Opinion
Case No. 2:05-CV-280.
June 8, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") brought by plaintiff Norman V. Whiteside ("plaintiff"), an inmate of the State of Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. With the consent of the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this matter is before the Court on defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings (" Defendants' Motion"). Doc. No. 15. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Madison Correctional Institution ("MaCI"). Complaint, ¶ 3. Plaintiff was transferred from the Orient Correctional Institution to MaCI when the Orient facility was closed in 2001. Id., ¶ 6. MaCI regulations require that personal property stored in an inmate's cell fit within a 2.4 cubic foot container. Defendants' Motion, at 10. Upon plaintiff's transfer to MaCI, plaintiff possessed "several bags of legal materials associated with his criminal conviction and other civil rights issues." Complaint, ¶ 3. The legal materials were reviewed by a MaCI official and plaintiff was authorized by the unit manager to store them in his cell. Id. Plaintiff also was permitted to store other legal files in the vault in his housing unit. Id., ¶ 10. Moreover, in response to a request by plaintiff, the MaCI warden issued plaintiff two additional footlockers. Disposition of Grievance attached to Complaint. Plaintiff alleges that he had possession of this legal material — apparently stored in his 2.4 cubic foot personal storage container, two footlockers and his housing unit's vault — for over a year.
Then, plaintiff "filed three lawsuits in the Court of Claims." Id., ¶ 10. At that point it is alleged, "MaCI staff launched a wave of retaliatory attacks against Plaintiff," took his property and ransacked his living quarters "for pure harassment." Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 11.
On October 4, 2002, plaintiff alleges that he informed his case manager, defendant Jondrea Parrish, that there was the possibility that "false records" were contained in his parole file. Id., ¶ 12. According to plaintiff, Ms. Parrish told him that she would not help him if he continued to file lawsuits. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he continued to file grievances to the Institutional Inspector, defendant Virginia Workman. Id., ¶ 13. Workman, according to plaintiff, refused to appropriately address the matters he presented. Id.
In December 2002, Parrish was promoted to unit manager. Id., ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges that Parrish "targeted" him for discriminatory treatment because of his membership in the NAACP and that Parrish and Workman together denied him access to his legal materials in retaliation for the lawsuits he had filed against MaCI. Id., ¶¶ 14, 15.
In April 2003, plaintiff asked Parrish if he could keep certain excess legal materials in his cubicle over the weekend, in order to work on them, even though they did not fit into his property container. According to plaintiff, Parrish gave him permission to do so. Id.
On April 21, 2003, an inspection of inmates' storage of personal belongings was conducted, which plaintiff alleges that he passed even though he had the excess legal materials that Parrish had allegedly given him permission to keep over the weekend. Complaint, ¶¶ 16, 17. On that same day, plaintiff contends, Parrish ordered a second inspection of only his cubicle. Id. Parrish directed that plaintiff's excess materials be sent out of the prison. Id.
On April 22, 2003, plaintiff reported to Workman that there were certain "discrepancies and improprieties in MaCI's fiscal accounting procedures." Complaint, ¶ 18. Plaintiff contends that, apparently because of this report, on April 23, 2003, his cubicle was "shookdown and left in total disarray with his legal papers strewn everywhere." Id., ¶ 19. Plaintiff also alleges that, on April 24, 2003, his cubicle was again searched, and his legal papers were again thrown into disarray. Id., ¶ 20. Plaintiff contends that defendants Parrish and Workman ordered the harassment, evidenced by one of the guards who told plaintiff, "that's what you get for filing all those papers." Id.
On April 25, 2005, plaintiff alleges that he heard Workman tell a prison guard that plaintiff was to be charged $5.00 every time he was found to have excess legal papers, and that defendants were going to "do something" about plaintiff assisting other inmates with legal matters. Id., ¶ 21.
On April 28, 2003, plaintiff retrieved legal materials from the housing unit's vault. Id., ¶ 22. The next day, yet another inspection of plaintiff's cubicle was performed by a sergeant, allegedly at the direction of defendant Workman. Id. Some of plaintiff's excess legal materials were confiscated. Id.
On April 30, 2003, the same sergeant who had performed the April 28, 2006, inspection returned to plaintiff's cubicle, again allegedly on order of defendants. Id., ¶ 23. The sergeant explained that plaintiff could choose which excess personal items would be sent out, i.e., legal materials or other personal items. Id. Plaintiff claims that other inmates were not required to comply with the regulation limiting the amount of an inmate's personal property. See Declaration of Todd Delcol attached to Motion to Supplement Plaintiff's Memorandum Contra. Plaintiff alleges that the confiscation of his legal materials caused him to lose the lawsuits he had filed against MaCI. Plaintiff therefore asserts a claim of denial of meaningful access to courts. Complaint, ¶ 24.
