belong to Nash, and (6) appellant was just as guilty as Nash. Conversely, during appellant's trial, Nash testified he stole the trailer with the intention of selling it for money to buy drugs, and appellant did not know the trailer was stolen until after the police arrested them both. Nash had worked on the house next door to the trailer two months before the theft. On April 15, 2002, between 1:30 and 3:30 p.m., Nash rode the bus from his Oak Cliff neighborhood to the area where the trailer was parked. Nash claimed he was looking for a man he worked for who lived in the area. When Nash could not locate the man, he went to Reagan's backyard and pulled the trailer, by himself, out into the grass alley. Nash took the bus back to Oak Cliff, intending to find someone with a truck to help him haul the trailer later. At 1:30 a.m. on April 16, 2002, Nash flagged down appellant and offered to pay appellant fifteen dollars if appellant would help him "go get a trailer." Appellant agreed to help, and let Nash drive the truck because Nash knew where the trailer was located. Nash testified appellant did not ask any questions about the trailer, and Nash never told appellant the trailer was stolen. When they arrived at the trailer, appellant helped Nash tie it to the truck. Nash drove the truck only a short distance before the trailer became untied. While he and appellant retied it, police arrived and began questioning them. Nash admitted he lied to police by giving them a false name, a false name of his boss, and false statements about how he got the trailer. After he and appellant were arrested and taken to the jail, Nash told appellant he would sign a "non-prosecution affidavit" that stated appellant did not know the trailer was stolen. Appellant denied he knew the trailer was stolen or that he helped Nash steal the trailer. Appellant testified he lived in the Balch Springs area, had a barbershop in Mesquite, and was in Oak Cliff on the evening of April 15, 2002 playing basketball with friends. At approximately 1:30 a.m., appellant was driving towards the highway when Nash stopped him. Nash had tools and a bucket, and asked appellant to take him to pick up his trailer. Nash offered to buy fifteen dollars worth of gas for appellant's truck. Appellant testified that although he had never seen Nash before, he agreed to help Nash because Nash needed help. Appellant let Nash drive the truck because Nash knew where the trailer was located and appellant wanted to take a nap. Appellant claimed that when he awoke, Nash had backed the truck down a long, grassy alley. Appellant saw a trailer and helped Nash attach it to the back of the truck. Appellant assumed the trailer belonged to Nash even though Nash did not have the proper mechanism to attach the trailer to the truck, and he had no lights to connect the truck to the trailer. Appellant told Nash to drive the truck because appellant believed that if they were stopped by police, Nash would get a ticket and not appellant. Nash drove a short distance and then the trailer came untied. Nash looked inside the trailer and found some rope. As they were tying the rope, police arrived. Nash told police he had picked up the trailer on the side of the road. Appellant knew Nash was lying, so appellant stepped back out of the way and said nothing. Appellant testified he made no statements at all to police, but he gave them his driver's license when asked to do so. Applicable Law
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). In a factual sufficiency review, we determine whether a neutral review of all the evidence demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The trial court, as fact finder in this case, was the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647-48 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant appropriated property without Reagan's effective consent and with intent to deprive Reagan of the property. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2004). A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. See id. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). In determining whether the accused is guilty as a party, the fact finder may consider events occurring before, during, and after commission of the offense. See Medellin v. State, 617 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Michel v. State, 834 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd). Discussion
Appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient because Nash admitted he was the person who stole the trailer, Nash exercised control over the trailer, and Nash led appellant to believe Nash was the owner of the trailer. Appellant further argues the evidence is insufficient to show he intended to deprive the owner of the property because appellant believed he was helping the owner of the property. The State responds the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to show appellant helped Nash appropriate the trailer without the owner's consent. We agree with the State. Winfield saw both appellant and Nash trying to attach Reagan's trailer to appellant's truck. Winfield testified both appellant and Nash told him they got the trailer from their boss and were going to use it for barbequing. Winfield also testified appellant stated he was helping Nash take the trailer to Nash's residence. Appellant denied he knew the trailer was stolen, and Nash testified appellant never knew the trailer was stolen. But, during Nash's own trial, he testified appellant was with him when he "picked up the trailer out of the man's yard," and that appellant knew the trailer did not belong to Nash. Although there was conflicting testimony presented, reconciliation of the conflicts in the evidence was within the exclusive province of the fact finder. See Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex.Crim. App. 2001). Having reviewed all the evidence under the appropriate standards, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the theft conviction. See Young, 14 S.W.3d at 753; Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 11. We overrule appellant's first and second points of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.