Opinion
No. 00 Civ. 8006 (SWK)
October 9, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3, for reconsideration of the Court's Order dated June 5, 2002 (the "June 5 Order"), which ordered limited jurisdictional discovery, and the appointment of David H. Pikus, Esq., to serve as Special Master for the supervision of discovery. Defendants originally moved to dismiss this case on numerous grounds. In support of their motion for reconsideration, defendants make six arguments: (1) the political question doctrine can be decided as a threshold issue of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over defendants before the Court may order jurisdictional discovery; (3) international comity concerns must be discussed before discovery may proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (4) defendants' due process rights were overlooked; (5) discovery in regards to the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be stayed; and (6) the appointment of a Special Master to supervise discovery is unnecessary. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
"A motion for reconsideration should be granted only where the moving party demonstrates that the Court has overlooked factual matters or controlling decisions that were presented to it on the underlying motion." Adiel v. The Pharmacy Fund, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 3273, 2000 WL 1634381, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000); see also Local Civil Rule 6.3;Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). This standard is narrowly construed against the moving party to "dissuade repetitive arguments on issues that have already been considered fully by the court." Caleb Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 624 F. Supp. 747, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Furthermore, the moving party may not "advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the Court." Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 768 F. Supp. 115, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The decision to grant or deny the motion is within the sound discretion of the Court. See Devlin v. Transp. Communications Int'l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendants contend that the issue of the political question doctrine, which is a claim of non-justiciability, can be decided as a threshold question, just like subject matter jurisdiction. In the June 5 Order, the Court stated that the political question doctrine is not a jurisdictional issue. See June 5 Order at 2 (citing 767 Third Avenue Associates v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d 152, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2000) The Court also indicated that it would determine whether defendants the Federal Republic of Austria ("Austria"), Osterreichische Industrieholding AG ("OIAG") and Dorotheum GmbH ("Dorotheum") are immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1601-11. See June 5 Order at 2-5.
The FSIA "provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this country." Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355, 113 S.Ct. 1471 (1993). Defendants Austria, OIAG and Dorotheum are foreign states for purposes of the FSIA. In actions involving the FSIA, the Supreme Court mandates that a district court "inquire at the 'threshold of every action' against a foreign state whether the exception to sovereign immunity that the plaintiff alleges permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction." Robinson v. Gov't of Malaysia, 269 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493, 103 S.Ct. 1962 (1983)).
In arguing that the more complicated jurisdictional issues posed by the FSIA may be avoided by determining whether this case should be dismissed on the basis of the political question doctrine, defendants request that the Court exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Austria, OIAG and Dorotheum. "The political question doctrine holds that a federal court having jurisdiction over a dispute should decline to adjudicate it on the ground that the case raises questions which should be addressed by the political branches of government." Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d 424, 483 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210, 82 S.Ct. 691 (1962)) (emphasis added)
However, not one of the Supreme Court or Second Circuit cases cited in either of defendants' memoranda involve a factual setting where a court bypassed the FSIA and decided a case on the basis of the political question doctrine when a defendant asserted both theories as a basis for dismissal. Defendants have therefore failed to demonstrate that the Court misapprehended a controlling decision. See Adiel, 2000 WL 1634381 at *1. Accordingly, this part of defendants' motion is denied.
III. Personal Jurisdiction
Defendants contend that plaintiffs are not entitled to jurisdictional discovery from defendants Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG ("Raiffeisen"), Voest-Alpine Stahl AG ("Voest"), VA Technologie AG ("VA Tech"), Bohler Uddeholm ("Bohler"), OMV Aktiengesellschaft ("OMV"), and Magna Steyr Investments SA ("Magna Steyr") (collectively, the "Corporate Defendants"). Defendants argue plaintiffs fail to set forth a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over the Corporate Defendants, and therefore jurisdictional discovery is unnecessary.
