Opinion
Civ. File No. 03-6096 (PAM/RLE)
May 19, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is denied in part and granted in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Kimberly Whitfield and her three children were, until June 2003, residents of the Mt. Airy public housing complex in St. Paul. On March 25, 2003, an Assistant Resident Services Manager for Defendant Public Housing Agency of the City of St. Paul ("PHA") issued a Notice of Termination of Tenancy to Whitfield. (Kemp Aff. Ex. B.) The Notice stated that Whitfield's tenancy was being terminated because she had repeatedly failed to comply with housekeeping and yard maintenance standards. (Id.)
Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), the PHA provides a grievance procedure for all disputes between tenants and the PHA. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.54-.56. This grievance procedure consists of two parts. First, there is an informal conference between the tenant and PHA. Id. § 966.54. If the dispute is not resolved in this informal conference, the matter proceeds to a formal hearing before a Hearing Officer. Id. § 966.55-.56.
Whitfield and PHA employees attended an informal conference in April 2003. Whitfield was represented by counsel at this conference. Either at the conference or shortly thereafter, Whitfield provided PHA with a letter from a psychologist. (Kemp Aff. Ex. E.) This letter stated that Whitfield had been diagnosed as suffering from depression and had started medication to ameliorate her symptoms in early April 2003. The psychologist expressed optimism that, given time for the medication to take effect, Whitfield would be able to maintain her home at an acceptable level.
The parties were unable to resolve their dispute at the informal conference, and the PHA convened a hearing on May 22, 2003. Whitfield was represented by counsel at this hearing. After several hours of testimony, the Hearing Officer temporarily adjourned the Hearing to allow the parties to discuss a settlement of the issues. The parties eventually reached a settlement, which was signed by Whitfield, an employee of PHA, and the Hearing Officer. (Kemp Aff. Ex. I.)
The settlement agreement imposes several obligations on Whitfield. Whitfield agreed to allow the PHA to inspect her apartment monthly for three months. Whitfield further agreed that she would pass all housekeeping inspections and complete all yard work and shoveling in a timely manner. As part of the agreement, Whitfield waived her right to continue the May 22 grievance hearing, and also waived her right to a grievance hearing as to any reinstatement of tenancy termination proceedings. Whitfield also agreed that, if she failed one housekeeping inspection or failed to comply with a yard care notice, PHA could reinstate the termination proceedings. PHA agreed to provide the assistance of a Human Services Coordinator, and to suspend the termination proceedings for one year if Whitfield continued to comply with the agreement. The agreement provided that, if the termination proceedings were reinstated, Whitfield would be required to move within seven days. Under the terms of the agreement, inspections of Whitfield's home were to begin on June 2, 2003.
The PHA inspector visited Whitfield's home on June 2, 2003, and noted a number of deficiencies. (Kemp Aff. Ex. K.) As a result, PHA reinstated the March 25, 2003, termination of tenancy, and informed Whitfield that she would be required to move out by June 12, 2003, or face eviction proceedings. Whit field subsequently vacated the home.
Whitfield raises a number of claims in this lawsuit. First, she contends that PHA failed to reasonably accommodate her disability under Title VIII of the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, and under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. She alleges that PHA interfered with, coerced, or intimidated her by conditioning the settlement agreement on her agreement to give up the right to a grievance proceeding, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3617. She further alleges that PHA retaliated against her for filing a complaint with HUD, in violation of § 3617. She claims that the provision in the agreement requiring her to waive the right to grievance proceedings violates HUD regulations promulgated pursuant to the Housing Act of 1939. Finally, she asserts that PHA breached the settlement agreement by failing to act reasonably and in good faith in inspecting her apartment and in failing to provide her with assistance to enable her to avoid eviction.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
As noted previously, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Alternatively, Defendants seek summary judgment on all counts of the Complaint. However, as Whitfield points out, this matter is in a very preliminary stage. Defendants have yet to file an Answer and there has been almost no discovery. Thus, a Motion for Summary Judgment is premature, and the Court will consider this Motion only as a Motion to Dismiss.
For the purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, the Court takes all facts alleged in the Complaint as true. Westcott v. Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). The Court must construe the allegations in the Complaint and reasonable inferences arising from the Complaint favorably to Plaintiffs. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). A motion to dismiss will be granted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief."Id.; see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
B. Reasonable Accommodation
The Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., and the Fair Housing Amendments Act ("FHAA"), Pub.L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619, prohibit discrimination in housing on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, and disability. Specifically, the FHA requires a landlord to make "reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodation may be necessary to afford [a disabled] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). This section imposes an affirmative duty on landlords to reasonably accommodate their tenants' disabilities. United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1994).