Plaintiff filed a grievance related to the alleged confiscation of his legal materials, Notification of Grievance, to which MaCI responded:
In your grievance you state that after MaCI staff became aware of a lawsuit filed against MaCI, legal materials that had been in your possession for a year suddenly became an issue. Further you state that the order given by Ms. Parrish and Ms. Workman for you to send out your legals materials was done in retaliation and motivated by your lawsuit against MaCI. Additionally, you state that your Stg. informed you that he had strict instructions to have you mail out any items that would not fit into your box and if you wanted to keep the legal materials then you had to mail out your personal clothing.
I read your grievance and interviewed Ms. Parrish who stated that she did instruct Sgt. Campbell to 2.4 your property. Ms. Parrish stated that you had been issued 2 additional footlockers for your legal material but you still could not meet the 2.4 criteria. Therefore she did instruct Sgt. Campbell to have you mail out items that would not fit a 2.4 pack up. Ms. Parrish let you decide what items you wanted to keep. She did inform the Sgt. that if you wanted to keep all the legal materials then you would have to eliminate personal clothing or vice versa.Disposition of Grievance attached to Complaint.
Plaintiff also filed a grievance against Ms. Workman for her alleged participation in the confiscation of his legal documents. Plaintiff did not attach the disposition of that grievance to his complaint. However, on November 30, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to supplement the record with the disposition of that grievance. Doc. No. 22. This Court granted plaintiff's motion to supplement. Doc. No. 27.
On November 4, 2005, defendants requested an enlargement of time in which to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Doc. No. 15. The Court granted defendants' request and accepted Doc. No. 15 as a timely filed motion for judgment on the pleadings. Doc. No. 27.
On December 1, 2005, defendants requested a stay of discovery pending the outcome of the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Doc. No. 21. The Court granted the requested stay. Doc. No. 27.
On December 21, 2005, plaintiff filed his memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, Doc. No. 23, in which he incorporated his previous opposition memorandum, Doc. No. 18. Additionally, on December 22, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to supplement that memorandum. Doc. No. 24. On December 29, 2005, the Court granted plaintiff's motion. Doc. No. 25.
II. STANDARD
Plaintiff filed this action on March 24, 2005, and defendants filed their answer on June 8, 2005. Subsequently, defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(2) provides that a Rule 12(b)(6) defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted can be raised after an answer has been filed by a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). See Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 11 (6th Cir. 1987). Where a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) defense is raised pursuant to a 12(c) motion, this Court must apply the standard governing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and all its well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true. See Morgan, 829 F.2d at 12.
III. DISCUSSION
In their motion for judgment on the pleadings, defendants argue that plaintiff's claims fail, in whole or in part, as a matter of law because certain claims are time barred, because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, because defendant Workman did not directly participate in the alleged unconstitutional deprivations and because the complaint fails to state a claim of retaliation.
A. Statute of Limitations
State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to claims under Section 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69, 275 (1985). For civil rights actions filed in Ohio under Section 1983, the statute of limitations is two (2) years from the date the cause of action accrued. Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10; Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989) ( en banc). Defendants argue that, because plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on March 24, 2005, any events that occurred before March 24, 2003, are time-barred. This Court agrees.
Claims arising out of plaintiff's allegations that in October 2002, Parrish refused to assist him with "false" records in his parole file and that, in December 2002, Parrish "targeted" him for discriminatory treatment because of his membership in the NAACP and Parrish and Workman together retaliated against him by preventing him access to his legal materials, Id., ¶¶ 14, 15, are time-barred. Accordingly, the only claims timely asserted are plaintiff's claims against Parrish and Workman for ordering the alleged retaliatory confiscation of plaintiff's legal materials in April 2003, which, plaintiff contends, effectively denied him meaningful access to the courts.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (" PLRA") requires a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies available to the prisoner prior to filing an action in a federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2004). The PLRA states:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.Id. The plaintiff-prisoner bears the burden of proving that a grievance has been fully exhausted, Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 2002), and the prisoner must attach documentation to the complaint as proof. Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998). "Exhaustion is not jurisdictional; it is mandatory, Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1999), even if proceeding through the administrative system would be 'futile.'" Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 308-10 (6th Cir. 1999).
Defendants argue that plaintiff's complaint does not evidence exhaustion of the claims against defendant Workman because plaintiff "does not attach any informal complaints or grievances pertaining to defendant Workman that he submitted to the Chief Inspector's Office." Defendants' Motion, at 8. However, after defendants filed their motion for judgment on the pleadings, plaintiff was granted leave to supplement the record with evidence of the disposition of the grievance against Workman prior to the filing of this action. See Doc. Nos. 22, 27.