A. Legal Standard
A plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of establishing jurisdiction over a defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. See Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1985). "District courts are afforded considerable procedural leeway in deciding" motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 153 (2d Cir. 1999), and the nature of "the plaintiff's obligation varies depending on the procedural posture of the litigation." Ball v. Metallergie Hoboken-Overpet, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990)
"However, when a Rule 12(b)(2) motion is brought at this stage — before substantial discovery and without an evidentiary hearing — plaintiffs need make only a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists." Schenker v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., Consol., No. 98 Civ. 9186, 2002 WL 1560788, *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2002) (citations omitted). In doing so, "plaintiffs may rely entirely on allegations of fact, and they will prevail even if the moving party makes contrary allegations which controvert their prima facie case." Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. et al., Nos. 98 Civ. 9186, 97 Civ. 2262, 2000 VJL 284222, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2000) (citations omitted). A court may also consider materials outside the pleadings. See Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 208 (2d Cir. 2001). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a court must view all of the pleadings in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, resolving any doubts in plaintiffs favor. See Hoffritz, 763 F.2d at 57.
In this action, personal jurisdiction over the Corporate Defendants "is determined by reference to the law of the jurisdiction in which the court sits." Id. If the exercise of jurisdiction would be valid under New York law, a court must then determine whether such exercise is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997).
B. New York Personal Jurisdiction Law
Plaintiffs claim that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Corporate Defendants pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") § 301. Under CPLR § 301, a New York court may exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if it is 'doing business' in New York. See McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 272 (1981). Under this test, "a foreign corporation is amenable to suit in New York if it is 'engaged in such continuous and systematic course of 'doing business' here as to warrant a finding of its 'presence' in this jurisdiction." Aerotel Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., 100 F. Supp.2d 189, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 536 (1967)). "Casual or occasional activity does not constitute doing business; rather, CPLR § 301 requires a showing of continuous, permanent, and substantial activity in New York.'" In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun Austria on Nov. 11, 2000, 01 Civ. 6554, MDL No. 1428, 2002 WL 31106403, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2002) (quoting Landoil Res. Corp v. Alexander Alexander. Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1990)).
The traditional indicia of whether a foreign corporation is doing business in New York are: (1) whether the company has an office in the state; (2) whether it has any bank accounts or other property in the state; (3) whether it has a phone listing in the state; (4) whether it does public relations work there; and (5) whether it has individuals permanently located in the state to promote its interests. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 941 (2001). "The 'doing business' standard is a stringent one because a corporation which is amenable to the Court's general jurisdiction 'may be sued in New York on causes of action wholly unrelated to acts done in New York.'" Jacobs v. Felix Bloch Erben Verlag, 160 F. Supp.2d 722, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Ball, 902 F.2d at 198). Moreover, "conclusory non-fact-specific jurisdictional allegations are insufficient to establish even a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction under § 301." Schenker, 2002 WL 1560788 at *2 (quotations and citations omitted)
1. Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG
Plaintiffs allege that Raiffeisen is doing business in New York because it has a license from the New York State Department of Banking to maintain a representative office in New York. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 89. The license, however, is "not a license to engage in the business of banking in the State of New York." Declaration of Phillippe Zimmerman, dated November 21, 2001 ("Zimmerman Decl."), Ex. 49. A foreign banking corporation with a license to maintain a representative office is able to only engage in certain limited activities in the state of New York. See N.Y. Banking Law § 221-a (McKinney 2001). Raiffeisen admits that it operates a representative office in Manhattan, and staffs it with two full-time employees. See Appendix of Declarations in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit H, Declaration of F. Dieter Beintrexler at ¶ 6. These facts demonstrate a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction with regard to Raiffeisen.
The question of the extent of Raiffeisen's business activities in New York is appropriately addressed after jurisdictional discovery has occurred. See Dorfman v. Marriott Int'l Hotels, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10496, 2001 WL 69423, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2001). Following discovery, plaintiffs will be required to establish that Raiffeisen is doing business in New York by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. The Court hereby allows plaintiffs limited discovery to ascertain whether the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Raiffeisen because it operates a representative office in New York pursuant to a license from the New York State Department of Banking.
2. Voest-Alpine Stahl AG
Plaintiffs allege that Voest is doing business in New York through its business relationship with Voest-Alpine Steel Corporation (USA) ("Voest USA"). See Amended Complaint at ¶ 103.