Defendants contend that Whitfield has failed to make out a prima facie case of failure to accommodate. Such a prima facie cases consists of Whitfield proving: (1) she is a member of a class protected by the FHA and FHAA; (2) Defendants knew or should have known of her membership in the class; (3) she was willing and qualified to continue renting from PHA; and (4) PHA refused to allow her to continue renting from PHA. At this early stage of the litigation, the parties do not dispute that Whitfield's depression qualifies her for protection under the FHA and FHAA, or that PHA refused to allow Whitfield to continue to rent from PHA. Nor is there a serious dispute as to whether PHA knew that Whitfield at least arguably fell within the protections of the PHA. Thus, the only dispute is whether Whitfield was willing and qualified to continue renting from PHA.
The "willing and qualified" inquiry depends entirely on whether PHA reasonably accommodated Whitfield's disability. If PHA did not reasonably accommodate her disability and as a result Whitfield was unable to comply with the terms of the lease, then she has raised a genuine issue as to whether she was willing and qualified to continue renting from PHA with a reasonable accommodation. If PHA did reasonably accommodate her disability and Whitfield still failed to comply with the terms of her lease, then she cannot establish that she was willing and qualified to continue renting from PHA.
Defendants contend either that Whitfield did not request an accommodation, or that, by suspending the termination proceedings, PHA provided her with the only reasonable accommodation to which she was entitled. Whitfield contends that PHA failed to give her any accommodation, or that PHA treated her less favorably than non-disabled tenants, thereby illegally discriminating against her. Nowhere in the Complaint, in the documents submitted by Defendants, or in her responsive memorandum does Whitfield specify what accommodation PHA should have provided.
Both parties point to the letter from Whitfield's psychologist as her only request for reasonable accommodation. This letter indicates that a reasonable accommodation would be to allow time for Whitfield's medication to take effect before instituting termination proceedings. Whitfield appears to argue that, because the first housing inspection was conducted only 11 days after the settlement agreement, PHA failed as a matter of law to give her a reasonable amount of time for the medication to take effect.
The psychologist's letter was dated April 4. The letter does not indicate how long it would take for Whitfield's medication to reach therapeutic levels. The first housing inspection was conducted on June 2. It is certainly not unreasonable for PHA to believe that two months was sufficient time for Whitfield's medication to begin taking effect. More to the point, however, Whitfield herself agreed that the first inspection would take place on June 2. The settlement agreement provided specific dates for the three monthly inspections, including June 2, 2003. Thus, Whitfield, who was represented by counsel in the negotiation of the settlement agreement, cannot argue that the time between the settlement agreement and the first inspection was unreasonably short.
Moreover, to the extent that Whitfield argues that PHA should have offered her other, unspecified accommodations, her claims fail. Although PHA has a duty to provide Whitfield with accommodations, PHA does not have a duty to try to ascertain what a reasonable accommodation might be. PHA is not responsible for investigating its tenants' alleged disabilities to determine what might make it possible for these tenants to continue renting from PHA. Particularly where a tenant has retained legal counsel, it is the tenant's responsibility to request a particular accommodation or accommodations, or at least to suggest a type of accommodation that might assist the tenant. Contrary to Whitfield's argument, it is not PHA's duty, once it learns of a tenant's handicap, to "make the inquiries necessary to see that [the handicap is] reasonably accommodated." (Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. at 17.) Such a duty would simply impose too great a burden on landlords.
Whitfield also appears to argue that PHA did not provide her with services that it agreed to provide, or that PHA did not provide her with services that it provided to non-disabled tenants. She thus raises a disparate treatment discrimination argument. In other words, she contends that, if PHA had treated her as it treated other non-disabled tenants, or if PHA offered her the services it agreed to provide, she would have been willing and qualified to continue renting from PHA.
The only paragraph in the Complaint that mentions disparate treatment contends that the terms of the settlement agreement were stricter than those imposed on non-disabled tenants. (Compl. ¶ 33.) The Complaint does not give any examples of similarly situated non-disabled tenants who were treated differently than Whitfield. To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, Whitfield must at the least allege that PHA had non-disabled tenants with similar housekeeping and yard maintenance problems who were offered settlement agreements that were more lenient than the settlement agreement she was offered. Absent some allegation of similarly situated individuals, Whitfield has failed to make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination.
Accordingly, Whitfield's first and second causes of action must be dismissed.
C. Interference, Coercion, or Intimidation
Whitfield contends that PHS illegally coerced her in two ways. First, she alleges that the provision in the settlement agreement that she waive her right to a grievance proceeding as to any reinstatement of the termination proceedings constitutes illegal coercion or intimidation. Second, she asserts that she filed a housing discrimination complaint with HUD, that she told PHA about this complaint, and that PHA thereafter reinstated the termination proceedings. She asks the Court to infer illegal retaliation from the proximity between PHA learning about the HUD complaint and the reinstatement of termination proceedings.
1. Waiver of Grievance Proceeding
The crux of Whitfield's allegations in her third cause of action is that, by forcing her to give up her right to pursue grievance proceedings, PHA interfered with her right to pursue grievance proceedings. This is really just a restatement of her claim that the waiver of grievance proceedings in the settlement agreement violated her rights, discussed more fully below. Moreover, whether or not PHA could legally ask Whitfield to give up her rights to a grievance proceeding, she did not have to agree to do so. She was represented by counsel and she could have either refused this condition and continued to negotiate a settlement with PHA, or she could have refused the condition and asked the Hearing Officer to continue the hearing. There is no allegation of undue coercion or intimidation that would rise to the level of a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617. Whitfield's third cause of action must be dismissed.