Defendants further argue that, because the complaint does not reflect "total exhaustion" of every claim, Jones Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 801, 805 (6th Cir. 2005), requires the dismissal of all remaining claims. However, another panel of the Sixth Circuit has recently held that the "partial exhaustion rule" is the law of the Sixth Circuit. Spencer v. Bouchard, ___ F.3d ___, Case No. 05-2562 (6th Cir., June 6, 2006).
Accordingly, plaintiff's claims against Workman are apparently exhausted and may proceed.
C. Section 1983 Claim Against Defendant Workman
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action under Section 1983, which states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 "'creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.'" Alexander v. Haymon, 254 F. Supp. 2d 820, 830 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (quoting Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 310 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Defendants correctly argue that under Section 1983 liability cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior. See Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Rather, a supervisor must have "at least implicitly authorized, approved[,] or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct [in question]." Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1989); O'Banion v. Bowman, 824 F. Supp. 743, 744 (S.D. Ohio 1993). Stated otherwise, "[t]here must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. . . ." Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1984).
In the instant action, plaintiff alleges that Workman, Parrish's supervisor, actively participated in the Parrish's alleged unconstitutional conduct, i.e., confiscation of plaintiff's legal documents. Complaint, ¶¶ 15-26. That is all that is required at this juncture. Pleading under the Federal Rules "is designed to give notice to the Court and other parties of the nature of the action and the relief sought." Senter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 522 (6th Cir. 1976). In keeping with this purpose, a complaint need set forth only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Resolution of the merits of plaintiff's claims against Workman are left for another day.
D. Retaliation
Plaintiff alleges that, because he filed three lawsuits against MaCI, defendants retaliated against him by illegally confiscating his legal documents and thereby denied him meaningful access to the courts. Complaint, ¶ 24. Plaintiff, therefore, alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999) (plaintiffs "each claim to have been punished for exercising their constitutionally protected right to access the courts, partially grounded in the First Amendment's protection of the right to 'petition the Government for a redress of grievances.' U.S. CONST. amend. I.").
A retaliation claim essentially entails three elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two — that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff's protected conduct.Id., at 394.
Defendants maintain that plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the second or third elements of a retaliation claim. With regard to the second element, defendants argue that the actions about which plaintiff complains did not "deter" him from "continuing to engage in" the protected conduct. Defendants' Motion, at 10.
Plaintiff does not allege that he was deterred from pursuing his grievances or even filing this lawsuit because of the "retaliatory" conduct. In fact, Plaintiff admits that he continued to file informal complaints and grievances even after this alleged retaliatory conduct by prison staff. Thus, there is no evidence that plaintiff was deterred from filing grievances, or pursuing this suit, due to any alleged retaliation.Id.
This argument misapprehends the second element of a retaliation claim. The second element requires — not a subjective response by the plaintiff — but an adverse action by the defendants. An adverse action is defined as an action that "is capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her right to access the courts." Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 398. The retaliatory confiscation of an inmate's legal papers is such an adverse action. Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 605 (6th Cir. 2002).
Next, defendants contend that plaintiff also failed to "establish" the third element of a retaliation claim, i.e., that defendants' actions were motivated, at least in part, by plaintiff's protected activity, i.e., filing lawsuits against MaCI. Defendants' Motion, at 10-11. Defendants' argument misses the mark. Plaintiff is not required to establish any element of a retaliation claim in order to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the pleading stage, plaintiff need only allege facts that, if true, would establish the third element of the retaliation claim. See Morgan, 829 F.2d at 12 (in deciding a motion to dismiss, or motion for judgment on the pleadings, all plaintiff's well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true).
Here, plaintiff alleges specifically that he had been permitted to possess the legal materials at issue but that, after defendants learned of the lawsuits he had filed against MaCI, he was targeted for the retaliatory confiscation of those same legal materials. This allegation that defendants' actions were at least temporally connected to plaintiff's lawsuits is sufficient to meet the required pleading standard, i.e., that defendants' actions were causally connected to plaintiff's protected activity. Whether plaintiff can actually prove the third element of this retaliation claim is, again, left for another day.
WHEREUPON, defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, Doc. No. 15, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, all claims arising before March 24, 2003, are time-barred and are DISMISSED. In all other respects, defendants' motion is DENIED.
The stay of discovery is VACATED.
All discovery must be completed by September 30, 2006. Depositions of incarcerated individuals may proceed on such terms as the institution shall impose.
Motions for summary judgment may be filed no later than October 31, 2006.