Under New York law, "the presence of a subsidiary alone does not establish the parent's presence in the state." Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 148 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1984)). To have personal jurisdiction against the foreign parent, "the subsidiary must be either an 'agent' or a 'mere department' of the foreign parent." Jazini, 148 F.3d at 184 (citing Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 101 F.3d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1996)
"To establish that a subsidiary is an agent of the parent, the plaintiff must show that the subsidiary 'does all the business which [the foreign parent] could do were it here by its own officials.'" Jazini, 148 F.3d at 184 (citing Frummer, 19 N.Y.2d at 537). "Courts have interpreted this to mean that the agent's activities in New York must be sufficiently important to the foreign [parent] that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the [parent's] own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services." Schenker, 2002 WL 1560788 at *6 (quotation omitted).
To determine whether a subsidiary is a mere department of the foreign parent, the Court must consider four factors: (1) common ownership, which is essential; (2) financial dependency of the subsidiary on the parent; (3) the degree to which the parent interferes in the selection and assignment of the subsidiary's personnel and fails to observe corporate formalities; and (4) the degree of control that the parent exercises over the subsidiary's marketing and operational policies. See Beech Aircraft, 751 F.2d at 120-22.
Plaintiffs refer to the website of Voest USA, which states that Voest USA "with its office in Harrison, New York — represents [Voest] in North America and serves as your local contact partner." Zimmerman Decl., Ex. 54 (emphasis in original). Additionally, the website also states that "[Voest USA] is a marketing and sales link between the members of [Voest] and its customers in North America." Id. Voest identifies Voest USA as its subsidiary, and admits having an ownership interest in it, which satisfies the first Beech factor. See Appendix of Declarations in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit H, Declaration of Dr. Hubert Possegger ¶ 14. These facts raise a legitimate questions as to whether Voest USA is either an agent or mere department of Voest, and are appropriately addressed after discovery. See Dorfman, 2001 WL 69423 at *4. Following discovery, plaintiffs will be required to establish Voest's presence in New York by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. The Court hereby allows plaintiffs limited discovery to ascertain the Court's jurisdiction over Voest through its business relationship with Voest USA.
3. VA Technologie AG
Plaintiffs allege that Va Tech is an affiliate company and shareholder of Voest. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 104. Plaintiffs assert that VA Tech's website reveals that it possesses more than a dozen affiliates in the United States, and, therefore, the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over VA Tech. See Zimmerman Decl., Exs. 56 and 57. The website, however, does not indicate that any of the affiliates are located in New York. See id. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs fail to make a prima facie case for the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over VA Tech pursuant to CPLR § 301.
4. Bohler Uddeholm
Plaintiffs allege that Bohler, because it acquired Allegheny Teledyne in 1997, is doing business in New York. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 105. According to Bohler's website, Bohler USA maintains its main sales office in Arlington Heights, Illinois, and service centers in Chicago, Cleveland, Boston and Los Angeles. See Zimmerman Decl., Ex. 59. The website, however, does not provide information suggesting that either Bohler or Bohler USA are doing business in the state of New York. Additionally, plaintiffs' complaint fails to address the nature of the business relationship between Bohler and Bohler USA. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs fail to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over Bohler.
5. CMV Aktiengesellschaft
Plaintiffs offer three factual scenarios to support their assertion that OMV is doing business in New York. First, plaintiffs allege that the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over OMV because it operates Agrolinz Inc in the United States. This argument fails. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts establishing that Agrolinz Inc. is doing business in the state of New York.