2. HUD Complaint
Whitfield's claim of illegal retaliation or coercion regarding the filing of a HUD complaint fails as a matter of law. The record shows that Whitfield informed PHA that she had filed a HUD complaint on the date of the hearing, May 22, 2003. (Larson Aff. ¶ 8.) Whitfield contends that the short time between this date and the date the termination proceedings were reinstated demands an inference that the termination proceedings were in retaliation for her exercise of her right to file a HUD complaint. However, as with retaliation in the Title VII retaliation context, temporal proximity alone is not enough to compel the conclusion that PHA's action was in retaliation for Whitfield's HUD complaint. See Kipp v. Mo. Highway Transp. Comm'n 280 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that proximity between complaint and adverse employment action not sufficient to infer causation under Title VII).
Although this evidence is outside the pleadings, Whitfield's Complaint alleges that the termination proceedings were reinstated fourteen days after she notified PHA of the filing of the HUD complaint. Fourteen days prior to June 5 is May 22.
The settlement agreement clearly set forth the date for the first inspection of Whitfield's apartment. That this date was only 11 days after the hearing is not evidence of retaliation or illegal discrimination, but rather reflects the parties' agreement as to what date would be appropriate for the first monthly inspection. Whitfield undisputedly failed this inspection. Thus, again according to the settlement agreement, PHA reinstated the termination proceedings. The proximity between the date on which PHA was informed about the HUD complaint and the reinstatement of termination proceedings is due to the parties' agreement, not to any retaliatory motive on the part of PHA. Whitfield's fourth cause of action fails as a matter of law.
D. Waiver of Grievance Proceedings
Whitfield contends that it constituted a violation of the FHA and HUD regulations for PHA to include in the settlement agreement a provision requiring Whitfield to waive her rights to a grievance proceeding. In response, PHA argues that, because Whitfield agreed to the waiver, it was not illegal. PHA also contends that it provided Whitfield with a grievance proceeding for the March 25, 2003, tenancy termination, and thus that it complied with all applicable laws.
PHA misapprehends a portion of Whitfield's claims. She contends that HUD regulations require a grievance proceeding for every dispute between a landlord and tenant, and that requiring Whitfield to waive such a proceeding with respect to a future potential dispute, i.e., the reinstatement of termination proceedings, constitutes a violation of HUD regulations. It is undoubtedly true that PHA provided Whitfield with the required process for the initial March 25, 2003, termination. PHA held an informal conference and a formal hearing. Thus, it was proper for the settlement agreement to provide that Whitfield was waiving any process with respect to the initial termination, because the settlement agreement was intended to resolve that termination.
It is a different matter, however, to require Whitfield to waive grievance proceedings with respect to an event that has yet to happen. The applicable laws very clearly require that PHA provide Whitfield with a grievance proceeding to address "any dispute which a tenant may have with respect to PHA action or failure to act in accordance with the individual tenant's lease or PHA regulations which adversely affect the individual tenant's rights, duties, welfare or status," 24 C.F.R. § 966.53(a). Thus, as Whitfield contends, the reinstatement of termination proceedings on June 5, 2003, could constitute an action or a dispute for which PHA was required to provide grievance proceedings.
PHA asserts that such an interpretation of the regulations will cause delay in the termination of leases when the termination of that lease has been suspended by a settlement agreement. It is certainly not the Court's intent to discourage PHA from entering into settlement agreements with its tenants that include suspension of termination proceedings. However, the regulations are clear: PHA is obligated to provide grievance proceedings for every dispute. Whitfield has at least made out a claim that the provision in the settlement agreement requiring Whitfield to waive grievance proceedings as to future disputes is invalid under these regulations.
E. Breach of Settlement Agreement
Whitfield's breach of contract claim depends on the implication of a covenant of good faith and reasonableness into that contract. (Compl. ¶ 62.) She is correct that, under Minnesota law, every non-sales contract includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Wild v. Rarig, 234 N.W.2d 775, 790 (Minn. 1975) (citing Haase v. Stokely Van-Camp, Inc., 99 N.W.2d 898, 902 (Minn. 1959)). Whitfield contends that PHA failed to act reasonably because the inspector did not act reasonably in conducting the June 2, 2003, inspection. Taking her allegations as true, she has succeeded in making out a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the settlement agreement.
CONCLUSION
Defendants are correct that Whitfield's first, second, third, and fourth causes of action fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and thus as to these claims, dismissal is appropriate. However, Whitfield has succeeded in stating a claim in her fifth and sixth causes of action. Thus, the Motion to Dismiss is denied as to these claims.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, and upon all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Clerk Doc. No. 6) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and
2. The first, second, third, and fourth causes of action in the Complaint are DISMISSED with prejudice.