Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b); see Whitehurst v. Wal-Mart, 306 F. App'x 446, 449 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Next Century Commc'ns Corp. v. Ellis, 318 F.3d 1023, 1027-28 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)).

. Accord Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College of Penn., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir.1991) (neither section 1654 nor Rule 17(c) permit non-lawyer parent to represent child in federal court); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986) (same); Whitehurst v. Wal-Mart, 306 F. App'x. 446 (11th Cir.2008) (same). Simply put, “parents who are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child's behalf-because it helps to ensure that children rightfully entitled to legal relief are not deprived of their day in court by unskilled, if caring, parents.” Devine, 121 F.3d at 582.

As an initial matter, contrary to Stallworth's contention otherwise, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) does not permit a parent who is not an attorney to assert claims pro se on behalf of their minor children. Devine v. Indian River County School Bd., 171 F.3d 576, 581 (11th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007); Whitehurst v. Wal-Mart, 306 F. App'x 446, 449 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Thus, because Stallworth is not an attorney, the § 1983 claims Stallworth asserts on behalf of B.E. necessarily fail and are due to be dismissed.

However, parents who are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on behalf of a minor child. See Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 582 (11th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) ("[P]arents who are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child's behalf."); Whitehurst v. Wal-Mart, 306 Fed. Appx. 446, 449 (11th Cir. 2008) ("[W]hile individuals have the right to proceed pro se, . . . and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 authorizes a conservator or guardian to sue on behalf of a minor child, . . . a non-lawyer parent has no right to represent a child in an action in the child's name."). This rule exists "because it helps to ensure that children . . . are not deprived of their day in court by unskilled, if caring, parents.").

Although "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 authorizes a conservator or guardian to sue on behalf of a minor child, a non-lawyer parent has no right to represent a child in an action in the child's name." Whitehurst v. Wal-Mart, 306 F. App'x 446, 449 (11th Cir. 2008). As Plaintiff appears to concede, the Second Amended Complaint does not allege any claims on Plaintiff's own behalf.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17. The Eleventh Circuit clarified that, although "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 authorizes a conservator or guardian to sue on behalf of a minor child, a non-lawyer parent has no right to represent a child in an action in the child's name." Whitehurst v. Wal-Mart, 306 F. App'x 446, 449 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Devine v. Indian River Cnty. School Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 581 (11th Cir. 1997)); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) ("Regardless of his persuasive powers, an advocate who is not a member of the bar may not represent clients (other than himself) in court."); Guajardo v. Luna, 432 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding court's rule that nonlawyers may not represent other people in litigation to be reasonable); 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (parties may appear on their own behalf personally or through counsel); M.D. Fla. Rule 2.01(a) ("No person shall be permitted to appear or be heard as counsel for another in any proceeding in this Court unless first admitted to practice in the Court pursuant to this rule (or heretofore admitted under prior rules of the Court).").

A defendant may remove an action before it is served with process. Whitehurst v. Wal–Mart, 306 Fed.Appx. 446, 448 (11th Cir.2008) (“[N]othing in the removal statute, or any other legal provision, requires that a defendant be served with the complaint before filing a notice of removal.”). Plaintiffs claim that Landmark and TBO's July 29, 2013, removal of this action was untimely because Defendants were served with process on June 6, 2013.

"Parents who are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child's behalf - because it helps to ensure that children rightfully entitled to legal relief are not deprived of their day in court by unskilled, if caring, parents." Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 582 (11th Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds by Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007); Whitehurst v. Wal-Mart, 306 Fed. Appx. 446, 449 (11th Cir. 2008) ("[W]hile ... Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 authorizes a conservator or guardian to sue on behalf of a minor child, Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c), a non-lawyer has no right to represent a child in an action in the child's name."); Williams v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., No. 07-0561-CG-B, 2009 WL 1767658 (S.D. Ala. June 23, 2009). Thus, any claim asserted by Williams purporting to proceed pro se on behalf of her minor children "necessarily fails."

Finally, we note that all other circuit courts that have considered this issue have reached the same conclusion. See Novak v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., NA, 783 F.3d 910, 914 (1st Cir. 2015) (per curiam) ("As far as we can tell, every one has concluded that formal service is not generally required before a defendant may file a notice of removal."); La Russo v. St. George's Univ. Sch. of Med., 747 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2014) ("Service of process upon a removing defendant is not a prerequisite to removal."); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 177 (5th Cir. 2000) (Section 1446(b) "require[s] that an action be commenced against a defendant before removal, but not that the defendant have been served."); see also Whitehurst v. Wal-Mart, 306 F. App'x 446, 448 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) ("[N]othing in the removal statute, or any other legal provision, requires that a defendant be served with the complaint before filing a notice of removal."). In sum, we hold that formal service is not a prerequisite to removal under § 1446(b)(1).

Sand Canyon removed the action within thirty days of the state court's order setting aside the default judgments and reopening the action; thus, the motion to remand was timely and proper. See Whitehurst v. Wal-Mart, 306 F. App'x 446, 448 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting that there is nothing in the removal statute, or any other legal provision, that requires service of the complaint before a defendant files a notice of removal). Burgos also challenges the district court's order granting a judgment of dismissal for Sand Canyon.