Plaintiffs further allege that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over OMV because it sells American Depository Receipts ("ADR") to U.S. investors and has designated a New York based depository for such ADR's. This argument also fails. When a foreign corporation's securities "are traded in the United States in the form of ADR's . . . that trading still do[es] not amount to continuous and systematic general business contacts sufficient to warrant the exercise of" jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR § 301. Dardana Ltd. v. A.O. Yuganskneftegaz, No. 00 Civ. 4633, 2001 WL 1131987, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2001). Additionally, a foreign corporation "is not 'doing business' in New York merely by taking ancillary steps in support of its listing on a New York exchange," Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 97, such as "designating a depository for [its] shares."Dardana Ltd., 2001 WL 1131987 at *4
Finally, plaintiffs assert that OMV is doing business in New York because its website identifies Golin-Harris Ludgate New York ("Golin-Harris") as part of OMV. See Zimmerman Decl., Ex. 60. This argument fails. Beyond providing information for contacting Golin-Harris, which is located in Manhattan, the website does not explain what business Golin-Harris engages in on behalf of OMV or the nature of the business relationship between the two companies. See id. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs fail to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over OMV.
6. Magna Steyr Investments SA
Plaintiffs allege that Magna Steyr is a manufacturer doing business in New York. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 92. According to plaintiffs, Magna Steyr is the corporate successor to Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG and manufactures automotive parts and assembles "certain Mercedes vehicles to the Jeep Cherokee." Id. Plaintiffs, however, fail to show that Magna Steyr has a business presence in New York.
Plaintiffs also claim that the Court may assert jurisdiction over Magna Steyr because Magna Entertainment Corporation ("MEC") is doing business in New York. Id. at ¶ 93. This argument is based upon the corporate relationship between three companies: Magna Steyr, MEC and Magna International. See Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law, dated December 20, 2001, at 46. Magna International is the corporate parent, Magna Steyr is a subsidiary of Magna International, and MEC is another subsidiary of Magna International. Id. MEC has no direct corporate ties with Magna Steyr, and Magna Steyr is the only company named a defendant in the complaint. Id. According to plaintiffs, MEC "is in the process of attempting to purchase New York's Off Track Betting parlors." Amended Complaint at ¶ 93. In effect, plaintiffs assert that because MEC is doing business in New York, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over Magna International, MEC's corporate parent, which, in turn, allows the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Magna Steyr because it is a subsidiary of Magna International. However, plaintiffs cite no relevant New York law that would allow the Court to exercise jurisdiction based upon this corporate structure. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs fail to state a prima facie case for the Court's exercise personal jurisdiction over Magna Steyr.
C. Personal Jurisdiction Based On New York's Insurance Law
Plaintiffs assert that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Corporate Defendants pursuant to the New York State Holocaust Victims Insurance Act of 1998 (the "Victims Act") See N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 2701-11 (McKinney 2000). The Victims Act requires certain conduct on the part of "any insurer organized, registered, licensed or accredited to do an insurance business in this state." Id. at § 2703(a). Plaintiffs, however, fail to provide the Court with facts indicating that any defendant is an insurer organized, registered, licensed or accredited to do an insurance business in New York. Therefore, the Victims Act does not provide a basis for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Corporate Defendants.
The Court finds that plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction pursuant to either CPLR § 301 or the Victims Act over VA Tech, Bohler, OMV and Magna Steyr. Accordingly, this case is dismissed with respect to VA Tech, Bohler, OMV and Magna Steyr.
IV. International Comity Concerns and Jurisdictional Discovery
Defendants contend that before ordering jurisdictional discovery against foreign defendants, international comity concerns obligate the Court to analyze how that discovery should proceed. The Court already performed such an international comity analysis in its June 5 Order, explaining that
In First City, Texas-Houston, N.A. v. Rafidain Bank, 150 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit held that when a district court determines whether a plaintiff should be allowed to conduct jurisdictional discovery, "[s]uch considerations require a delicate balancing between permitting discovery to substantiate exceptions to statutory foreign sovereign immunity and protecting a sovereign's or sovereign agency's legitimate claim to immunity from discovery." Id. at 176 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Thus, "a plaintiff may be allowed limited discovery with respect to the jurisdictional issue; but until she has shown a reasonable basis for assuming jurisdiction, she is not entitled to any other discovery." Id. (quoting Filus v. Lot Polish Airlines, 907 F.2d 1328, 1332 (2d Cir. 1990))
June 5, 2002 Order.
Additionally, conducting discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper when a defendant is a foreign litigant. See Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that "the Supreme Court expressly held that the Hague Convention did not preempt the Federal Rules with respect to discovery from foreign litigants") (citing Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 539-40, 207 S.Ct. 2542 (1987).
The Court recognized the international comity concerns implicated by such discovery, and therefore limited that discovery to a determination of whether jurisdiction exists over defendants. Accordingly, this part of defendants' motion is denied.
V. Defendants' Due Process Rights
Defendants contend that the June 5 Order overlooked their due process rights because the Court did not address their request to file a motion for a protective order. Defendants, in a letter dated March 14, 2002, informed the Court that they viewed plaintiffs' discovery requests as broad and asked the Court to stay discovery until the Court issued a ruling on the pending motions to dismiss, especially since those motions raised threshold legal issues. See Letter from Konrad L. Cailteux, Esq., to Hon. Shirley Wohl Kram, dated March 14, 2002. The June 5 Order addressed defendants' concerns because it limited the scope of discovery to the threshold issue of jurisdiction. See June 5 Order at 5. During the production of jurisdictional discovery, if defendants, upon reviewing plaintiffs' discovery requests, object to a specific item requested, they may move for appropriate relief at that time.
Defendants also contend that the Court made certain statements during the pre-trial conference held on May 22, 2002, and then issued an order which was inconsistent with those statements. Specifically, in response to defendants' statement that "the way that we can move this case along most effectively is for your Honor to decide the motions . . .," the Court indicated that deciding the motions was "the only route to go." May 22, 2002 Tr. at 10. Following the pre-trial conference, the Court, in its discretion and upon further review of the motion papers and supporting memoranda, determined that jurisdictional discovery was necessary for it to decide the threshold legal challenges presented by defendants.
Therefore, the Court finds that defendants' due process rights were not overlooked when they were ordered to engage in limited discovery. Accordingly, this part of defendants' motion is denied.
VI. Forum Non Coveniens Discovery
Defendants assert that the June 5 Order is internally inconsistent because it first stated that discovery would be limited to determining whether the Court has jurisdiction over defendants but later stated that the parties should also engage in forum non conveniens discovery. "The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a court to dismiss a claim even if the court is a permissible venue with proper jurisdiction over the claim." PT United Can Co. Ltd. v. Crown Cork Seal Co., Inc., 138 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). In this action, the Court has not yet determined whether it has proper jurisdiction over defendants. Therefore, the Court finds that defendants should not be obligated to provide discovery regarding the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Accordingly, this part of defendants' motion is granted, and the portion of the June 5 Order ordering "that the parties also engage in discovery to assist the Court in its determination of whether the complaint should be dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens, should the Court decide it has jurisdiction over this matter" is hereby deleted from the June 5 Order.
The Court notes that the original decision to conduct such discovery was done with efficiency in mind so that the parties would be spared the burden and expense of re-conducting discovery should the Court conclude that it has jurisdiction over this matter. This case involves a matter of the utmost importance to the survivors of the Holocaust, many of whom have been waiting over sixty years for redress.
VII. Leave to Amend
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides, in part, that once a responsive pleading has been served, "a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). The decision to grant or deny leave to amend lies within the Court's discretion. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227 (1962). Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend the Amended Complaint as to their claims against VA Tech, Bohler, OMV and Magna Steyr. Any such amendment must be filed within 21 days of the date of entry of this Opinion and Order.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motion for reconsideration is granted in part and denied in part. The Court grants the motions filed by VA Tech, Bohler, OMV and Magna Steyr to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs may amend the Amended Complaint, which must be filed within 21 days of the date of entry of this Opinion and Order. The parties are hereby ordered to conduct jurisdictional discovery, under the supervision of the Court, limited to determining whether: (1) the Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Austria, OIAG and Dorotheum pursuant to the FSIA; (2) the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Raiffeisen through its operation of a representative office in New York; and (3) the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Voest as a result of its business relationship with Voest USA. Jurisdictional discovery shall be completed by January 8, 2003. Furthermore, the parties are ordered to appear at a pre-trial conference on January 15, 2003.